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Chapter 1
Being up for grabs – the preliminaries
Up for grabs
This is a book about what ain’t necessarily so. It is about how we can grasp, 
assimilate or come to terms with what could have been otherwise – or might 
not be at all.  Aristotle claims that we cannot know the impermanent.1 
It can be argued, from that perspective, that thought itself requires a 
measure of fixity. After all, if thought has a format akin to predication, it 
requires a subject for that predication. Indeed, metaphysics has classically 
been associated with necessities of some sort. It has typically resorted 
to substances (which endure modifications and provide reality to what 
is perceived), to substrata (hypokeimena underneath different qualities 
and predications) and to fixed principles and necessary connections: in a 
word, to one kind of arché or another. If resorting to what is necessary is 
unavoidable, there would be no metaphysics without an appeal to necessity. 
This book, drawing on the growing philosophical attention to the 
accidental, attempts to develop a metaphysics of the non-necessary. It is, in 
this sense, an exercise in anarcheology. The book’s main contention is that 
contingency is what we should primarily look at in order to ultimately come 
to terms with the sensible or the concrete. In other words, metaphysics 
should first engage with the contingent. In doing so, it attempts to provide 
positive accounts of contingency – not taking the compulsory as basic, or 
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the accidental as primarily the unsubstantial. In that sense, it contrasts 
sharply with Aristotle’s metaphysical project. (We will see below that it is an 
Aristotelian project in other senses.) The project is not to treat the accident 
itself as an absolute principle or an ultimate element to which everything 
else is to be reduced, but rather as a key to unveiling things: a key to a 
renewed, well-informed metaphysics. In other words, the idea is not to state 
the sovereignty of contingency – not even to claim merely that the accidental 
has the upper hand – but rather to spell out the details that makes possible 
its governance. Contingency is not the upper hand, but it is a primary 
component of what there is. As such, it counters Aristotle’s premise that 
metaphysics cannot exist unless there is some necessity in the sensible.2 
Aristotle’s starting point is a rejection of (what he takes to be) the 
Heraclitean image that “everything flows” in the sensible and that therefore 
there is no room for necessities of any kind.3 According to Aristotle, it 
was Plato’s adherence to this Heraclitean image of the sensible that made 
him look for (metaphysical) knowledge elsewhere, because he could see 
no necessity in matters of fact and therefore no possibility of knowledge 
of those matters of fact. The Aristotelian move was to bite the bullet and 
reject the idea that the sensible is always insubstantial. There ought to be 
sensible substances constituted by their form and matter, carrying proper 
potentialities.4 Because they carry potentialities, some of the ways in which 
they can change are necessary – they subsist in time – whereas others are 
accidental. They undergo changes while retaining what makes them what 
they are. In contrast, accidental beings cannot undergo generation or 
corruption for there is nothing substantial being achieved or lost. (Met. E, 2, 
1226b21-23) Permanence and the regular order of things are condensed in 
substances which themselves are primarily what constitute matters of fact. 
This is, in a nutshell, the Aristotelian conception of sensible substances. If 
sensible things have no substance, no change is necessary, and therefore 
nothing remains what it is. 
The Aristotelian diagnosis was that either there are substances in the 
sensible, among concrete things, or else everything is in flux. This book 
accepts the wager but rejects its thrust: it claims that there is a metaphysics 
of this flux. It holds that we have enough access to the non-necessary to 
enable something more sound than substance metaphysics. We don’t have to 
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choose between finding necessities and abandoning metaphysics. The book 
is, in this sense, a Heraclitean endeavor.5
The goal of this first chapter is twofold. While I introduce some elements 
for a metaphysics of contingency, I try to make the project of the book 
clearer. The objective is to bring together elements from several sources 
to build a mosaic where features of the inherently impermanent and 
contingent appear. As we will see, the project is Aristotelian in the sense that 
contingencies won’t appear as the building blocks everything is made of – 
like Aristotle, I don’t believe that substance is the only form of existence. 
However, I don’t approach contingency with the intent of building a general 
theory that would map onto some ultimate furniture of the universe. Rather, 
I take the contingent to exhibit itself to us in various, contrasting pictures. 
Also in a rather Aristotelian vein, these pictures relate to the accident, just 
as Aristotelian substance presented itself qua several things (qua matter, 
qua forms, qua synolos, etc.). The metaphysics of the unnecessary has to be 
investigated with care. It engages with the vulnerable realities of things that 
can be otherwise and aims at understanding what it means for something to 
be, down to its marrow, up for grabs. 
Turning ontologically towards contingency
Metaphysicians have been engaging with the accidental for quite some time. 
Hume hinted at a world without necessary connections, Leibniz was led by 
Arnauld to present an account of contingent events in terms of the rest of 
the possible world in which they belong. Schelling explored the connection 
between nature and sufficient reason, Whitehead developed a philosophy of 
process with no room for sensible substances where the creation of agents 
performs the constant production of the concrete. These voices were often 
obliterated by the overwhelming conviction that metaphysics should either 
deal primarily with necessities or boil down to thin air. A possible response 
is to equate metaphysics with thin air and attempt to move thought away 
from matters of existence. Philosophers of this persuasion have made an 
epoch by trying to exorcise all attraction to ontological issues and to find 
their ways without looking into how things are. This may be called the Era 
of the Correlate.6 Or rather, to use an apt phrase of Derrida’s, the Age 
of Hauntology,7 wherein ontology became no more than a specter. Such 
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conviction forced philosophers to circumvent ontological preoccupations 
and find alternative ways (semantic, epistemological, textual or scientific) 
to deal with issues that were once considered metaphysical. Maybe this age 
is now over. It has nevertheless contributed to our mounting intimacy with 
contingency– deconstruction, analyses of knowledge and various scientific 
endeavors have detected how the accidental haunts everything that exists. 
That such an age is maybe coming to an end is the importance of 
several ontological turns that have taken place in the last thirty years or so. 
Philosophers of many traditions have cast new eyes on metaphysical issues, 
increasingly less ashamed of doing so. The work of Saul Kripke opened 
up a new wave of metaphysical interest triggered by his account of how 
terms refer in modal contexts.8  Kripke introduced the idea that something 
can be contingent and also known a priori. This has consequences for 
disentangling epistemic and semantic issues from those related to necessity 
and its absence. Kripke’s work showed how there could be genuine necessity 
that doesn’t simply arise from analytical (or conventional) definitions. He 
presented reference-fixing as a procedure that could be distinguished from 
providing a description. The subsequent analytical ontological turn9 made 
frequent use of Kripke’s modal framework. Meanwhile, a speculative turn10 
was gestating in less analytical traditions, introducing several new ways of 
approaching ontological issues and raising issues about the absolute and 
how to attain it.
As we will see in a moment, a great deal of speculative attention has 
been paid to accidents, facticity and impermanence. They are in dialogue 
with several developments in other areas. Anthropologists have convinced 
themselves that differences among peoples are to be found in the way that 
the non-human is part of their common life. Human cultural diversity is 
not always the stable site of difference – but the very way the non-human is 
treated and become part of the collectives is itself diverse. Anthropologists 
discussing this issue found themselves swimming in ontological waters: the 
very divide between the natural and the cultural – and the ontological and 
the political – is at stake when we meet people who are unlike us.11 
Philippe Descola shows how three other dispositions concerning the 
non-human in its relation to human communities can be found apart 
from the current one embraced in modernity – where nature is the site 
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of common physicality and humanity is the site of interiority. The site of 
impermanence could be not interiority, but physicality itself. Similarly, 
political sciences (and political projects) have brought in the realm of the 
non-human, partly prompted by the demands of political ecology that 
address the import of things often thought to be beyond the communities of 
humans.12 There is no substantial nature out there, no matter the politics (or 
cultural devices) we contingently adopt. An important factor that prompted 
attention to what is beyond the human is the work of Bruno Latour, who 
conceives the effort of science as taking place genuinely in a realm shared 
by humans and other actors, in order to rethink the divide between the 
scientific communities and their objects of investigation.13
In the same vein, philosophers are called upon to rethink, from an 
ontological point of view, the divide between what seems substantial and 
what is deemed accidental, what is necessary and what is contingent, 
what is permanent and what is flexible. Maybe the divide itself – like 
that between nature and culture – is not established once and for all. In 
any case, the idea is to explore the ontology of the non-substantial – the 
non-permanent, the non-necessary. What would the world really be like 
if there were no substantiality – or no necessity of any sort? The task of 
metaphysics no longer seems to stop where the contingent starts. That there 
are more than substances in heaven and earth, Horatio, is now a matter of 
philosophical concern. 
Contingency has always been on the various intellectual menus du jour, 
often appearing solely as the opposite of the absolute. Latour himself 
suggests that our preoccupation with how permanence and transformation 
intersect is universal.14 Rather than taking the opposing pair of necessity and 
contingency as a starting point, he inquires into different modes of existence– 
a term he inherits from Etienne Souriau,15 indicating the several ways in 
which things can exist and where substantiality (or necessity, permanence) is 
only one mode among others, as we’ll explore below. Among these modes is 
metamorphosis, which exists as disruption and not as anything that subsists. 
This mode is best understood by the peoples who make room in their 
images of the world for things that can appear and disappear, things that are 
passing and whose existence is not always easily spotted. Latour claims that 
if we insist on stability as the sole or fundamental mode of existence, we lose 
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contact with the things that don’t subsist (examples would include crises, 
transitions, interruptions or climate changes, which exist only as long as they 
don’t subsist). Latour understands permanence and stability in terms of a 
mode of existence that reproduces itself. He then holds that
the thing the least well distributed in the world is not reason […] but 
rather the subtle elaborations invented by all the collectives to explore the 
crossing between the beings of reproduction and those of metamor- phosis.16 
The contrast, therefore, between these two modes of existence is a 
shared preoccupation.17 Those beings of transformation have to find room 
somewhere among those that subsist. They are akin to accidents, to the 
surprising, to what appears suddenly. We can address the non-necessary as 
something that exists as a spark.
The non-necessary is indeed revealing. It uncovers, at least, something 
about the limits of the substantial. In fact, the borders between permanence 
and disruption play a role in most attempts to look metaphysically at 
the necessary. The phrase “law-like” contrasts with “undetermined.” 
“Principled” contrasts with “unruly.” “Causal” contrasts with “casual.” 
The accidental, in its contrast with what subsists, can inform us about how 
things are stable. Maybe things endure or subsist only with respect to things 
that don’t. It is perhaps something like a Doppler effect. The frequency of 
a wave, Doppler noticed, changes only for an observer moving relative to 
its source. Change is relative to the thing that spots the change. The sound 
of a car passing is only heard by those standing still or moving more slowly. 
Perhaps, similarly, something can be other than what it is only with respect 
to something else that cannot, or at least not at the same pace (or in the 
same way). It is this contrast that is brought to light by a metaphysics of 
contingency; maybe it is not possible for everything to be non-necessary, 
or rather, for everything to be equally non-necessary. But if so, what is the 
(metaphysical) nature of this injunction? 
I have been intentionally lax about terminology thus far. I hope to 
remedy this fact throughout the chapter, but a few remarks on language are 
now in order. I use contingency as a general term.  It is neither contrary nor 
contradictory to necessity, for what contradicts necessarily P is clearly possibly 
not-P.18 Rather, something contingent is neither necessary nor impossible 
and, therefore, lacks the weight of necessity. It contrasts with the absolute. 
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Impermanence, variability and accident are symptoms of the lightness 
we’re talking about, the lightness of being that appears when, according to 
the motto made famous by Kundera’s novel, einmal ist keinmal19 – whatever 
happens just once didn’t really happen, for it carries no weight.
This lightness has spatial symptoms – the variable, the local, the 
particular20 – as much as temporal ones – the temporary,21 the passing, the 
unstable. It also has modal symptoms – the peculiar, the merely actual, the 
accidental. We can discuss lightness in terms of lack of resilience: lack of 
resilience against space variations – things that become something else in a 
different place; lack of resilience against time changes – things that become 
something else with time; and lack of resilience against variation in qualities 
and relations – things that become something else when their qualities and 
relations are removed.
The contrast between substantial and accidental is key to understanding 
the lightness of being. The accidental lacks resilience. It doesn’t subsist on 
its own, as will become clearer below. Another related contrast is worldly 
versus trans-worldly; the worldly is a denizen of a single possible world, 
the trans-worldly inhabits more than one possible world. The latter is 
often thought to point at the substratum, a hypokeimenon that underlies all 
qualities and relations.22 Now, things can be resilient against time and yet 
denizens of a single world (like Leibniz’s monads or Lewis’s individuals); 
they can enjoy some sort of worldly substantiality. In contrast, Socrates may 
exist in worlds where there is no philosophy while being himself time-bound. 
These two dimensions point at two interwoven features of the metaphysical 
lightness we’re looking at: what is contingent on time (or space) and what is 
contingent on qualities and relations. In fact, lightness of being appears in 
several formats, and it shows itself in the impermanent and in the particular 
as much as in the accidental and in the merely actual. In all these cases, we 
find an element of existential fragility. 
The accidental invokes the idea of the coincidental. Incident comes from 
cadere, what happens (just happens) or what “falls,” the way things land 
at random. Two or more things coincide if they fall somewhere together. 
A coincidence, therefore, has to do with plurality – more than one event 
happening at the same place or time. These events chance to fall – or to 
happen – together. We often find coincidences in the unplanned, when two 
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or more things lightly co-occur. Accidents have a measure of the unexpected 
– coincidences are, in a sense, accidental.
When Hume takes all succession of events to be accidental, he asserts 
that any expectation we may have of that succession is merely psychological 
(not based in reason or experience).23 Maurice Blanchot, who thinks of 
the disaster as what has been separated from its fate (astrum), conceives 
it as being out of all expectation.24 There is no future to disaster, he says, 
as it is under the sovereignty of the accidental. If the future has to do with 
what can be expected – with what is associated to the stars that govern 
calendars – accidents are not in the (foreseeable) future.25 We can at most 
say that, if there are accidents at all, accidents will happen. They have no 
place in the future, because by their nature, we cannot predict them based 
on the past. It is in this vein that Catherine Malabou writes, in her Ontology 
of the Accident, that such an ontology is a “philosophically difficult task: it 
must be acknowledged as a law […] that does not allow us to anticipate its 
instances.”26 She goes on to say that the law of the accident is “surprised by 
its own instances.”
Because of this element of surprise, it might seem that knowledge (or 
discourse) about the accidental is impossible. In any case, even before 
the contemporary drive toward rethinking the contrast between what is 
necessary and what is not, we witnessed some systematic studies of (certain 
realms of) accident. Schelling famously heralded the historical sciences as 
starting where laws go silent: for Schelling, that which follows a necessary 
law, as he conceives it, is not an object of history. Nature was then taken 
historically by the endeavors of Naturphilosophie, which paved the way for 
evolutionist biology and was in line with Huttonian geology – both historical 
to the core. In both cases, what is explored is the accumulation of accidents, 
the development of the coincidental.
Accidents constrain each other – they help some things to happen while 
pre-empting others. A contingent event could be like Blanchot’s disaster 
– surprised by its own instance – but a succession of contingent events 
display a connection, even if they cannot provide proper expectation (or a 
foreseeable future). Discourses on history – as the history of accidents – are 
known for explaining without predicting. They provide no covering laws, 
but still offer a sort of explanation, at least as much as lightness allows. 
Being up for grabs – the preliminaries 23
Stephen Jay Gould, in his Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature 
of History explores this lightness by showing how, in our narrative of the 
evolution of organisms, the crucial corners are accidents: unrepeatable 
both in time and in the closest possible worlds. 27  Manuel Delanda 
studies how geological, biological and linguistic histories have interacted 
in the last thousand years on Earth, plotting the history of the planet. 28 
He shows how indeterminacies mix together into a concatenation that, 
while being more than a series of random independent events, is less 
than a determined trajectory where each event falls as the previous event 
ordained. Contingencies coincide to weave a plot that make some events 
more likely than others. The weaving is triggered by the sheer accumulation 
of accidents, as twigs shape into a nest. This unveils something about 
contingencies: lightness somehow builds up toward a sort of gravity.
To look at this lightness is to look at something elusive. The metaphysics 
of the accidental has a family resemblance to that of the je ne sais quoi that 
Jankélevitch endeavored to bring about.29 In fact, philosophers have often 
tried directly or indirectly to engage with that which lacks solidity and seems 
to be approachable only on tiptoe. That is why this book tries to address a 
metaphysics of contingency from different angles. It looks for alternative 
ways to see the contrast between that which carries necessity and that which 
doesn’t. The lightness of being contrasts with what comes necessarily, for 
it is precisely what exists only by the skin of its teeth, not consolidated but 
lying open, exposed to the elements. 
The dismissal of necessary connections
When Hume exorcised necessary connections from an image of the world 
constructed around experience (aided by analytical judgments about 
matters of reason), he brought back the specter of a Heraclitean image of 
the sensible that Aristotle had put aside, and the message rapidly spread 
that there was no longer any business for metaphysics. Hume saw matters 
of fact as lacking any necessary connection or substantiality, or possibly any 
modality at all. Among matters of fact, he said, things just happen; there are 
nothing but actual events. In this actualist picture of the world, necessary 
connections are alien to a realm of inert distinct objects and qualities. They 
have to be found elsewhere, for this is a realm where no event necessarily 
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follows any other. The coupling of objects and qualities with necessity 
requires alien elements like human observers trained by events they perceive 
as displaying succession, concomitance or commonality. These observers 
are affected by the repetition of events – whatever is necessary is necessary 
solely to them. They introduce necessity into a realm of pure actuality. 
Metaphysics cannot be about the sensible, about matters of fact alone. It 
could perhaps be about matters of fact coupled with their observers, but 
then necessary connections migrate from ontology to psychology. 
Kant felt the need to look for necessities somewhere else, if they couldn’t 
be found in the sensible. His move was to resolutely reject any appeal to 
psychological needs, habits or instincts and rather find some sort of rational 
basis for what we perceive as necessary connections in the world. He looked 
at how our concepts intrinsically and necessarily respond to norms and 
thus make binding necessity – invoked by duties and obligations – replace 
the appeal to a necessity that is taken to be true in the world, the so-
called alethic necessity. His insight was that metaphysics could be built on 
normative necessity, which itself is (at least sufficiently) universal, instead of 
postulating necessary connections in the world. In so doing, he attempted 
to regain the lost substantiality not in the supra-sensible but rather in the 
infra-sensible, the transcendental. Substances are not sensible, but we can 
find substantiality among the concepts that make the sensible possible. Kant 
then heralded a revamped metaphysics postulating no necessity in the world. 
The idea seemed to be: metaphysics must go where necessity is – if necessity 
is nowhere, metaphysics should be abandoned; if it dwells in concepts, 
metaphysics should revolve around a description of how concepts operate.
In the last few centuries of hauntology, many philosophers have 
explored ways of abandoning metaphysics, only to find several pitfalls and 
red herrings. In fact, the Humean challenge (and the ensuing Kantian 
response) alters the landscape where metaphysics had its place and makes 
the end of metaphysics a tempting possibility. A less-explored response 
to the challenge is to rethink the ties between metaphysics and necessary 
connections between concrete things. There are at least two strategies, then. 
First, one can posit that there are necessarily no necessary connections. In 
the same vein, one can say that, necessarily, nothing is substantial. There 
may be something inherent in the structure of concrete things that make 
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substances or necessary connections impossible. If so, metaphysics would 
look at necessary principles instead of necessary things or relations among 
things. This would be a metaphysical (or maybe speculative30) explanation 
of why and how, as is written everywhere in Lars von Trier’s Antichrist, chaos 
reigns – or rather, why and how the lightness of being is itself not accidental, 
capricious or light. Necessity is necessarily absent, and it matters why this 
absence is necessary. This book, by contrast, intends to address the issue 
of sensible contingencies head on, relying neither on a general principle 
nor on an ultimate absolute. A second strategy is to stop treating the 
contrast between what is necessary and what is not as a primordial divide, 
a structuring stricture of all metaphysical horizons, a privileged vocabulary 
central to all things ontological. 
Maybe the divide can itself be illuminated, if we stop taking it as the 
starting point. Contingencies can be approached as basic, as ontological 
primitives. This book is an attempt to move in this direction. It tries to find 
ways to think about that which is up for grabs without using necessity as a 
fixed metronome. It makes use of images not oriented by a contrast with 
necessity while keeping an eye on how the absence of necessary connections 
(and of substantiality) sheds light on the lightness of being. It seeks to 
understand what is not contingent in terms of what is up for grabs – and 
not the other way around. Meillassoux argued that a factual world admits of 
apparent law-like events by exorcizing the charge of a cosmic coincidence – 
that would leave regularities unexplained.31 His exorcism involved appealing 
to the difference between what is under judgments of probability and 
what is not. Regular events are not under such judgments, and therefore 
there is no sense in saying that only miracles can explain them. This book 
provides a different solution for a slightly different problem. Facticity 
itself is elaborated, so that the verdict is not merely that hyperchaos reigns. 
Further, what is regular is accounted not in terms of the scope of probability 
arguments, but rather in terms of a metaphysics of what is up for grabs. 
Hume himself may have indicated ways in which this can be done. In a 
world of contingencies, habits are built from actual repetition that has an 
impact on what is affected by it. Repetition creates permanence in the eye 
of the beholder. Indeed, repetition could be enough to emulate much of 
what is ascribed to necessity. Repetition and expectation form a matrix very 
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different from that formed by the necessary and the contingent. I explore 
this matrix below in a rhythm-oriented ontology (see chapter 5).
Humean actualism is driven by a temptation to equate the real with the 
actual. There are no real connections but the non-necessary ones. Actualism 
is sometimes understood in opposition to dispositionalism32  – the idea 
that there are tendencies, capacities, potentialities in the world. Actualism 
postulates a world without powers, without tendencies, without capacities. 
Interestingly, here there is no room for contingency, because everything is 
equally contingent; the actualist world is modally flat. Indeed, Humeans 
think of actuality as a thin layer composed only of what happens. However, 
it can also be conceived as something denser, encompassing a tectonics 
between multiple strata. We can approach a multilayered actuality through 
Aristotle’s distinction between a first and second actuality.33 First actuality 
is related to capacities or abilities one is not exercising – like knowing 
a language one is not speaking at the moment – while second actuality 
appears when an ability or capacity is exercised. Potentiality underlies these 
actualities – second potentiality is a capacity to acquire a capacity, while 
first potentiality coincides with second actuality. This gives us three layers; 
the top two are layers of actuality. Such a tectonics can be understood in 
different ways. It gives rise to tendencies and dispositions as much as to 
finks and antidotes, understood as actual events that prevent some capacities 
to be ever exercised.34 We can think of muscle strength that is never 
exercised – never put to work, if we think of Aristotle’s word en-ergeia, often 
translated as ‘actuality’.
We can also include a tectonics of urge. An urge, like a capacity or ability, 
is actual and can be found in the pressure of a tree root against a road 
or in the drive of sugar to melt in water. It can be contained or diverted 
into something else, but it does exert an influence on the course of events. 
Urges are not necessities, but events can be explained in terms of urges 
created by other events.35 As with tectonic plates, the movement of events 
creates new urges that will make other things happen. Urges are products of 
accumulated tension built up by events, and simultaneously, they are what 
fuels events, what provokes things to happen. Lightness of being appears in 
the absence of any urges; on the other hand, an accumulation of a critical 
mass of light events can generate urges. A multilayered actuality is a way to 
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understand what is light as what is not under gravity – as out of the blue. To 
be sure, the very presence of enough things from out of the blue generates 
some weight, as the mere assembling of a number of people walking in a 
crossroad would require some of them to change their path. 
Three speculative accounts of contingency
To start broadening the metaphysical horizon of contingency, I will 
briefly sketch three recent speculative perspectives. The recent speculative 
turn has pulled the discussion, whether directly or indirectly, toward the 
insubstantiality and contingency of things. Some of the ideas guiding several 
of these thinkers, such as immanence and flat ontology – about which we 
will talk later in this introduction – revolve around how to conceive of being 
as light. This is why I see these perspectives as accounts of what it is to be 
up for grabs. What is interesting for our purposes here is that these three 
speculative perspectives are not often thought to be compatible with each 
other, yet they all capture elements of what contingency may be. This book 
enters into dialogue with these accounts because we are exploring ways to 
think about being up for grabs, and because this book dwells in speculation. 
Speculation. These three recent perspectives are speculative in the 
sense that they share a method or procedure that can be traced back to 
Alfred North Whitehead. For him, speculation is a procedure to expand 
what is known or experienced. It proceeds by taking a starting point – a 
discovered or established particular – as an example of something larger, 
more general, closer to the universal. To speculate is to enhance general 
knowledge by using particular items of knowledge as tools. According to an 
image put forward by Whitehead in the opening pages of Process and Reality, 
speculation is
like the flight of an airplane. It starts from the ground of 
particular observations; it makes a flight in the thin air of 
imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. […] 
The success […] is always to be tested by the applicability of 
its results beyond the restricted locus from which it originated. 
[…] In other words, some synoptic vision has to be gained.36
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When Whitehead extends the subjective forms associated with the 
Cartesian cogito beyond the realm of the mental, he is engaged in a 
speculative flight. Whitehead praises high flights over those that simply look 
over the airport runway. Importantly, he notices that speculation is always 
at risk of excessive ambition, which should lead not to more caution but 
rather to frequent self-correction. Speculative results are not all true, but 
whenever they are self-corrected (by other philosophical systems), they 
elicit some grains of truth. Whitehead says that speculative philosophers 
“do what they can in the way of systematization, and in the event achieve 
something. The proper test is not of finality, but of progress.”37 In that sense 
as well, this book is a speculative exercise. It tries to broaden the particulars 
we know about what is up for grabs so that we can view the issue through a 
wider lens. 
The first speculative perspective on contingency I would like to mention 
comes from Whitehead himself, and from the so-called philosophy of 
process. There has recently been a remarkable surge in interest in both 
Whitehead and process philosophy in general.38 I take the central idea in 
terms of processes: reality itself is nothing but the processes that sustain it. 
This is an idea put forward not only by Whitehead’s notion of organism but 
also by Gilbert Simondon’s notions of transduction and meta-stability,39 
Souriau’s notion of instauration,40 and Latour’s conception of gradients 
of resistance.41 The reality of anything can only be explained in terms the 
processes that make it possible – there are no ultimate principles that are 
out of the reach of existing processes. Nothing is separate from the processes 
that maintain it; maintenance is typically not internal to a thing but rather 
dependent on something external. There are no substances causa sui, but 
rather the model of being is what after Souriau, calls “being-as-other”.42 As a 
consequence, being is always in the hands of the processes that maintain it – 
it relies on the rest of the world. There are no permanent (concrete) things; 
something sensible can be permanent only if it is sponsored43 to be so by 
external processes.
Simondon’s diagnosis is that Aristotle was wrong when he claimed that 
conceiving sensible substances was the only alternative to Heraclitus’s view 
of matters of fact as in flux. Meta-stability – the idea that bits of the flux 
stabilize others – is an alternative to both the stability of substances and the 
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unruliness of flux. Substances are replaced by something else – called actual 
entities, or actors, or even monads (see chapter 1 below) – that are what 
they are only while relevant sustaining processes are taking place. Nothing 
is either destined or disposed to last over time – everything is simply actual, 
existing only while sponsored. Whitehead conceives his actual entities to be 
basic, but they are concrete things constantly becoming other actual entities 
under the influence of other, contemporary actual entities. To trace what 
becomes concrete – in his words, to trace the routes of concrescence – one 
has to focus on actual entities and their actions. Latour prefers to look at 
things as relative to tests of resistance – any actor can dissolve into a network 
of actors given sufficiently stringent tests of resistance that makes its unity 
collapse, and analogously, a network can act as a unit given less stringent 
tests of resistance. In any case, it is subsistence that needs to be explained, 
because substantiality – that some things tend to subsist – is not taken 
for granted. 
Process philosophy has no room for either substantiality or for 
necessary connections. Nothing exists by itself or without the concourse of 
a (concrete) sponsor. This doesn’t mean that each actual entity – or each 
actor – is under no determination. Necessary connections are replaced 
by maintained connections – and these need sponsors. Substantiality is 
replaced by enforced subsisting. This move, championed by Simondon, is an 
indispensable tool for a metaphysics of contingency. Not that anything goes, 
nor that nothing holds, but rather that there is a cost for things to be as they 
are – a worldly cost. (Simondon’s word is allagmatics, which comes from the 
Greek alagma, a word that translates into English as “costs.”)
Lightness of being, process-philosophy style, is something akin to what 
Sartre called pour soi – that which does not have an essence preceding its 
existence. In fact, in his analysis of bad faith, he takes it to be double-edged: 
we deceive ourselves by treating ourselves as transcendent as much as by 
treating ourselves as objects of pure will, not shaped by facticity.44 Similarly, 
actual entities are light not because anything can happen to them but rather 
because they escape both substantiality and pure flux. Interestingly, Sartre 
talks about a transcendence-facticity meta-stability – bad faith is found both 
in not recognizing ourselves as our own sponsors and in taking ourselves to 
be our only sponsors.45 Process philosophy can be regarded as coming from 
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this kind of speculative step: from the meta-stability of human consciousness 
to the sponsored character of all connections. Latour captures this last 
idea through his principle of irreduction.46 It states that nothing is in itself 
either reducible or irreducible to anything else. Anything can be reduced 
or taken to be peculiar or irreducible, but either way, there is a cost – there 
is a process behind it. In other words, someone or something has to go 
through the process of reducing one thing to another. Exorcising reducibility 
(and irreducibility) is itself a way to approach a world without necessary 
connections – nothing boils down to anything necessarily, and if a reduction 
is available, it is provided (or sponsored) by something else. All reductions 
(and irreductions) are contingent on something.
The second speculative perspective on contingency is the idea of a 
principle of unreason or insufficient reason. Sufficient reason is often 
taken to be what swings things toward a given state of affairs. A principle 
of insufficient reason holds that nothing swings anything toward any state 
of affairs. Meillassoux defends this principle as necessary; he also calls 
the principle facticity.47 He holds that, necessarily, there are no necessary 
connections. Things are not contingent on other things, but rather they 
are unmoved by anything and therefore can be consistently one way or 
another. Philosophy, he says, has been trapped by correlationism – the idea 
that there is no way out of the correlation between a subject and the world, 
that we cannot access anything beyond such correlation or perhaps even 
think beyond it. Starting from Hume’s criticisms of necessary connections, 
Meillassoux advocates that a world without them is a world without any 
form of sufficient reason for anything. Kant’s reaction to Hume was to recoil 
upon an environment determined by the correlation between thought and 
world.  Such correlation displays a primacy over anything else we can access 
(and therefore taints every access) and a facticity, as they are simply matters 
of fact, no correlation is necessary. These are two features of correlations – 
they can neither be dismissed, nor treated as absolute, as necessary.
Meillassoux applies the speculative method not to correlations 
themselves but to their facticity. This is crucial, because it parts ways 
with process philosophy: through a speculative procedure performed 
on correlation itself, correlation is made absolute. Process philosophy 
therefore betrays the lessons of correlationism, because no correlation – 
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human or otherwise – is to be taken as a necessary piece in the furniture 
of the universe. Meillassoux’s alternative speculative step – beginning 
in the facticity enjoyed by any correlation, according to the lessons of 
correlationism – enables him to justify his principle of unreason. Everything 
is necessarily up for grabs, except that very principle. The principle of 
unreason is, therefore, the only absolute that speculative reason can attain. 
It follows that a principle guarantees the contingency of things. Things are 
not factual because they are left to their own devices with nothing sustaining 
them; they are made contingent by a necessary principle. 
Meillassoux’s unpublished manuscript The Divine Inexistence48 contains 
further contributions to the philosophy of contingency. He makes explicit 
some of the consequences of his principle of unreason – especially the 
eventual birth of God and a subsequent advent of a “World of Justice.” The 
advent of God changing everything in the world can happen at any moment 
and we can hope for it because, everything being factial, nothing prevents 
it. The principle of facticity runs above the eventual advent of God and 
cannot be overruled by no fact in the world – including the advent of God. 
Meillassoux explores the possibility that God is not a necessary being under 
which everything is contingent – God can render necessary truths false – but 
rather that God himself is under a principle of facticity. Facticity is not up 
for grabs, not even God can dispel it. Meillassoux takes it to be absolute, 
a genuine anarchiste couronné, a guarantor that nothing else will prevail. 
Facticity is the very fabric of things. Through it, Matter was followed by 
Life, Life by Reason – each one forming what he calls a World – and Reason 
can be followed by Justice. The lightness of being is what makes things 
emerge – it acts as a transcendent principle that imposes itself on everything.
After Whitehead and Meillassoux, the final speculative perspective on 
contingency I will mention for now is the appeal to a history of light beings. 
Iain Hamilton Grant has used the sciences of the accidental, mentioned 
above, to establish a speculative image of layers of contingency.49 He draws 
on Schelling’s image of natural history to place nature as the home of the 
undetermined, and he says that it cannot be approached without taking 
its layers into consideration. It is like a floor, it grounds and it keeps track 
of what it has grounded through the marks that constitute it. Further, it 
is not an ultimate, necessary layer that grounds all the others, but merely 
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actual layers that hold all the others. There are sufficient reasons in these 
layers – not necessary connections, but elements that lead the state of 
affairs to lean one way or another. For Grant, nature itself is the principle 
of sufficient reason. There is no reason to be found anywhere but in nature 
and its history. Nature is subject to a tectonics where each layer depends on 
the previous one. Contingency is not a principle that assures the lightness 
of everything, nor something that is itself up for grabs, but rather an 
embodiment of nature. To be natural – which amounts to being sensible – is 
to exist under the embodied principle of sufficient reason, the very stuff of 
which every ontogenesis is made.
Such an embodied principle – of sufficient reason – makes a contrast 
with the other two speculative perspectives. Grant appeals to the 
unconditioned (Schelling’s Unbedingt) – which is both the unconstrained 
and what is not a thing – as a general framework for contingency. Nature 
itself is therefore substantial and, as the unconditioned, it is not sponsored 
by anything – except itself. It is substantial, albeit ever-changing and built 
on non-necessities. In this sense, we are closer to Meillassoux’s principle of 
facticity than to process philosophy. However, unlike speculative facticity, 
this perspective takes the lightness of being to have a genetic element. Any 
(concrete) ontogenesis – the coming to being of things, relations or events 
– takes place within nature, where all contingencies have left their mark. 
Grant explores the line from Meillassoux’s position to his own endorsement 
of nature as sufficient reason. He comments on Meillassoux’s thesis that 
contingency is the only necessity, according to which there is no single 
reason for what exists and how it exists. Apparently denial of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, Meillassoux’s claim is in fact expressly designed to satisfy 
it, albeit paradoxically. Yet the character of the question is irrevocably altered 
if it is asked what grounds any particular satisfaction of the principle; or 
again, as Meillassoux notes, what necessitates contingency in nature. Now 
this recursivity or regress might be held to afflict any putative satisfaction 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; but it indicates that although the 
Principle [...] is logically satisfied, it is not, nor can it be, really or materially 
satisfied by reason alone.50 
Natural history is a series of accidents that disfigures whatever is taken 
to be particular substances. However, it is, crucially, a series. The principle 
Being up for grabs – the preliminaries 33
of facticity is untenable without appeal to sufficient reason, because any 
facticity originates in facts of nature. There is a fully historical place where 
things happen, and there is no reason beyond it. Being up for grabs is being 
open to history, because the up for grabs is fully at home in the aggregate of 
layered contingencies that makes up nature. 
Communitas and immunization
Being up for grabs is related to an expression frequently used by Bataille: 
mettre en jeu.51 This phrase could be interpreted as meaning to put at risk, or 
rather to dare or to go beyond one’s own will to subsist or conserve. Daring, 
in this sense, is the opposite of protecting and therefore of maintaining 
something that subsists. It can be thought of as going beyond substance, 
or beyond what subsists. Bataille would have it that the serf is someone 
who prefers not to mettre en jeu her life – would prefer to conserve it, and 
by doing so engages in a relation of subservience in order to be immune to 
threats on her life. Serfdom appears as a device where one’s life is preserved 
in exchange for some service – for the performance of some task, some duty. 
Looking beyond life, facing death on its face, one reaches beyond serfdom 
by a mise en jeu of one’s preservation. Such mise en jeu contrasts with 
immunity: to take risks is to be affected and not protected.  
Roberto Esposito explores the difference between connection and 
independence in terms of communitas and immunitas.52 His purpose is to 
analyze associations and how external ties constitute individuals. His work 
is based on the Latin etymological origin of both these words – munus (or 
munia). Munus translates to “task” or “law,” or rather to “duty,” in the sense 
of binding obligation. It is not about any non-constitutive relation, but about 
a binding necessity, something akin to a law that is intrinsic to something 
communal. It is about ties that constitute an individual as dependent on 
something else. To be in a community, Esposito stresses, means already 
to be bound by a law that makes sure the community members provide a 
munus. Communitas is something reciprocal, intrinsically capable of both 
affecting and being affected. Munus is a two-way road: its law requires 
something from both parts. If someone is in a community, she has duties 
over others and others have duties toward her.
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By contrast, to be immune is to be out of the scope of any munus. 
Someone is immune if no munus, no reciprocal lawful duty, applies to her. 
To be immune is to be out of the scope of a community. Typically, this 
means not being affected by the community, being out of reach, because 
there is no binding law making the connection. Immunity means not 
having to be affected by the community – it therefore spells detachment, 
independence and indifference toward what takes place elsewhere. To be out 
of the reach of a community is to be free of any binding interference from it, 
and also to be closed to it. 
Esposito’s remarks about the difference between community and 
immunity – and about the process of immunization, through which someone 
gains the means to subsist on her own – are addressed to biopolitical issues 
concerning common life. Now, although they are framed as pertaining to 
human associations, these categories can illuminate issues concerning modal 
ontology, in particular ascriptions of necessity and contingency. I believe 
they can be applied to any association whatsoever, as there is an ontological 
dimension to communitas and immunitas. Consider how Gabriel Tarde 
understood societies in general: non-human beings such as bees – but also 
molecules, stars and even objects in general – form societies with different 
degrees of internal cohesion.53 Cohesion will soon prove relevant to an 
ontology of contingency: whenever there is a great degree of cohesion, we 
can say that things are contingent on each other’s existence. Objects, events, 
relations and qualities can be intrinsically at the mercy of others – and hence 
under the effect of a munus. 
On the other hand, if they are somehow untouchable then they are 
immune to anything else. To be sure, something can be immune to others 
and have an effect on them, but such effects are not bound by reciprocity. 
The effect would therefore not be affected by any (temporal or modal) 
difference in the community. If something is immune to everything – say, 
a principle or a necessary connection – it is not under any influence and, if 
it interferes with something else, it does so irrespective of what is under its 
influence. It would interfere in whatever is under its scope. It is not sensible 
to any difference in the community it can affect, and is not up for grabs.54 
Indeed, the contrast between community and immunity unveils some 
features about the lightness of being. While communitas involves openness 
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to others, necessity – and necessary connections – seems to have something 
important to do with immunity. Something is necessary if it affects things 
while not being affected by them (and not being affected by the way it 
affects things). Necessity seems, in fact, to be close to indifference, to 
unreachability. But notice that only what is under a necessity is immune: 
what imposes the necessity is not immune. In order for something to 
impose necessity – provided that it doesn’t do so out of necessity – a certain 
freedom of action is required. A non-necessary start, as we will see in the 
next chapter, is one that could have been otherwise. As such, it can be 
affected and is exposed to the elements – it is up for grabs. This is a central 
issue for the purposes of this book: what is up for grabs contrasts with what 
is immune. It can be affected. 
To gain more intuition into how close necessity is to immunitas, I’ll 
consider some simple examples where we ordinarily distinguish cases of 
necessity and non-necessity. I’ll make oversimplifying assumptions that 
will ignore, for the moment, the bite of Quine’s criticisms of the analytic-
synthetic duality and its consequences for a distinction between facts and 
meanings.55 Consider these two sentences:
1. A triangle has three angles adding up to 180 degrees, and 
2. Adam has sinned. 
The first is ordinarily taken to be necessary, while the second is not. Now, 
1 is independent of any fact (except, of course, facts about how to define 
triangles or how to measure degrees, but we are assuming the fact/meaning 
divide that Quine appropriately criticized). Sentence 2, on the other hand, 
depends on facts about the serpent, Eve, the apple tree, God, and all sorts 
of other things about Eden (and beyond). Sentence 1 can be taken as a fact 
immune to the influence of any other fact in the world – it doesn’t depend 
on the color, the texture or the components of any triangle. It also affects 
triangles irrespective of their color, texture or composition. It is thought to 
be necessary because it is thought not to be up for grabs, to be unreachable, 
so that nothing can change it. An epistemological consequence of this is 
that no fact about our empirical knowledge – no way of carving the world 
or measuring quantities – will affect our acceptance of it. Interestingly, one 
of Quine’s points can be rendered like this: our belief in Sentence 1 (or our 
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capacity to safely commit to Sentence 1) is not really immune. Rather, we 
immunize it by protecting it from the verdict of a tribunal of experience that 
can impose beliefs on us only to the extent that they don’t affect Sentence 1. 
In other words, the verdict of experience is such that it can be deflected so 
as not to hit Sentence 1. There is a protective veil around it that needs to be 
maintained – its immunity requires sponsors. Quine’s image is that we place 
Sentence 1 in the center of a sphere whose edges touch experience, and we 
protect Sentence 1 from being revised by experience by making the verdict 
challenge instead whatever we have placed closer to the edge of the sphere.56 
It is a process of immunization. 
On the other hand, Sentence 2 is often taken not to be a necessary 
but rather a contingent matter of fact. That Adam sinned was once up 
for grabs by the serpent, Eve, or whomever else. There is no immunity, 
no unreachability. I choose this example because it comes from Leibniz, 
especially in his correspondence with Arnauld.57 Leibniz argues that 
Sentence 2 is tied to the rest of the world by a modality that he understands 
as co-possibility – Adam is tied to sin by the world in which he is. Therefore, 
Leibniz emphasizes, God doesn’t create an Adam who is a sinner, but rather 
He creates a world where Adam has sinned – not an immune fact, but 
something that was in a community with everything else in its world.58 The 
creation was of a community, and not of isolated, unreachable facts.
Deleuze in his book The Fold, echoing a movement already present in 
Difference and Repetition, makes use of a notion of virtuality connected to 
contingency.59 Something is virtual when it depends on everything else 
in the world – for example, that metal expands when heated depends on 
several other contributing factors; it is only when we take it in isolation from 
everything else that we can say it is the case. Most laws of physics depend 
on supporting conditions (i.e., atmospheric states, gravitation, friction, etc.); 
they are virtual and therefore often only strictly true in lab conditions.60 The 
virtual is contingent upon many things, just as “Adam sins” is, for Leibniz, 
contingent upon the (rest of the) world. We can then reckon that knowledge 
of the virtual is always tentative, as it depends on knowing everything 
else, which is unlikely. Knowing something virtual is not enough to make 
predictions, unless they involve ceteris paribus conditions. This is a way to 
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link the contingent, the virtual – what lacks in immunitas – on one side and a 
posteriori knowledge on the other.
Indeed, a posteriori knowledge is typically regarded as revisable. It 
relies on experience and, as such, it gathers information from particular 
events and occurrences. Before Kripke established the possibility of 
necessities a posteriori, empirical knowledge was generally considered to be 
knowledge of contingencies, and therefore only applicable to things that are 
accidental.61Accordingly metaphysics, understood as an endeavor about the 
necessary, could not rely on any empirical knowledge. To the measure that 
it attains contingency, a posteriori knowledge is knowledge of virtualities. I 
know that the sun will rise tomorrow, but only based on my expectation, 
which can be met with disappointment from any corner of the world. 
Something I am not aware of can change the movement of the planets: an 
asteroid, a distant celestial body, a cosmic phenomenon, a God or even a 
Mallarméan throw of the dice, which Meillassoux interprets as an episode 
of his own concept of hyperchaos. In any case, something else affected the 
rising of the sun; it is not immune to everything. It is up for grabs. 
The so-called knowledge of necessary truths (if we disregard Kripkean a 
posteriori necessities for a bit longer) is knowledge of a content that nothing 
can affect. Logical (and semantical or analytical) truths are thought to be 
truths that nothing can overcome. If we attain them, nothing can affect 
our knowledge; it is knowledge of something fully immune to all facts, and 
that knowledge is fully immune itself. From a Humean point of view, these 
immune pieces of knowledge are about matters of reason, knowledge of 
which no fact can interfere with and no tide of randomness can disrupt. 
Except, of course, Meillassoux’s facticity – but then, of course, Meillassoux 
claims that nothing but his principle of facticity displays full immunity. 
Immunitas is missing in anything up for grabs. To know something with 
immunitas, if it is possible at all, is to know something distinct and apart 
from the rest of the world, knowledge that stands alone. Because it is about 
something independent from anything else, it is sheltered, protected from 
erosion by facts.
The vocabulary of immunitas and communitas has an important feature 
that can help us understand contingency. It admits of degrees: something 
can be more immune than something else. We might say, for example, 
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that Sentence 1 above is more immune than Sentence 2. To accommodate 
lessons from Quine about no fact grounding the distinction between matters 
of fact and matters of reason, we might say that Sentence 1, taken as a 
sentence or a belief, is immunized by language-users who protect it from 
easy revision via experience. Similarly, we can consider Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities such as:
3. The morning star is the evening star.
It surely depends on the way the reference of “morning star” and “evening 
star” is fixed. Given what we refer to with these terms, Sentence 3 is, 
according to Kripke, a necessary fact. It is immune to anything except 
changes in the ways the terms denote. The notion of immunity can provide, 
in this case as in others, a fine-grained way to determine what facts and 
propositions are contingent upon. Necessity can be taken as a matter of 
degree, as Paul Churchland among others has suggested analyticity should 
be treated.62 Things are contingent upon some things but not upon others. If 
we find a way to fix the denotation of the terms in Sentence 3, we immunize 
Sentence 3 from anything else. If “morning star” refers to Phosphorus and 
“evening star” to Phosphorus, they are the same, come what may. 
Immunization is a procedure by means of which something is protected 
from (some) risks; it is made more secure by the provision that whatever 
elements are doing the immunizing endure. Degrees of immunity can be 
conceived in terms of instauration, as an effect of sponsors. We can also 
think of them in terms of meta-stability: something is meta-stable if it is 
not immune in itself but it is immunized by something else. Degrees of 
immunity, the vocabulary of communitas notwithstanding, can also be seen 
in terms of brute likelihoods; something is more immune if it is simply 
less likely to change (or not to repeat itself), independent of any other fact 
or event in the world. In any case, relative immunity is a way to deal with 
lightness of being as a quantity. It also fits into the Doppler effect analogy 
drawn above: things can be more or less contingent with respect to a 
reference element. The more contingent something is, the less strongly it is 
tied to what it is; it follows the trends. We can understand to what degree it 
is up in the air and to what degree it stands on its own in terms of immunity.
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Substances and substrata can both also be understood in terms of 
immunity. The former are sometimes taken to be what subsists in time, 
while the latter are what subsists when qualities and relations are removed – 
what subsists when moved to another possible world. The former is trans-
temporal, the latter trans-worldly. Substances are whatever is immune to the 
passing of time. They keep their identities, immune to change. Events occur 
without affecting the substance, which is sheltered and resists whatever 
happens. Thus, the substance of a wooden chair is constant, no matter 
its changes in color. Substrata are whatever is immune to qualities and 
relations and their possible changes. The wooden chair would keep the same 
substratum if it had a different color altogether. A substratum, accordingly, 
is what often makes something retain its identity in different possible worlds. 
Thanks to a substratum immune to any properties, a particular is the same 
no matter what universally applicable predications it acquires. It is immune 
because it lies under any of its properties – a hypokeimenon. As I mentioned 
above, Leibniz’s substances have no substrata; they are worldly, even though 
they subsist in time. There is something in each monad that is immune to 
events while attached to a particular world.
The same distinction can be drawn concerning relations. Some relations 
are trans-temporal and subsist no matter what accompanies them. Causal 
relations are often thought to be substantial in this sense – and it is 
arguable that this was primarily the target of Hume’s attacks. We can say, 
nevertheless, that “metal expands when heated” is a virtuality that endures 
through changes in time, even if it does not hold in all possible worlds. It 
may be contingent upon the rest of the world, but if it stands as a virtuality, 
it resists changes in time; it is at least strongly immunized.
Other relations are trans-worldly and subsist in all possible worlds. 
These are thought to be logical (and sometimes semantical) necessities 
like Sentence 1 above or a posteriori necessities like Sentence 3. They are 
immune to circumstances – or at least immunized to their effects. The 
difference between these two types of immunized relations – we can call 
them substantial and substrating relations – is the crux of the difference that 
Kit Fine defends between natural and metaphysical necessity.63 Natural 
necessity, like substantial relations, is typically worldly, while metaphysical 
necessity holds in all possible worlds. Kripkeans tend to suspect that at 
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least some natural necessities – some laws, for example – are metaphysical 
necessities discovered empirically. Fine argues that this can sometimes 
occur, but he doesn’t generalize. In any case, we can understand the 
distinction in terms of immunitas: relations that are only immunized against 
travels through time and those that are further immunized against travels 
through the world.64
Being up in the air
It is clear by now that lightness of being, even apart from whether it is 
a matter of degrees, admits of modes. Something can be up for grabs, 
for example, if compared with an immunized substance or if compared 
only with an immunized substratum. As there are varieties and modes of 
necessity, there are corresponding types of non-necessity. Further, as we 
will see, there is a lightness of being that doesn’t fit into the contrast with 
necessity. For our main purpose in this book, we will look at the contrast 
to find out what makes it hold. One piece of this jigsaw puzzle is the notion 
of self-abandonment – being in something else’s hands. (We will see below 
how this notion is related to Plato’s rejection of the  Parmenidean idea that 
to be at all is to be substantial.) Self-abandonment means that something is 
not specially protected by its own nature but rather mise en jeu. Rainer Maria 
Rilke, in the letters from Muzot65 rendered famous among philosophers by 
Heidegger’s commentaries66, depicts it well:
[...] Nature gives other creatures over 
to the venture of their dim delight 
and in soil and branchwork grants none special cover [...].67
In Rilke’s image, nature leaves its creations up for grabs, not giving 
them any special cover against the ventures he mentions. Rilke continues by 
saying that our nature doesn’t give us any special cover against risk, either. It 
is not that we are forsaken by something external; it is rather a case of self-
abandonment, a theme that Rilke explored for example in his Duino Elegies, 
where he talks about the Verlassenen – the forsaken. Heidegger has also 
elaborated it under the category of Verlassenheit – a sort of solitude of being 
but also a lack of protection. Heidegger talks about the opposition between 
cura, that which needs care, and sine cura, that which does not – that 
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which is secure.68 Security relates to immunity, while the insecure requires 
(sponsoring) care to continue being what it is. It is not especially protected 
by something like a substance or a necessary connection; it rather requires 
care of what is abandoned. There is, nonetheless, another element to 
Verlassenheit – it points at a tonality of inertia. Even without care – without, 
say, the work of its sponsors – a forsaken being can carry on, in sheer 
availability. Something can persist in a fragile state, abandoned, vulnerable 
and up for grabs. This is why mortality falls within the horizon of what 
doesn’t subsist on its own.69 It involves a measure of being up in the air.
There is a dimension to immunitas of not being exposed, of being closed, 
locked in and somehow protected. When something is fully determined, it 
is protected, sheltered, immunized. Substances (and substrata, necessary 
connections) display a kind of aloofness where nothing around them matters 
– for they are causa sui. Lack of immunitas, by contrast, comes with this 
openness, this exposure to the elements and this measure of availability 
that Rilke is considering. Being light is being at something else’s disposal, 
as if there were a weight that could not be carried on one’s own. Too light 
to persist, and yet persisting. Indeed, if we take immunity as a protection, 
whatever is not immune displays a sort of availability, a being left to the 
world. Up in the air.70 Things left available are unsecured, like something 
that was thrown away and has nothing holding it. It is being in the Offene –
the Open– that Rilke also often refers to in his poems.71 To be in the Open is 
to be in a state of availability where there are no ontological locks or fences. 
Whatever exists in the Open co-exists – being there is being in co-existence. 
Therefore, nothing in the Open has a fixed, inborn upper hand. It is a realm 
of what Jonathan Schaffer calls priority nihilism: nothing is metaphysically 
prior to anything else.72 We can put it in terms of government, of arché: what 
is at other things’ disposal is not under anything else in particular; nothing 
governs it and therefore everything can govern it. 
This being up in the air, with its openness or availability and this sense 
of being thrown into the world, can also be said to constitute a space of 
interdependence. Things are abandoned if anything can take control over 
them. An ontology of contingent things is akin to what Manuel DeLanda 
calls a flat ontology: the elements of the world differ in spatio-temporal scale 
but not in ontological status.73 The absence of necessary connection leads 
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to an open world, with no priorities or differences in ontological status to 
shape a previously structured landscape. This flat space where things are 
equally at stake turns up in many accounts of contingency. Tristan Garcia 
crafts a plan d´égalité – a plane of equality – where things are present not as 
what they are but rather because they all harbor a n´importe quoi – no matter 
what – that enables everything to be something else.74 This plane is a surface 
on which all things are at the same footing.
 The notion recalls many aspects of what Deleuze and Guattari termed 
the plane of immanence, a plane where all different plans are executed.75 The 
plane is like an ontological street everything has to pass along in order to do 
its business. While in the street, it is exposed to the elements.76 The upshot 
here is that everything has to go through a space of contingencies in order to 
be what it is. In order to have an effect on the world, a thing must become 
available in order to be affected. The lesson can be explored in many ways 
– and it will throughout the book. In any case, to be thrown into the world 
– into the sensible, concrete world – is to be thrown among the accidents. 
Even a substance has to dwell in accidents if it is to reach the realm of 
concreta. It is as if anything must first meet the force of contingencies before 
it can affect the sensible – either Plato’s intelligible substances play no part 
(metexis) in concrete things or they come down corrupted by accidents. The 
pull of these accidents is the scope of an ontology of Verlassenheit. 
Automaton
Another dimension of contingency has to do with what is not subsumed, 
what is not under anything else. The not-subsumed is what contrasts 
with what is in serfdom – and therefore is mise en jeu. Considering 
necessity in terms of subsumption makes explicit the political character 
of the ontological discussions concerning contingency – what is under a 
government is also protected, put in security, safeguarded because it is 
governed (as chapter 2 explores). Thinking in terms of arché, what is not 
(especially) protected is not subsumed. It follows that what is thrown into 
the world is left to its own devices. Something is light if it doesn’t have the 
pull of a determination immunizing it from further interferences, but by the 
same token, something is light because it is not determined. This double-
aspect character of contingency can be seen more clearly if we think of it in 
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terms of the ungoverned. Something ungoverned has to fend for itself – it 
is not immunized, not sine cura – and at the same time it is left unruled, 
without arché.
In Book Z of the Metaphysics, Aristotle considers how substances 
are generated out of other substances and says that such transformation 
(gignomenon) can take place due to physis, to techné or to automaton.77 This 
last is a very interesting word – it is sometimes translated as “chance,” 
sometimes as “spontaneity”; things can be generated by chance or 
spontaneously.78 Automaton is also the origin of the automatic; indeed, 
sometimes we consider that which is not controlled to be automatic. 
According to Aristotle, whatever is not generated by nature or manufactured 
by people is brought up by something, not subsumed by anything else. It 
is planned neither by manufacture nor by a natural process – therefore, it 
happens in an ungoverned manner. Excluded from the produce of nature 
and manufacture, it is an accident.
The word automaton points at processes that are either indeterminate 
(associated with chance) or self-determined (associated with spontaneity). 
We can indeed draw a line between things that are self-governed, and 
therefore autonomous, and things that are thoroughly under no government, 
and therefore in anomy. For some reason, Aristotle clusters together what 
seems to be two different cases. It is interesting to notice that something 
that is generated by automaton is somehow originated motu proprio, that is, 
without an external need. What seems to be important for Aristotle is that 
those gignomenon are not ruled either by physis or by techné – these external 
bodies do not govern them. In any case, there is no heteronomy, either by 
humans or by nature – nothing governs the automaton, even though it can be 
susceptible to interference from elsewhere. Is it up for grabs? 
Aristotle opposes automaton to physis (and techné). Physis governs a 
thing’s nature, and if something follows its nature it is acting causa sui; 
a nature holds it as it is. Aristotle clearly doesn’t conceive of physis as 
abandonment. In contrast, generation by automaton is not governed by any 
nature, and it is under no rule, except for self-imposed ones. But then if X 
imposes a rule on itself, X, as a ruler, is not governed (it is self-determined; 
nothing external causes it). X, as a ruler, is left to its own devices and is not 
causa sui, not immune. By contrast, X as the ruled is immune to anything 
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apart from its ruler, that is, itself. X, the ruled, is governed, while X, the 
ruler, is susceptible. Overall, X is not governed except by itself. This is 
also what is meant by absence of government: nothing rules, except if we 
consider self-rule. The automaton X, whether governed by itself or not, is 
up for grabs.
To be sure, this flies in the face of some central Kantian doctrines. Kant 
made a lot out of the difference he drew between indetermination and self-
determination. He would say that if X, the ruler, is free, it would respond to 
a deontic necessity – a moral law. It is therefore not contingent on anything 
but the moral law. If this is so, it seems an automaton is not up for grabs, as 
it cannot be affected by any (non-moral) element. But this is because X, the 
ruler, is then (morally) governed, as another necessity has been introduced. 
(One could say that the nature, the physis, of whatever is free is to follow its 
moral law. If it is so, Kantian self-determination falls short of being a case of 
a genuine gignomenon through automaton.)
The parricide 
When we look at what is up for grabs, we face the legacy of the Stranger’s 
parricide in Plato’s Sophist: something can be, full-bloodedly, while not 
being substantial. Parmenides held that being cannot come in more than 
one variety: substantiality.79 To exist at all, a thing must be self-standing, 
unchangeable and tied to necessity. In fact, the description of being in 
Fragment 8 presents arguably all the features of a substance:
[…] what is is uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, 
immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for 
now it is, all at once, a continuous one.
There is no change or transformation in being; nothing affects it, nothing 
moves it, it is inviolable. It has no dealings with any other thing, nor does 
it relate to nothingness, and so it could never have come into being, for if 
“it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.” It 
follows that the flow, whatever is in flux and not permanent, does not exist. 
Existence doesn’t come into being. It has no origin. Parmenides proceeds:
[…f]or what kind of origin for it wilt thou look for? In what 
way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? 
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[…] And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made 
it arise later rather than sooner? 
Only being creates being. Any other origin of being is outside the scope of 
what can possibly be. Therefore, existence admits of no degrees, no varieties, 
no modes, no gradations, for it must “either be altogether or be not at all.” 
Being is described as compact, with no parts and no division, nor is there 
a divide between what falls within its border and what does not. It is pure 
interior, for “everything is full of what is.” In contrast, nothingness has no 
interior – it is like complete emptiness, with nothing inside anything. One 
of the corollaries of Parmenides’s allegiance to being as substance can be 
expressed in a motto: to be is to have a (compact, dense and self-standing) 
interior. The connection between existence and substance is an ontological 
privilege of what comes from inside as opposed to what is affected by the 
outside. Because its substance lies in its interior, being is self-sufficient, and 
“rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself.” Hence, he takes it to be
[…] complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, 
equally poised from the center in every direction; for it cannot 
be greater or smaller in one place than in another.
He proceeds:
[…] it remains constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps 
it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. 
Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is 
in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in 
need of everything.
Being, therefore, is neither an assemblage of what there is nor the origin of 
everything, but rather what is kept in place by “hard necessity.”
This necessity – which arguably has to do with enabling predicative 
thought – is what makes substance what it is. It both constitutes being and 
keeps it as it is. Parmenidean being (or substantial being, as we can call it) is 
not an automaton, for it is driven by an internal necessity that doesn’t admit 
gradations. Western metaphysical thought and imagination have been so 
strongly committed to the parricide – the rejection of Parmenides’s theses 
in Fragment 8, and the disentanglement of being and substance – that it is 
hard to figure out what Parmenides might have meant. The parricide made 
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it possible to consider existence beyond substantiality – something Aristotle 
learned very well from Plato, for while he concentrated on substances 
and took them to enjoy some ontological primacy, he also took accidents, 
for example, to full-bloodedly exist. Emanuele Severino has been trying 
to package a neo-Parmenidism that rejects the parricide and returns to 
the unity of being.80 He intends to critique and reject what he sees as the 
nihilism that follows from admitting that anything but being is. To consider 
the substantiality of all being is indeed an important breakthrough in 
post-parricidal thought. To be sure, the unity of being – expressed in what 
Souriau calls existential monism81 – is still widespread82, and plurality 
has seldom made an impact on, for instance, the copula that makes up 
predication. The predication of any subject is often conceived as the same 
operation no matter what is attributed to what. In that sense, the parricide is 
perhaps still incomplete. However, the parricide was successful in claiming 
that unsubstantial being is possible (which is, I believe, the leitmotiv of 
Severino’s complaint). 
The Stranger’s parricide essentially allows for the “other” to be. Breaking 
with Parmenides’s injunction to think of being beyond unity – to affirm the 
existence of anything but the substantial – made room for things other than 
uncreated, indestructible, complete-yet-finite being to exist. Plato’s effort is 
to determine that being itself has no opposite. The Stranger says:
[...] the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of 
the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is 
no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for 
me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only 
the other of being, and nothing more.83 
To be is plural enough to admit varieties while encompassing all of them. 
The Stranger continues:
Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was 
beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful 
was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being 
was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the 
many classes of being?84
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If nothingness is, there is something non-substantial that reaches to 
existence. The parricide opens the way for the existence of that which has 
no self-sufficient interior maintaining its being; if something as empty 
as nothingness can exist, existence makes no requirements for what is 
inside. Impermanent and occasional things that cannot subsist on their 
own – either like Simondon’s meta-stable individuals or Latour’s entities 
of the mode of existence of metamorphosis (see above) – acquire the status 
of being as much as what is substantial. Substantiality is no more than 
one class among many classes of being, for being is not univocal.  Plato’s 
parricide, positing more than one mode of being, addresses the issue of 
whether all modes are on equal footing. As we will see, for Aristotle, who 
was thinking within the realm of the parricide, some beings exist because 
other beings are substantial. 
The parricide opens the Pandora’s box of the diversity of being. It 
introduces plurality in the very kernel of being, and it shows how it relates 
to what is up for grabs (see also, in chapter 2, Anarcheology E 1/J-N).85The 
parricide precipitated the distinction between the different ways something 
can be on the one hand, and its very being or existence on the other. It 
made it possible for an S that is not P to be P – possible for a chair that is 
not white to be white. That is, it established a distinction between matters of 
existence and matters of predication. The former is about whether something 
exists, regardless of in what ways, while the latter is about how it exists – 
provided that it can exist in different ways. Things can be very different from 
what they are while still being. (In fact, it became possible for existence to 
be conceived as a predication.) For Parmenides, in contrast, if S is not P, it 
is impossible for S to be P; an S that is P would be like a nonbeing that is 
(like the white chair that does not exist). Meillassoux puts a lot of weight on 
the capacity to be other in his argument for absolute facticity. He claims that 
whenever we appeal to a distinction between the “in itself” and the “for us,” 
we are tacitly appealing to the “absolute’s capacity-to-be-other relative to the 
given”86. Because everything has this capacity, I can think of myself as not 
existing in-itself. He writes:
We are able to think – by dint of the absence of any reason 
for our being – a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing 
us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this 
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capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our 
thinking, precisely because it harbors the possibility of our 
own nonbeing.87
The capacity to be other while still being itself may indeed be required for 
the distinction between the “in-itself” and the “for-us.” (We could maybe 
face Kant’s transcendental distinction between phenomena and things 
in themselves as a distinction between different modes of being.)88 For 
Meillassoux, however, it also grounds an absolute principle of facticity 
according to which everything could be other. The principle seems to imply 
that everything is equally under facticity – and therefore nothing stops 
anything from being anything else. If it is so, it seems the plurality of modes 
of being attained by the parricide is lost: everything is equally unsubstantial. 
It verges on an inversion of Parmenides’s formula: to be is to be capable 
of not being.
Aristotle’s lesson from the parricide was that there are many modes of 
existence. His metaphysical project was indeed to counter Heraclitus and 
find substances in the sensible. The project, however, was neither to say 
that everything is substance nor even to say that in the sensible everything 
is substantial. It was rather to explain the existence of what is sensible by 
means of some substances: ousiai protai ton onton – substances are primordial 
to all modes of being.89 (Met. Λ, 6, 1071b.5). That is, substances enjoy a 
primacy among what exists. Aristotle realized that the sensible had room 
for accidents – as much as for relations, qualities, etc. There is as much 
being in the substances as in the accidents, and it is only under the light of 
substance that accidents can be understood at all. Things are elucidated and 
can be known through careful examination of ousia. Aristotle held that there 
were more things in the world than substances – parts of substances, for 
example, were not thought to be substances themselves – and yet, without 
substances, we cannot understand the sensible. Substances are not the only 
thing that exist, nor the ultimate ingredient, but rather they are existence’s 
central character, much like the central events in a history narrative or the 
central geographical accidents in a region. For Aristotle, some things cannot 
be otherwise, and it is on the basis of this sensible necessity that we ought to 
examine other modes of being.
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Symbebeka prota ton onton 
The present book is Aristotelian in several respects. It maintains that what is 
up for grabs has a primacy in a sense close to that which Aristotle ascribed 
to substances. To formulate this as a proposition in Aristotelian terms, we 
can say: symbebeka prota ton onton. This has to come with a caveat: it is not 
the accidental itself that is prior, but rather what is up for grabs – that is, 
what makes accidents possible. Also, to be clear, the primacy of what is up 
for grabs does not explain anything else away, but it is crucially a starting 
point to address how things are. It enjoys a non-reductive (and non-
eliminative) primacy. Not that everything is up for grabs, but rather that a 
picture of the sensible should start out depicting what is. The proposition 
can be read as addressing Aristotle’s project in his own terms: we don’t have 
to start out with ousiai but rather with symbebeka. Therefore, Heraclitus 
would be on the right track if he claimed that the sensible was full of flow, 
but not quite so if he meant that everything was equally in flow – or flowing 
at the same speed. The current project, albeit Heraclitean in an important 
sense, takes seriously Whitehead’s remark that “pure chaos is intrinsically 
impossible”.90 Contingency is primary but it is neither all-encompassing 
nor all-pervasive. The claim in this book is that the sensible is the realm of 
accidents, but accidents can be instrumental in sustaining things that endure 
– they sponsor things at different levels of subsistence. 
The methodological similarities with Aristotle go further. I take one 
of the main points of the Metaphysics, and explicitly so in books Z and M, 
to be the introduction of aspects: substances have many aspects (form, 
matter, etc.). He makes important use of the particle hé (translating “as” 
or “qua”). In Book M, he claims that mathematical entities are aspects of 
sensible things; in geometry, it is an accident that a circle is white but not 
that it is circular, while if we study the whiteness, the shape is to be treated 
as accidental.91 Aspects are thought to be fully external, independent of the 
examiner, and thus we can have perfect knowledge of them. Mathematical 
entities are not something other than sensible substances (as opposed to 
Plato’s view of them as abstract or intelligible objects), but neither are 
they sensible substances tout court (as opposed to the Pythagorean view 
that numbers are among sensible things). Instead, they are aspects of 
sensible substances.
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Analogously, in this book, being up for grabs appears in many aspects; 
these aspects are neither fully independent from each other nor reduced to a 
single one. Nor are these aspects mere ways of seeing contingency – they are 
rather, as we shall see, ways in which contingency shows itself to us, or ways 
in which it is expressed. There is no univocal way to present contingency. 
In particular, it is not to be thought univocally in terms of a contrast with 
necessity. It presents itself under many disguises: echoing Aristotle once 
more,92 it can be said in many ways. There is no ultimate, non-contingent 
aspect of contingency, but contingency can at most be partially unveiled 
as it shows itself in its aspects. The present book considers several aspects 
of being up for grabs, only to show how it enjoys primacy without being 
overarching. We will consider being up for grabs as if it were flowing, with its 
many aspects, through the sensible. 
Contingentism and haecceitism
The parricide introduced issues of existence and predication. They appear 
when we consider contingency. What, in something, is up for grabs? That 
something is, or rather how or what it is? To be up for grabs can itself be 
understood in these two different manners: either in terms of non-necessary 
existence or in terms of non-necessary predication. Something can exist 
necessarily while taking contingently different forms – acquiring different 
qualities, being in different relations. Something can also exist contingently 
while necessarily having some form, some qualities or relations.
Existence is sometimes thought to contrast greatly with predication: it is 
sometimes thought not to be a predicate like any other. There are debates 
of all kinds concerning this contrast, and it may be useful to note a few of 
them. First, whether “exists” is a predicate like “is a horse” – Meinongians93 
and adepts of a general theory of objects, including some variants of 
object-oriented ontology94, believe it pretty much is – or rather like “is 
here” or “is now”  – modal realists like David Lewis95 would say “to be 
actual” functions like a demonstrative. Second, whether existence is a real 
predicate, as opposed to an indication of a position – a modal position, for 
example, whether something is real or merely possible. Kant  denied that 
it is real – which gave him resources to refuse all ontological arguments for 
the existence of God.96 Third, whether existence is a first-order predicate (or 
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rather a higher-order predicate, a predicate of predicates) – Russell denied 
it is first-order in order to deal with Meinongism.97 Fourth, the debates 
around what Quine labeled Plato’s beard: whether there can be predicates 
of something which doesn’t exist, a question which stems from Plato’s 
parricide.98 Fifth, and most importantly for our purposes, debates around 
what makes something exists. In particular, whether a thing is more than 
a bundle of qualities and relations, whether something independent of any 
predication must also exist; whether, for instance, there is a substratum or 
a haecceitas – a non-qualitative thishood – to a particular.99 These are, to be 
sure, just four debates among many others, including most debates about 
reference and descriptions or about de re and de dicto modalities. 
If existence contrasts with predication, then it can be up for grabs that 
something exists and also that something is what it is. Contingency can affect 
a thing’s existence and its predicates. To say that something is contingent 
on its circumstances might mean that it wouldn’t exist without them (it is 
worldly, a denizen of a single possible world) or alternatively that it would be 
something entirely different without them (it inhabits more than one world). 
If existence is contingent, there could be more things than there actually 
are – looking at an empty doorway, there could be a possible bald man in 
that doorway and a possible fat man in that doorway.100 (If existence is not 
contingent, there is something that could be the bald or the fat man in that 
doorway, even if it is not actually anything concrete.)
The issue could maybe be presented in terms of what is up for grabs 
de re and what is up for grabs de dicto. It is arguable that the structure of 
predicative thinking favors considering the latter more easily than the 
former.101 The former concerns the lightness of moving between existence 
and non-existence, that nothing holds things on either side. I mentioned 
above Latour’s attention to metamorphosis as a mode of existence – things 
that don’t remain in being yet exist, though they are impermanent. Such 
beings would be temporary by nature and, arguably, would be naturally 
conceived of as having a contingent existence (they couldn’t be anything but 
beings of metamorphosis). 
Timothy Williamson presents the debate about whether what exists is 
necessary in terms of two positions, necessitism and contingentism:102
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 Call the proposition that is necessary what there is necessitism 
and its negation contingentism. In a slightly less compressed 
form, necessitism says that necessarily everything is necessarily 
something; still more long-windedly, it is necessary that 
everything is such that it is necessary that something is 
identical with it.103
He defends necessitism while making clear that his defense has no 
consequences concerning whether things are necessarily how they are – that 
is, whether predications are necessary.104 Necessitism and contingentism 
are about what exists and not about how it exists. (He also presents the 
distinction between permanentism which holds that everything is always 
something, and temporaryism that negates this thesis.) Williamson’s 
necessitism holds that the dramatis personae involved in whatever happens 
are fixed, although each of the characters could take a very different form 
in order for something else to happen. Indeed, very different forms for 
something concrete (or sensible) could have been non-concrete (or non-
sensible) and vice-versa, while still existing. He says that
[…] on plausible auxiliary assumptions, necessitism requires 
the barrier between the concrete and non-concrete to be 
modally […] permeated in both directions.105 
If necessitism is right, contingency acts on a fixed number of items; nothing 
can come to existence, and nothing can cease to exist. Contingency can 
change things, but it can never create anything ex nihilo or destroy it ad 
nihilum. Necessitism holds that all things have substrata independent of any 
of their qualities (as permanentism holds that all things have something 
substantial independent of any of their changes). The necessitist talks 
about something that is a possible table, or a possible fat or bald man, 
meaning that it is not concrete. Something could be a table, or a fat or 
bald man, but it is actually something else, something non-concrete. A 
table is not necessarily a table, but it is necessarily something. Notice that 
a contingentism, on the other hand, could either endorse or not endorse a 
non-substratum view of the particular, whereby something is what it is only 
by virtue of its qualities. For she can say that there is a substratum to this 
table independent of its qualities and yet it is not necessarily something. 
Contingentism holds that the existence of something is exposed to 
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contingencies, while for necessitism, existence is protected from being up for 
grabs – although predication is not. 
Williamson connects the necessitism controversy to issues in modal logic 
and, in particular, issues related to the acceptance of the Barcan formula.106 
He argues that necessitism is a more convenient metaphysics to use to 
elucidate and explore the consequences of a classical quantified modal logic, 
while such a commonly accepted alternative in logic has its metaphysical 
advantages. The choice between necessitism and its denial is tied to the way 
modalities are seen and, in particular, to how contingency is conceived. 
The distinction is relevant for this book, as the aspects of contingency 
to be considered here will have implications concerning it. In any case, 
the main thesis of the book, the primacy of contingency, is compatible 
with both necessitism and contingentism. The primacy, as considered in 
the last section, could be present both in a world of fixed characters – the 
necessitist picture – and in a world where the existence of something is itself 
up for grabs. In particular, in a necessitist scenario, the transit between 
what becomes sensible (concrete) and what ceases to be so ought to be 
understood in terms of the primacy of contingency; it is contingent that 
something (which, according to necessitism, is necessarily one thing or 
another) is concrete. In other words, the contingent border could either be 
placed at the gates of concreteness or the very gates of existence – in both 
cases, contingency plays a relevant bouncer role. 
Although Williamson claims that the necessitism–contingentism debate 
is clearer than the actualist–possibilist debate, and should replace it – for 
it is plausible to say that all possible worlds are equally actual – it is still 
illuminating for our purposes to briefly consider another debate centered 
on possible worlds.107 David Kaplan has introduced a distinction between 
haecceitism and anti-haecceitism, a distinction about trans-world identity. He 
defines them as follows:
The doctrine that holds that it does make sense to ask 
– without reference to common attributes and behavior – 
whether this is the same individual in another possible world, 
that individuals can be extended in logical space (i.e., through 
possible worlds) in much the way we commonly regard them 
as being extended in physical space and time, and that a 
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common “thisness” may underlie extreme dissimilarity or 
distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 
Haecceitism. […] The opposite view, Anti-Haecceitism, holds 
that for entities of distinct possible worlds there is no notion of 
trans-world being.108 
The haecceitist is necessitist, for haecceitism assumes that, necessarily, 
everything is necessarily something (in all possible worlds). The 
contingentist, though, can embrace either an anti-haecceitist or a haecceitist 
view. Here again, the primacy of contingency fits with both views. If 
things are trans-worldly, still there is room for contingency to play a role 
in making them what they are – and, in particular, making them sensible. 
However, haecceitism suits the primacy thesis better. In fact, our interest 
in this second distinction lies in that it points toward the haecceitas of 
something beyond any of its qualities – its singularity. Singularity is what 
makes something more than the sum (or the cluster) of its qualities. A 
thing’s haecceitas is not dependent on the thing’s qualities. Singularities 
are tied to the primacy of contingency in the sensible, for sensible things 
are left abandoned by their qualities – by their nature (see Verlassenheit 
above). Deleuze and Guattari call their plane of immanence  also a plane 
of haecceities109; it is formed by singularities detached from the qualities 
they realize. The very tie between things and their qualities is touched by 
contingency. The qualities of things are up for grabs, and so are things that 
carry on through changes in their qualities. For that reason, for the primacy 
of contingency thesis, it is more suitable for us to embrace haecceitism. As a 
consequence, the thesis would favor necessitism and the view that the gates 
of the sensible are the ones that contingency guards. 
Transcendent and immanent contingency 
In two sections above (Three speculative accounts of contingency and The 
parricide) I have contrasted a view like Meillassoux’s, according to which 
there is a principle of facticity that makes it possible for everything to 
be something other than what it is, with those views according to which 
contingency is not an overarching principle. Meillassoux considers a God 
whose inexistence is contingent; God is up for grabs, for His existence is 
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under the principle of facticity that is not up for grabs. (In that sense, his 
conception of God contrasts with the equally non-standard one held by 
Whitehead according to which God is what ensures that pure chaos is 
intrinsically impossible.) We can distinguish between contingency viewed 
as transcendent – as a necessary principle – and contingency viewed as 
immanent. In an immanent view, the lightness of being is itself light. While 
a transcendent view of contingency places it outside its own scope – chaos 
reigns by necessity or by other non-contingent reasons – an immanent 
view holds that contingency is itself contingent. According to this view, 
something can come along – like a newborn God, as we are in Meillassoux’s 
quasi-theological territories – and revoke all contingencies; nothing is 
necessary, but not by necessity. A recent fragment of Heraclitus expresses 
what it means for a test of force to be immanent: “[…] the stronger prevails 
because it is stronger – and not due to any law of the strongest” (fr. 138, see 
AnArch., 2/138). Analogously, immanent contingency means that it prevails 
because there is no arché, and not because there is an arché that makes it 
prevail. The immanent view is that, contingently, everything is contingent; 
the transcendent view is that, necessarily, everything is contingent. 
The primacy-of-contingency view diverges from both of these. It doesn’t 
hold that (necessarily or contingently) everything is contingent. Primacy, 
for us, means no universality. To be sure, it agrees with the transcendent 
view that there is something structural connecting the accidental and the 
sensible. It also agrees with the immanent view that there is no general 
principle of contingency under which everything lies. An objector might 
then wonder whether the symbebeka prota ton onton approach genuinely 
differs from taking contingency to be immanent or transcendent. In order 
to see the difference, we need a firm grip on the Aristotelian character of 
the proposition. Contingency is not meant to be the ultimate reality or a 
principle that rules everything. Neither is it something fully contingent itself, 
which disappears due to further contingent matters of fact. Contingency is 
central – that is, it is structurally present among the sensible. It is a main 
character, a key one; therefore, it is neither a single character – for there is 
more than one mode of being – nor a passer-by. It is transcendently present 
while not being transcendently unique. It is just a sine qua non. 
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The view defended in this book is that we cannot conceive the sensible 
itself except by ascribing a central – albeit not exclusive – importance to the 
accidental. Even though it is not possible at this point to give a complete 
picture of the central character of contingency among the sensible – this is 
the task of the whole book – we can now grasp some pieces of the puzzle. To 
begin to see why accidents are the main characters of sensible plots, we can 
think again of contingency as a lack of immunitas. In order for something to 
be up for grabs, it has to be open to interference; no substantial interiority 
and no other necessary connection protects it from being affected by 
something else. Interference can either come from other things, or it can 
come ex nihilo as an automaton, as in the Epicurean clinamina.110As we will 
see, the different aspects of contingency deal with interference. Interference 
has to do with sponsoring, with meta-stability, with dependence, with 
abandonment, with compossibles, with fragments, with doubts, with 
rhythms. It is related to a conception of existence as co-existence. There is a 
common plane on which things exist – a plane of what is up for grabs – that 
shows itself in different ways and that we will meet in the following chapters. 
To be sensible is to be accidental, because the sensible is the very realm of 
the unprotected, where any immunity is itself up for grabs. To be concrete 
is to be surrounded by what is less than substantial, by connections that are 
less than necessary. Fragility is not the only ingredient of the sensible, but 
without it, the stew cannot be ready.
The parricide introduced plurality into the kernel of being while 
making no form of being overarching. I will later mention the fallen 
pile of Muja (see Anarcheology  1/J-N), which explores the connection 
between the multiplicity of modes of existence and what is up for grabs. 
There (N), Idarsal Selassie writes about a discontinuity that governs the 
different modes; nothing can cross from one mode to another without 
being translated. We cannot have different things, he says, if we don’t have 
separators. Translation is a gate where things are lost and things are found. 
Here again, contingency acts as bouncer. Without it – if discontinuities 
could be dispelled – there would be no plurality. Selassie’s addressee 
espouses the thesis that different modes of existence co-exist.111 Latour talks 
about mini-transcendences that feature in each mode, which are also like 
gates in that they make each mode irreducible to the others. These gates, 
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like the modes of existence they guard, are sui generis. If contingency deals 
in gate keeping, it must somehow be in the corridor that links the different 
modes of existence. Such a corridor has to do with the plane I mentioned 
before (the plan d’immanence of Deleuze and Guattari, the plane of equality of 
Garcia). Etienne Souriau also has a name for this concept: surexistence.112 He 
defines it as the crossroads of existences. This crossroads does not precede 
the modes of existence, but it is rather a consequence of their plurality – a 
consequence of there being more than one mode. If there are genuinely 
many modes of existence within the sensible, the gates between them cannot 
dispense with discontinuities. These discontinuities, in their turn, must 
usher in contingency. In other words, if contingency enjoys a primacy while 
not being overarching, it stems from the very plurality of modes of existence 
within the sensible. This reveals why contingency is connected to the 
sensible: it is a feature of genuine interference and of genuine plurality.
Anarcheologies and ontoscopies
A metaphysics of accident ought to look different from a metaphysics 
of substance. The former is not a one-faced endeavor. Contingency has 
indeterminately many faces – all of them look toward the concrete. There 
is no general theory of what is up for grabs; at least, there is no theory that 
could replace it in its gatekeeping. Doing metaphysics is not to step out 
of the grasp of the primacy of contingency but rather to follow its paths 
through its many aspects without losing sight of its consequences. This 
book is not a collection of arguments for the specific primacy of accident it 
maintains. Rather, it attempts to follow the paths of contingency by looking 
at its marks; it tracks some of the faces with which what is up for grabs 
shows itself. The arguments will eventually appear both to ground and to 
bend the main proposition. They will be embedded in the faces that what 
is up for grabs exhibits. Those faces may have something to do with us, but 
they also have a lot to do with contingency.
A recent fragment of Heraclitus (fr. 204, see AnArcheology 2/204) 
compares the voyeurism of someone spying on a neighbor with that of the 
public at a peep show. The latter, but not the former, involves an important 
act by the people being watched: the act of selecting what is seen and for 
how long. Analogously, that which exists determines how it shows itself. 
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What we see is not our projection onto the world, but rather how the world 
hits us. I call the ways the world shows itself to us ontoscopies. As contingency 
has many faces, spotting it requires a measure of stereoscopy – this is why 
I introduce the word in the plural. Ontoscopies have to do with what we 
see of what there is, for they reveal what reality makes available to us. In 
that sense, they are what gets exhibited, what the world affords to present 
to us. Ontoscopies are presentations of what there is, prior to any maps, 
descriptions or interpretations. Still, these things always contain ontoscopies 
– as any account of being, any ontology, contains an ontoscopy. Hence, for 
the purposes of this book, we will treat ontologies themselves as ontoscopies.
Although I understand ontoscopies to be different from explicit story-
telling, there is something in common between how an image is put forward 
in a story being told113 and how things present themselves in an ontoscopy. 
A metaphysics of contingency needs to create its own images, for otherwise 
it will be prey to images already spread and that often obliterate the 
accidental as merely what contrasts with what is necessary. An ontoscopy 
is a way to see things. It aims at producing an image. It is an invitation to 
see something qua something, as much as what is done when a story is told. 
Images invoke tonalities. Thinking about the world always engage tonalities 
– and some of them are metaphysically fruitful. To use a Whiteheadian 
phrase, an ontoscopy is a lure for feeling.
The rest of this book divides into six chapters. The first explores the 
notion of anarcheology. It is a study of the absence of archés – and in this 
sense, as I said at the outset, this whole book is a study in anarcheology. 
However, the notion has important parallel meanings, to be explored in the 
chapter. One of them has to do with exploring the historical consequences 
of an unsanctioned version – and in that sense intervening in the thought-
scenario through explicit story-telling, where truthfulness to facts is not a 
measure of importance. In this sense, anarcheologies dwell in story-telling 
but in an explicit way, not like ontoscopies where what matters is the 
creation of images. The chapter contains three anarcheologies in this latter 
sense, which we will refer to and consider throughout the book (some of 
them have been mentioned already always referred to as “AnArcheology” 
followed by identifiers). The following three chapters present ontoscopies 
that look at the sensible and explore the primacy of what is up for grabs. 
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They relate to each other in several manners, but they are also independent 
aspects of contingency. They could be considered as modes of existence, 
but I take them to be closer to Aristotle’s aspects. Each of these ontoscopies 
revolves around one concept and provides an image of the sensible. These 
concepts shed light onto what it is like to be up for grabs.
Mistudy of my traces Gisel Carriconde Azevedo, Sculpture: silicone, pigment  
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Chapter 2
Anarcheologies
Being out of the blue
Hector D’Alessandro tells a story about witnessing something out of the 
blue.114 Stories often involve preparing, describing and accommodating 
rupture, depicting something that suddenly starts – or ends. In 
D’Alessandro’s narrative, a character goes for a late breakfast in an ordinary 
department-store restaurant. He spots people sitting with their food and 
drinks, chatting or looking around and proceeding with their activities: 
business as usual. Eventually he notices a man and woman arguing. So far, 
so unremarkable. Then comes the sudden rupture. The man stands up, 
walks toward the toilet, goes to the balcony, breaks the glass and jumps from 
the seventh floor. The narrator becomes a witness. The weight of the out of 
the blue burdens him. It is the lightness of the casual, of automaton, of what 
is determined by itself. He bears witness to this lightness – and it proves 
hardly bearable. Another witness of the out of the blue is the viewer of the 
TV show in Saura’s film Antonieta, which opens with a woman presenting a 
recipe in a cooking program only to suddenly shoot herself. There is always 
something sudden to any death – because something else suddenly starts. 
This is the strength of what is out of the blue. 
Beginnings point to the core of that which is peculiar to anything 
sensible. The sensible is perishable, because it contains what is on the brink 
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of beginning. Looking for the starting point is often a way to look for the 
commanding element, if the original holds the force of a beginning, which 
provides a rightful ascendency. If it is so, what merely follows exists to a 
lesser degree than what is followed. This is the kernel of the discussions 
around priority monism and its alternatives. If the whole is prior, 
everything depends on it. If the parts are prior, everything else depends on 
them. Priority, which is not what we mean in this book by primacy, here 
spells command.
Although temporal, logical and governing order seem to be tangled up 
here, this could be an effect of our chosen vocabulary, where to be prior 
is to generate and to govern. Before debunking this conflation of orders, I 
would just point out that beginnings, as such, display independence. Being 
up for grabs has something to do with the independent and with what is not 
ruled. That which is contingent on something else is open to interference 
– it is exposed to the elements. This exposure is present in what begins, for 
in order for anything to start, it must be capable of making its own rules. A 
beginning is only really a beginning if no rules are at work on it; beginnings 
are outside any determining scope. In this sense, what is automaton is open 
and up for grabs. Automaton is a determination that starts there, that is not 
under anything else’s control. That which is under a rule is immune – that 
which imposes the rule is not. Whatever is immunized has its up-for-grabs 
feature switched off. A start could always have been otherwise. Only what is 
up for grabs can afford to be out of the blue.
This an-arché feature is at the heart of what is up for grabs. It is present 
in the Kantian idea of a causality of freedom: the starting point of a novel 
causal chain. The starting point is not ruled, because self-determination 
is by definition an independent determination. Because it is unruled, it 
is exposed to the elements. Only what is up in the air can genuinely start 
something. This independence is crucial for Kant; there cannot be another 
causal chain being started if everything were fully chained in a single causal 
connection. There are starting points because there is more than one causal 
chain. In fact, Kant uses our capacity to start new causal chains to introduce 
a moral realm in a world that is determined by us. Whether or not Kant 
means to introduce genuine lapses of determination in the non-moral realm, 
what is described morally through imperatives requires agents that can 
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do otherwise – even though they won’t if they are really acting according 
to the categorical imperative. The point of departure of any action that 
follows an imperative – that issues a causality by freedom  is a freedom of 
action, a freedom to be determined autonomously. The Kantian agent acts 
morally because she genuinely chooses to be under the moral rule. Moral 
determination is therefore sui generis: it requires that what is in its scope is 
not immunized. Because the scope is not immunized, the moral agent starts 
a genuinely new causal chain. To be a moral agent, for Kant, is to be an 
initiating agent. 
We often view a beginning only as the origin for what follows, 
considering it in terms of what it has originated. But starting points cut 
an edge between the out of the blue and the realm of determinations (a 
term I always use as meaning hetero-determinations; that is, something 
that is determined if it is under a command). A beginning is therefore an 
undetermined (hetero-)determiner. Disentangling beginning from mere 
originating is part of the plot of Heidegger’s reflections on being and 
beginning in Über den Anfang (About the Beginning), a posthumously 
published manuscript. There, he holds that being has its essence in 
beginnings.115 To begin is to be preserved from unveiling – there is nothing 
to conceal a seed when it hasn’t grown into a tree. Beginnings display 
a peculiar transparency, whereas the things that follow are hidden in an 
ontogenealogical tree of ancestors and descendants. Such transparency is 
not the lightness of an origin, but rather its disconnection from the tree 
of governing and governed nodes. Heidegger’s suspicion concerning the 
insufficiency of metaphysics shows itself as an incapacity to deal with all 
the power of a beginning. The luminous character of the beginning is what 
makes it possible, for Heidegger, to understand truth as unveiling. What is 
revealed when a beginning is made explicit is not what leaves a shade over 
whatever exists, but the strength of the out-of-the-blue. This is present in all 
origins only to the extent that they are ungoverned.
Arché
We can now start to debunk the idea that beginning is legitimate 
dominance. This is an entrenched idea and hard to debunk. The connection 
between being and beginning can suggest that there is an arché to being – 
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its original core that is at the same time its ultimate revelation and which 
ultimately governs it. Part of the force of the notion of arché derives from 
the conception of being as centrally substantial: the arché is the original 
core, the grounding or foundational stone that unveils all that can be 
unveiled about something. But the substantiality of being is not all there is 
to the connection between being and beginning – not even to the notion of 
arché. There is accident to this connection, since arché is the bridging point 
between the ungoverned and the ruled, between the starting point and 
what is under immunizing effects. The out of the blue requires the up for 
grabs. Further, the arché is the point where a dominion is created. It is the 
institution of a rule – and of its scope. 
Agamben takes up the Foucauldian notion of archeology as a lever to 
explore what an arché is.116 The original two meanings of the verb arché 
as both to commence and to command – to give rise to and to rule – are 
intertwined. It is an entrenched overlap: we take what genuinely starts 
something to be what originates a new determination. Archaic, archetypes, 
hierarchy: we speak of priority as carrying a power of governance. To 
command comes from mandare, “to send.” What is sent has a destination 
and embodies a destiny. But it is also thrown – carrying an indefinition. 
An issued command is up in the air, for it has to find obedience, but 
simultaneously there is no obedience without the command. The fitting 
together of these two elements is perhaps a central political drama, and 
Agamben explores it in terms of how the present is shaped by obedience 
to past archés. His analysis is biopolitical, but like Esposito’s, it provides 
the right terms to consider ontological issues concerning determinations. 
The arché brings to ontology the issue of governments that need rulers and 
followers. It brings in determinations, and with them substance, necessity, 
and fixity. Aristotle’s search for the substantiality of the sensible was guided 
by the notion of arché: to understand the sensible is to spot its obedience.
Agamben diagnoses a lack of reflection in Western philosophy about 
command. Governing is possible because of commands; it is not enough 
to have obedience. Yet commanding has received far less attention than 
obeying. The sovereignty of a commanding force hinges on its capacity to 
act out of the blue, its capacity to start something – no determining force 
can be entirely at bay. This is why weak governments rarely manage to 
Anarcheologies 65
start anything unexpected; their gambit is to stay within the boundaries of 
business as usual. Whatever is ultimately determining – or genuinely prior in 
the sense of an arché – has to preserve an element of the up in the air.
It because it is about commencement that the commanding word – 
arché – contrasts thoroughly with apophantic discourse, the discourse that 
declares how things are assuming that they are determinately one way 
or another. The command belongs in a different procedure with words: 
it intends to make them true rather than attempting to be true. It is an 
intervention. Consider the inextricable co-existence of normative and 
declarative vocabularies. Agamben ventures the hypothesis that there are 
not one but two interplayed ontologies inherited from Parmenides: that 
of “being” and that of “making it be” – esti and estó in Greek. The latter is 
the ontology of the ruler: it deploys the non-declarative tenses of “to be.” 
It is ontology, albeit in another tense, only to the extent that ontos revolves 
around arché – and through a connection with the substance of what is. If to 
be is an issue in determinations, accidents can exist, but only in a peripheral 
way. The effect of the focus on arché is to center ontology on rules and 
commands. It follows that to be is either to determine or to be determined. 
These two intertwined ontologies are therefore related to the idea of 
arché as the dominant origin. Agamben cites Nietzsche’s definition of will: 
to want something is to command, and therefore to be ready to commence. 
To act according to a will, one needs to be at least somewhat outside the 
scope of a governing rule. One must be away from a determination and 
not fully immunized – a causality of freedom.  Agamben raises the issue 
of a society of control – or a society of performance, in Byung-Chul Han’s 
terms.117 In such associations, there are few limitations to the will that is 
stimulated; in general, it is exercised without restraint. Government acts on 
the content of these pursuits – the content of the commandments of the will. 
Desires become the battlefield: government becomes the government of self-
commandments. This is possible because where there is a genuine starting 
point, something is up for grabs – and therefore open to interference. The 
two intertwined meanings of arché show how the declarative discourse is 
hostage to the normative one. They both dwell in governments and, as such, 
they both draw from Bataille’s notion of mettre en jeu. To describe what there 
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is in terms of its substantiality is to acknowledge what governs things; to 
invoke originality is to appeal to what lies in the open. 
The first ontology of Agamben – the esti ontology – is guided by the 
notion of obedience to a command to provide an ultimate account of 
the nature of things. The second ontology – estó – looks at the exercise 
of a command. In Elizabeth Anscombe’s terms, the two ontologies work 
in opposite directions of fit: estó brings about a determination, while esti 
recalls a determination.118 Just like desire and belief, the two ontologies 
can fail and succeed in opposite ways: a command fails when it is not 
obeyed – there is no item in the shopping trolley matching the shopping 
list – while a declaration fails when it doesn’t obey – there is no item on 
the receipt matching something that is in the shopping trolley. But we 
can also understand these two directions of fit in terms of government: its 
constitutional power and its constituted power. The former makes power be, 
and the latter declares it. Together, they swing between the controlled and 
the controlling, the movable and the immutable mover. The central moment 
is precisely the arché – the advent of a command. 
Arché, as a word hosting a claim, makes room for the intertwining 
ontologies and can be understood as follows: to disclose the world is to 
disclose what rules it. Archeology looks at the past to find the commanders 
of the present. In contrast, attention to what is up for grabs intends to reject 
this claim and rather look at the ungoverned. This book tries to shift the 
attention to the an-arché. Its concentration on the centrality of contingency 
displaces not only substance but also the arché toward which the thought of 
substance is directed. The aim is to begin to put forward a metaphysics of 
the non-archeological. 
To be sure, it is on the ungoverned that determinations can have scope – 
and it is the ungoverned that can institute determinations. Both ruling and 
failure to rule draw on the ungoverned, because obedience always has an 
up-in-the-air character. The unruly lives in what can escape determination 
(see Heraclitus’ fragments 198 and 205, AnArcheology 2/198 and 2/205 
below). This is what makes following a rule a delicate affair: an imperative 
has to find its way through several ungoverned obstacles. As national 
governments must negotiate with their citizens and institutions, imperatives 
must find a path of implementation between the vicissitudes of other rulings 
Anarcheologies 67
and among the resistance of the ungoverned. It is about sponsoring – the 
word we chose to translate Souriau’s instaurer in the last chapter. A rule 
must navigate what is up in the air, negotiate with other determinations, 
interfere in the established order. The ungoverned makes explicit that archés 
require allagmatics. The up for grabs harbors an an-arché – an absence of 
pull. We can see what is up for grabs in the friction between the archés, in the 
emptiness produced by their absence or in the capacity to emulate them by 
commencing something else. These three loci of an-arché will appear in the 
three upcoming ontoscopies. 
Three anarcheologies
Anarcheology119 can be understood in at least three different ways, in line 
with three different parsings. Perhaps they are three different but entangled 
anarcheologies:
1. Anarche-ology: the study of the unruled, the ungoverned, the 
absence of command or determination and its effects;
2. An-arche-ology: the study of what is groundless and doesn’t have 
a foundation;
3. An-archeology: the study of versions of the past independently of 
whether they are considered to be facts.
The first one points toward a non-arché-based ontology that is the main 
concern of this book. It looks at the unruled in contrast to the determined. 
It explores how something can resist determination and finds ways to access 
what is not ruled. Governance is considered by anarche-ology as derived 
from the unruled and as search deserving of explanation – and not merely 
posited as the name of the game (arché). Anarche-ology can certainly be 
approached in different ways; in this book, I will pursue it through the 
friction of ontoscopies. 
An-arche-ology, by contrast, looks at what has no ultimate foundation 
– at the groundless. An-arche-ological excavation does not aim to find 
bedrock, but rather to unground further. It doesn’t explore the underground 
as a grounding resource for the surface; it places on the same surface what 
is underneath and what is visible – the past and the present in the same 
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hierarchical position. There is no hierarchical depth to the present, for that 
would have to refer to an ultimate foundation – the underground has no 
priority. An-arche-ology is close to priority nihilism, for nothing is ascribed a 
superior ontological status. 
There is a sense in which Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille Plateaux120  
inaugurated an-arche-ology. In the opening pages, the authors talk 
about transversal communications that mix genealogical trees, about our 
understandings of the past being submitted to all sorts of contaminations, 
of the parallel development of things unrelated to each other. The book 
presents an ontology of co-existence around the idea of a plan d’immanence 
where all hierarchies coincide. On such a plane, primacy gives place to 
geography: everything sensible must occupy a space (and, presumably, 
bicker with its neighbors). Excavating an-arche-ologically is an exercise 
in conjunction more than an endeavor of unveiling constitutions or 
tracing roots. 
In this sense, an-arche-ological exploration can go together with an 
anarche-ological emphasis on the unruled – which has only an-ancestors. 
The methods of an-arche-ology are those of contiguity: infection, disruption, 
diversion. It doesn’t look for roots, but rather exposes arbitrary associations 
that are themselves up for grabs. Further, an-arche-ology is the study of the 
unoriginal. As such, it points toward anarchetypes, that is, toward parodies 
or simulacra. Anarchetypes are anathema to (Platonic) models, which are 
unoriginated originators. Anarchetypes can be imitated by anything in 
their path – or by nothing. Imitation, simulation and parody follow from 
contiguity and not from any primacy. Deleuze’s account of repetition 
draws no distinction between the originals and the simulacra – they all can 
be repeated.121 He then invokes a generalized eternal return to dissolve 
any appeal to an original form; everything is repeating something else, 
there is no ultimate model. There is no prototype, no archetype, nothing 
but a succession of repeated parodies where nothing can have any status 
but that of a simulacrum. The an-arche-ological move here is to exorcise 
the precursor as a fixed determiner – anything can incidentally govern 
anything else. 
An an-arche-ological archeology can be also compared to Ben Woodard’s 
xenoarcheology122, the ungrounding of the alien. This excavates the strange, 
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that which produces the opposite of an explanation – xenoarcheology 
excavates to unexplain. As such, it replaces ontological patriarchy (or 
matriarchy) by a provisory xenoarchy where the unfamiliar seems to 
affect the present by its sudden contiguity. It is a Cthuluoid archeology, 
for it is – like Reza Negaresteni’s ethics, which he cites – not suggested by 
anything but openness to the weird. The image of Lovecraft has become a 
figure of a call from the alien weird: Negaresteni’s stance is one that makes 
room for the appeal of the unrecognized, of the unclassified, of what lacks 
a pronounceable name. Time – or the succession of eras – is no longer 
seen as layers approaching the familiar, but as a tortuous assemblage of 
alien materials. A xenoarcheological geology would be a natural history of 
strangeness – as an an-arche-ological geology would point toward a natural 
history of the incidental.
Finally, an-archeology deals with the past in the form of its versions. 
It is unconcerned by what we take as fact, for it assigns no preference 
among the versions. Zouzi Chebbi once claimed that south of the Maghreb 
there is no distinction between facts and versions.123 The assignment of a 
privilege among versions is always tainted by the power of those who write 
the history books. An-archeology, therefore, excavates what could have 
been; it ungrounds different pasts – and provokes an-arche-ological awe 
in those concerned with a history of facts. If anarche-ology deals with the 
unruly, an-archeology uproots the past while reintroducing the (an-arche-
ological) unruly in the present.124 It takes the alien versions together with the 
sanctioned ones to constitute the present and future. It is a department of 
history – where counterfactual history lies. An-archeology invokes the power 
of the past as an anarchetype – as something that admits of reshaping and 
could be disentangled from the force of authenticity. (I have used the term 
inarcheology125 to describe my action of inserting in the archeological site 
of the castle of Sappho, dedicated to Artemis, in Lesbos, a stone engraved 
with an-archeological fragments of Heraclitus – 144 and 210 – see below 
Anarcheology 2/144 and 2/210. In this case, excavation purports to ground, 
and not to unground, something.)
An an-archeology of philosophy aims to provide philosophy with a 
freedom from the chains of its actual history. It is not an antirealism about 
the history of philosophy but rather a tonality – one less concerned with 
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the veracity of the past – that considers versions as capable of motivating 
and inspiring thought as historical facts. It intends to free thought from 
its archeologically approved background. It moves in a tonality in which 
there is no room for asking how much of a fact a version is. In this sense, it 
unveils the power of the counterfactual in philosophy: the different ways that 
thought could have gone but (in fact) has not. If Chebbi is right about what 
happens south of the Maghreb, it also points toward a decolonization of 
thought in which many versions of philosophy’s past are called to the fore. 
This book primarily addresses anarcheology in the first sens, but it 
eventually connects to the second and makes use of the third. The remainder 
of this chapter is an exploration in what we might call the an-archeology 
of anarche-ology. These exercises bring together some senses in which the 
ontological obsession with arché can be dispelled. 
Exercises in anarcheology
History is always incomplete without its counterparts. It’s not only that a 
grain of truth can always be found in what is rejected, but also that truth 
must live side by side with what could have happened. The shadow of the 
counterfactual on facts is what makes lightness shine in facticity. The factual 
is made insufficiently determined by the possibility of a counterfactual. If 
facts are just a counterpart, they are incomplete without the other things 
that could have happened. These exercises explore virtual history: what 
would have happened, for example, if Heraclitus had lived until our era and 
had had time to rethink his doctrines of the polemos under contemporary 
lights? An-archeology invites us to consider such doctrine as much as its 
factual absence; it is certainly harder to consider counterfactual doctrines, 
but that doesn’t make them unimportant. 
The truth of facts is always split, for the lightness of what took place 
cannot be fully appreciated without the alternative routes things could have 
taken. What could have been points toward a split that has existed from 
the beginning: an ontological diaphonia that enables things to take several 
directions. An-arché. What we call truth, as Edmond Jabès ascribes to an 
anonymous mouth, is truth in shards.126 To come to terms with these shards, 
we must not attempt to see the hidden full thing. An-archeological history 
is never more than a mosaic of versions. The an-archeological tonality is one 
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that attempts to place them together on a single surface to offer material for 
thought. Jabès himself is a thinker who resorted to anarcheology: in his The 
Book of Questions 127  he introduces several voices of rebs who are invoked 
in a dialogue where a tradition and its past has to be populated by literary 
characters that are as ready as fiction can be to manage some truths. As 
Marianne Moore once said, “imaginary gardens with real toads in them.”128 
The following three pieces of anarcheology are referred to in the rest 
of the book (as they have been so far) as AnArcheologies. The pieces 
are called 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and their components are identified 
in the texts. 
Idarsal Selassie and the pile of Muja (1)
Ethiopian history has many versions. Most people live there with several 
of those versions, making their pasts come alive with tales and endless 
conversations. I had one such conversation when I was in Mekele on a 
Sunday afternoon in early 2012, waiting for a transport to Lalibela which 
would depart early the next day. I sat in a café and started browsing a 
copy of Latour’s Irreductions.129 Seeing the book in my hands, a passer-by 
approached me, enthused. He had come across it some years back and it 
had made a big impression on him – or so he told me. I offered him a piece 
of chocolate and he sat down. Our conversation covered some of the many 
versions of what had happened to the dynasty of Menelick. After some 
hours, he told me he had recently written a letter to Latour and asked me 
to wait for him while he went home and fetched a copy he would like to 
give me. An hour later, he came back with the letter, photocopied on dirty 
sheets of paper. 
(A) Dear Mr. Bruno Latour,
I am Idarsal Selassie and I live near Mekele, Tigray, in 
northern Ethiopia. I write to you because I have something 
to tell you, as much as you, in a piece of your writing, had 
something to tell me. Reading is something that disturbs 
me – I find it hard to understand what is not directly said to 
me. I enjoy books most when they are read to me – they seem 
more like chatting. But I read pieces of your book, as I will 
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tell you, on my own. So I may be misunderstanding what you 
wrote. Plus, I don’t like keeping what I understand anywhere 
– I don’t like the stink of my thoughts rotting away. I know 
I cannot think them again. And yet I enjoy when they come 
again in my mind to visit – but only because they feel different. 
The thought I got from your book comes back to me very 
often, as I will try to explain.
(B) I traveled around my area of the world and beyond, always 
looking for some insight into how things are. I was looking 
for hows. I found many becauses, which often seem to me to 
amount to advice to stop scavenging. Yet I found inquiry to 
be able to free me from being a proud and accomplished 
shepherd in my village. They say I am restless. 
(C) I have a job cooking for tourists in a hotel in Mekele. 
I’m proud of some of the things I have cooked, a shiro130 that 
comes out tasty, some boiled beans with the right color, a 
tomato sauce they eat to the last drop. I cook and I find the 
chance to talk to people from afar. Our customers are almost 
always faranjis.131 Most of them end up telling me something 
about nature and, as they like it, I often approach them asking 
about how nature works. Some of them talk about God, but 
nature is different, is all ready, as if it were created once and 
for all, even if it was never really created. Sometimes I have 
trouble understanding why they take some things as natural 
but not others. When I press them a bit, they get confused, but 
they rarely give up thinking that only some things are natural. 
Some tourists tell me about rituals they see in the south; they 
sometimes scarcely understand what the whole thing is about, 
but they are always certain that some of the things they see are 
natural – but not all. I invariably spend hours in the kitchen 
trying to figure out how they draw the line. 
(D) My traveling has taken me to several different parts of the 
world and to many conversations. I have talked to all sorts of 
people: travelers, priests, peasants, pious folks, worshipers of 
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animals, whores, Zulu believers in a Christian Unkulunkulu132 
and many others. I met the followers of Skendes back in 
Axum, where I was born, who told me that all that I need to 
know about things is that they were created by just one of 
them. A God. A creator, responsible for all things and who 
responds for all things. There are no more things, as everything 
boils down to one. Gods as a principle that unfolds on all 
things, I take it. But then they unfold on my prayers as well. 
I asked them why prayers should be directed to the origin of 
all things instead of being directed to the origins of what we 
want (or fear). In any case, why are origins so important? They 
said prayers should be directed to the ruler. I thought, aren’t 
those prayers somehow making the rule happen? Skendes 
himself slept with his mother while she thought she wasn’t 
sleeping with her son but with a stranger, and for some money. 
When she found out, she didn’t curse the origin of all things 
for making her bump into her son like that, nor did she blame 
the son who fooled her for the sake of some investigation he 
was carrying out, but rather she killed herself. I have always 
thought there is more than one story happening in everything 
that manages to happen. 
(E) I also met the enchanters of Nenaunir.133 Nenaunir resides 
in the clouds, in the rainbow that flags water. Rainbows are in 
the clouds, but they live in the clouds seen from some places, 
not from others – and so does Nenaunir. Her naughty face 
spells peril, as she reigns over evil for those who spot her. But 
then I showed them the rainbow I can concoct by playing with 
running water in my hands. They don’t quite like this kind 
of Abrahamic quest for what is behind their divine spirits. 
They went: you can make Nenaunir appear, but you cannot 
do it on your own – no spirit can, one needs water. Some told 
me Mungo is behind the rainbow and no God could make 
Nenaunir appear without Mungo – not even me playing with 
running water in my hands. Surely, kids paint rainbows with 
sunshine on a sheet of paper. But a painted Nenaunir rules 
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only over a painted piece of land. It is all about power and 
dependence: who can do what they want and who depends 
on superior rulers. Clearly, there are gaps between the realms 
of all those many powerful spirits. Unless each thing is itself a 
god – I asked a Mungo worshiper once. She bowed her head 
and said in a low voice: there are also gaps between things, 
and gaps between the spirits of each gap. There is no god 
for the unruly.
(F) When I cook, I deal with spirits. I don’t dare count them. 
When I count, they become too many – when I don’t, they 
are just one, the one who makes itself present. They are the 
kind of thing that doesn’t agree with the storekeepers. Still, 
sometimes I venture to count them and then decide to redo it 
again a minute later and the numbers end up not matching. 
Plus, to tell you the truth, my attention is rarely enough for 
more than one spirit at a time – even though I have to attend 
to many pots, many fires and often too many clients at once. 
There is no divided attention when spirits are at stake. I once 
thought I could decide to call them all one, but then I decided 
to call them many. The numbers seem to be in the eyes of the 
beholder. Count the stars, and the night sky will disappear 
before your eyes. 
(G) I came across a book of yours years back. It was in 
a bad state, and I read the first part, about Pasteur and 
the microbes, only in passing. The second part, beginning 
with your principle of irreduction, captured my attention. 
The principle made me think a lot about what I have been 
looking for. I didn’t have time to check out how you explore 
the principle in the book. The book was in the hands of a 
costumer here in the hotel when she came down for breakfast. 
We chatted for a while and she left it with me for the day, 
while she was going around for some sightseeing. She was off 
the next day and so was the book. I did copy some pages in 
the photocopy machine we have in the office, but I couldn’t 
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copy more than ten pages in one go. In any case, when the 
costumer came back – she was from Holland or Belgium, I 
believe – we discussed her interest in your work. She told me 
you’re interested in doing what she called an anthropology 
of the faranjis. She said you want to look at them in the same 
way the anthropologists look at native peoples here in Africa. 
I thought you had something important to tell me with your 
principles, and I myself have long been remarking things about 
the faranjis. 
(H) As I said, in my job, I end up doing a lot of talking to 
the faranji costumers in the afternoon. The faranjis! There are 
several things that call my attention to them. To be a faranji 
is not about the color of the skin, not only that. I’m not sure 
I know how to define these people – but most of them come 
with some hidden certainties that they never talk about. I like 
chatting with them. They have a habit of suspicion toward 
most things Africans tell them, and that intrigued me for a 
very long time. I think this is partly because they have a sense 
of reality and everything has to match it, otherwise it is not 
credible. Sometimes I see some distress in them because 
it seems they realize there is too little they are entitled to 
believe. It is as if they have to live in small places, no matter 
where they go. It seems that everything has to fit in the single 
way they conceive what exists and everything else has to be 
placed in some sort of garbage bin where they place things 
that are at most well crafted. I suspect my discomfort with this 
attitude has something to do with my allegiance to something 
like your principle of irreduction. They say polytheism is an 
African idea, and as for monotheism, well, I believe it all 
started out around here too. But I don’t want to get into these 
controversies. I just think things in this life come in many 
colors. Or maybe they come in a single color – but the effort to 
make colors out of what is black as much as the effort to paint 
everything white is something that I often find too heavy to be 
compulsory. Do you see what I mean? Why would one really 
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have to do the hard maneuvers needed to make many seem 
one? It also takes too much work to make one seem many. A 
sense of reality cannot distort your sense of what is true and 
what is false. This sense, on its own, makes things already too 
complicated to grasp. To get closer to truth, as my travels have 
told me, is a hard job, and I don’t understand why it should be 
made harder from the beginning by adopting a general scheme 
for everything. You can see I read your principle in my own 
way – but then again, how else could I have read it?
(I) I realize you are a faranji yourself. Plus, I can imagine what 
kind of faranji you are: one that is a bit burdened by your lore. 
As I told you, restlessness has been in my veins for a long 
time – and I believe it somehow goes beyond the borders of 
ethnic or any other identity. I have met many different faranjis, 
and several who breathe genuine restlessness. I had a long-
standing faranji friend who used to transport cash across 
Africa and who took me to many capitals as she traveled like 
a globetrotter. Anna introduced me to many books and taught 
me much about writing usages. We discussed your principle 
many times in our conversations. She was also very much 
into it, but used it in contexts that were very different from 
my own. She thought it was all about the complexity turned 
simple and the simplicity turned complex of the human soul. 
For her, everything apart from human preoccupations was 
very liberating yet unbearably cold. I took Anna once to travel 
by foot in the mountains in Semien Wollo, around Lalibela. 
There is much there, as you have probably heard, and I was 
convinced I would find something out there that would ring 
like an insight. 
(J) At some point in our weeks walking the mountains, we met 
another faranji traveler, quite adventurous. Myriam Karmona 
was investigating the circumstances of the construction of 
Roha (nowadays Lalibela) and lived in Gondar for some years. 
She took us to have coffee and injera with a small group of 
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men in a small nomad village close to Morora Hospital. I 
understand these people, not more than twenty in the village, 
have lived around the mountains for some time. We talked for 
many hours about these mountains far before Roha was built. 
They have ancient stories they hear from their ancestors and, 
you know, great ruptures are what really matter in people’s 
lives. They feel committed to them as if they were hostages to 
the memories of things that have shaken too much. We arrange 
historical events around catastrophes – or big blessings, 
depending on which side of the break you are. In any case, 
they told us about what had been the biggest turning point for 
the Oromos who lived in the region. They believed that the 
higher the mountain, the closer to the nothingness of the sky 
it gets. To reach nothingness was something simultaneously 
feared and desired, and they used to engage some effort in 
building up further mounts on top of high mountains so that 
they could be even closer to it. To attain nothingness became, 
it seems, an obsession, to the point where they decided to 
make an organized enterprise to come up with a pile of stuff 
on top of a mountain in Muja. The pile was made of whatever 
materials they could get hold of, but the pile had to stand on 
its own. It was made, I understand, mainly of rocks but also 
of some wood and other bits of vegetation. They told us the 
Oromos planted trees on top of the pile and then tried to plant 
more trees on top of the others. It was as if they were making 
an artificial earth, layer by layer.
(K) The pile was a sacred site around which they performed 
many rituals about reaching nothingness and keeping in 
touch with it. I believe they were maybe trying to find ways 
to need less, to crave less, as life in these mountains is quite 
hard and starvation was probably routine. Well, a catastrophe 
took place when the pile came down. It must have taken part 
of the mountain with it, as it seems to have been a huge and 
probably heavy construction. It took many human lives with 
it also. They say that the pile eventually reached nothingness, 
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and then its being itself crumbled into pieces, all of them 
contaminated with non-being, at least to some extent. 
Some pieces gave rise to existences that were flimsy, elusive, 
without substance, like liquids, while others turned stiff and 
stringent. In other words, they say that as the pile broke down 
in shards, existence became varied, a bit as if it were served 
in many different dishes combining being and nothingness 
– like various ways to season what it is with something else. 
Existence acquired many varieties after the pile came down. 
Again, what was one became many. But it was not that several 
things then came into being out of one, but rather that there 
appeared many ways to be. Ways that make things one, ways 
that make things several. Later, Myriam spent hours telling 
us how she believed in Shekhinah – that presence that can be 
found in shards, in fragments, that we ought to bring together. 
She somehow thought all this could have come from the pile 
the Oromos tried to make stand on top of the mountains. 
When the pile came down, significance itself was scattered on 
the floor and under it. And with the pile down, there were also 
many ways to make sense. 
(L) Myriam reckons this tale of the origin of the many 
varieties of existence became the legend about the Tower 
of Babel, where different languages became spoken as a 
punishment for human lack of humility in trying to reach the 
sky. I always thought there was far more to language than the 
way people speak. Language is a translation of a way things 
are, and translations are part of how they are. I wonder, 
though, why the tower of Muja became the Tower of Babel – it 
was moved away from Africa and it was moved from the many 
ways things can be to the many ways we describe how they 
are. It seems to me, as it does too often when the African past 
is concerned, that the tower in Babel was a way to hide the 
pile in Muja. Languages are ways to reduce some things while 
not reducing others. But the fall of Babel left existence alone, 
singular; even though there are many things that exist. Beyond 
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the fog curtain that is the conversion of a pile in Africa into a 
tower in the Middle East, the Oromos thought Muja witnessed 
the origin of a plurality in the very heart of being. Our 
judgments of what is true or false are always within the shards, 
and we never know how many there are. I think the Oromos 
found a way to vindicate reliance on our careful hiking around 
in a landscape of insecurity.
(M) You understand, of course, that I’m not sure at all if I have 
means to know whether anybody ever built this pile in Muja. 
I like what they told me. I don’t mind legends. Sometimes I 
even suspect my memories are themselves legend-makers. But 
I did find some insight in my trip to the mountains in Wollo. 
I think Muja became for me a symbol of how things can be 
incommensurably different from each other. To have a sense of 
reality is always to have one sense of reality: we cannot judge 
cooking as if it is entertaining. It is really curious that Muja 
became Babel – if you hear me in English, my Amharic doesn’t 
make sense. But here in Africa, we don’t make these sharp 
distinctions between languages that I learned to make with 
the faranjis. Languages mix together all the time, and we don’t 
listen to one language judging its grammar by the standards of 
another one. We get around using a mix of them. Sometimes 
one language is just not enough – and yet we can make it be 
enough; but in order to do that, we have to let something go.
(N) The more I think about it, more I find it enlightening 
that Muja became Babel. I did learn to transit between one 
language and another – and to do it quite self-consciously, 
like the faranjis. I very often think I find things in translations 
(even more than what I lose). I move to another language and 
suddenly something that wasn’t there appears – it is brought 
up like that, suddenly, without previous notice. Translation is 
a curious thing – nothing can be anticipated when we move 
to another language. In fact, if it were otherwise, Babel – or 
Muja – wouldn’t have had that much impact, for one could 
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easily move from one language to another. What happens is 
that when we move to another language, we often discover the 
unfelt discomforts that we had in the previous one – and the 
unfelt comforts, for sure. I feel sometimes alien in Amharic, 
because there is a genuine gap between languages. It is a gap 
we cross all the time, but it is not straightforward to explain 
how we do it. I think there is a gap between these many ways 
things are that these people in Wollo told me about. This gap 
was brought about in Muja. A discontinuity that rules over 
the different ways things are – and it is an interesting kind of 
ruler. It makes me remember your principle of irreduction. It 
rules because there is always something to cross between the 
different ways of being. No way can just follow, as a matter 
of course, from any other. There is a pause in things. Things 
have to stop at a crossroads in order to change their way of 
being. The crossroads is the lore of Muja, as I understand 
it. (As much as translation itself was what we took from 
Babel.) In a sense, we cannot have different things if there are 
no separators. These separators, although so hard to attain 
directly, are what I learned to consider the main ingredient of 
how things are.
Well, I have written more than I thought would be suitable. I 
wish you luck and peace. 
Respectfully, 
Idarsal Selassie
New fragments of Heraclitus and the polemos (2)
Contrary to popular belief, Heraclitus survived his ailments and recovered 
as soon as he left Ephesus. He settled for awhile – perhaps with Hermodoros 
– close to Assos and then carried on traveling. This was the beginning of 
a millenary life, in which he lived close to the Etna and could have met 
Empedocles, in various parts of Italy and the rest of Europe up to the 
twentieth century. Then, he went to India, went to Brazil and spent his last 
few years in Deiral-Balah, Gaza. In early 2009, he disappeared, although 
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there are rumors that he has been seen in various places since. This is hard 
to confirm, as he had a habit of living and traveling anonymously. During all 
his years, he reworked the very book he had deposited at Artemis’s temple in 
Ephesus. As he left the place with no copy of the text, he resumed his work 
using only the fragments that emerged afterwards, and legend has it that he 
always carried a Diels-Kranz (DK) version of what survived of his writings. 
In 2012, a book was published in Brazil134 in which a group of 
anarcheologists unveil fragments of an updated version of Heraclitus’s book. 
They claim that Heraclitus had a working copy of the revamped book with 
him in Gaza when the bombardments took place and he disappeared. They 
can only reconstruct fragments based on what was available in more than 
one language. (Apparently Heraclitus had started to write versions of his 
new book in several languages but didn’t complete any.) They published 
these fragments in Portuguese, claiming that the philosopher had expressed 
this wish in the few years he lived in parts of Brazil around 1987 and 2004. 
What follows is a selection of these fragments, mostly translated from 
the Brazilian book. In some cases, marked with a star, I have considerably 
changed the version appearing there based on other versions available. Their 
numeration is built from the standard DK numbers.
53. There is polemos when things are created by other things; it 
makes some believe they are gods and others believe they are 
just mortals. It makes some into slaves, others not. 
128*. Not even once we can swim in the same river. Now is 
a passing state, but here is also a passing state. Without the 
passing of time, the river is not a river. Some say that they 
can imagine an atom of time and picture the river there – 
maybe even swim there. But I say there would be no river left. 
Cratylus corrected me clearly by saying that once is always 
once too much. Cratylus said that the water that arrives at 
one’s feet is not the same that reaches one’s legs. It is not the 
same drop. It is not the same sample. It is not the same tide. 
130. Whenever something comes about, a polemos comes 
about, and then there is politics – a dispute between 
governments. 
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131. Polemos often lies where we don’t expect. It lies not only 
in the catapults, but also in the surprise that meets the polemos, 
in the temptation for polemos and in the knowledge of polemos.
133*. I often prefer to talk about each polemos in turn. 
Not about the beginning, not about the end. I’m not into 
principles. They grow old. I’m into aging instead. Even if all 
things are grounded in the same source, each thing ages in a 
different manner. 
138. I liked to say that the stronger prevails because it is 
stronger – and not due to any law of the strongest. 
139*. The route of the polemos is never other than the one that 
cuts through fringes. 
141*. When physis, which is polemos, was replaced by a realm 
of laws – and nature stopped being strong to become merely 
ruling – it freed itself of wild dispositions and became merely 
an instrument of order and progress. What was left of polemos 
itself was then thrown into the realm of chance.
144. In order for people to reach logos, they should become 
like rolling stones. 
145. It is quite common to exorcise polemos from the world 
by holding that each thing has its core. A core is a conquered 
territory where battles have already been fought and 
everything is properly trained and tamed. We find no cores, 
we find more and more things. In order to persuade ourselves 
that the world is rid of any polemos, we posit a world that has 
no more things than the ones that seem to be unmoving. 
And then we can say, with the sort of philosophy that is most 
popular in the last centuries, that the polemos is in our heads.
147. In the beginning, there was no politics. Neither was there 
polemos. Nor beginning.
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150. [...] on me live the philosophers who didn’t intend 
to have a grip on things […] but rather would approach 
everything on their tiptoes [...]
155. I keep meeting people who act as if disputes are about 
poles. Polarization distorts the polemos – polemos has no poles. 
Its force lies in the sliding of the poles. […] only when we tire, 
we choose sides. 
157*. Physis should not be translated as “nature.” I have myself 
used that translation sometimes, either because I was confused 
or because I wanted to make myself understood. But, come to 
it, nature cannot be hidden. It is all there, all available, all open 
to us – even when we don’t understand it. Physis is rather the 
power or the act in all things – the blossoming of the rose, but 
not the rose. The former is what is hidden – even when all the 
roses have blossomed. 
157b*. Nature, by contrast, is no more than a scapegoat.
169*. I have heard many people talking about idealism and 
realism. It seems there is a realm of thought without nature 
and a realm of nature closed in itself. […] then they ask 
themselves whether they have created nature. I say that the 
moon created the tides. There are slow creations and fast 
creations. It is like a Doppler effect. Things happen because 
there are slower things around them.
175. […] as with the government of the states, our control of 
ourselves is subject to insurrections, rebellions, strikes, civil 
disobedience and coups d’état.
177. There is no cage without an escape route somewhere. 
Still, we cannot escape from the polemos without it – for it is 
escape itself. It is what doesn’t fit in itself. It fits no cage. It is 
not present, but it springs from what is somehow omni-absent. 
178.* There are no archés. What we take to be archés are often 
no more than the slowest things to change. Like when we 
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think we spot a turtle holding the world. Or we spot laws of 
nature guiding it. Or we spot a unitary cosmos grounding all 
its parts. What is slow is not always a metronome setting the 
pace for the orchestra. Often, it is another instrument. Polemos, 
by contrast, is just the lack of archés – it is an an-arché. 
196.*[…] While the river changes, it changes what it drags 
and what can swim in it. Nothing is necessary or contingent 
once and for all. The flowing of the river changes not only 
what there is but also what there possibly is. No law is immune 
to flooding. Some of them are just too costly to challenge 
at the moment.
197*. The world is not a stage, for a stage is an arché. There is 
always a backstage. There is also a back-arché. Things can be 
ready and ripe, but they don’t stay put.
198*. [...] [On the other hand,] attachment to archés springs 
from an interest in control: find out who is the boss and we 
shall deal with him. Find the laws of the land and we will 
strike our deals. But no empire lasts, because no realm lasts. 
Not even the realm of all things. There is no principle that 
could prevent any other beginning. Bacteria, worms and 
viruses as much as roaches and rats haven’t surrendered to 
the alleged human victory over the animalia. Human gestures 
are themselves full of anomalies that resist the humanizing 
principle imposed on all things and mainly on whomever 
happens to be born into the human species. 
202. We have been hunting the animals but not the viruses 
inside them – we never eat from the same plate twice. The 
hunted animal is a cradle. They say back to dust. They told me 
I’m going to go back to dust myself. I ask: which dust?
203*. Polemos is waged by mercenaries, war deserters, those 
who escape from the bright light, those who riot at more than 
one pace, those who rot, those immune to antibiotics.
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204. Things for us, in our perspective, from our own 
viewpoint... I hear about this often, and often it sounds like we 
are the ones who possibly cannot escape the veil that covers 
everything with our fingerprints. It is as if the issue is whether 
we can go beyond the pale. [...]It sounds like we’re talking 
like spies: how to break in, how to see beyond these limits set 
for us. Or, rather, we are engaged in an exercise of voyeurism 
(of those things in themselves). I say that things are rarely 
just there to be perceived. Voyeurism – but of what sort? They 
rarely are seen like when we look at our neighbors through 
binoculars. More often, they give a peep show. They decide 
what and when and how they will show themselves to us, and 
they go back home after work hours. 
205*. An-arché: fate, like grounding, looses its grip when it 
becomes plural. “Everything is fated” could mean “there are 
fates for everything.” There are grounds for everything. For 
each thing, there is plenty of ground, several fates, and many 
intersecting laws applicable. This plurality itself concocts the 
polemos: an-arché. Instead, people often pick a single arché 
and herd it. We cherish poles, identities and labels. We hold 
on to the lasting banks of the river to give a name to it – we 
think of what there is in terms of what can be tracked down. 
Yet polemos, leaving its traces everywhere, is always changing 
tracks. We asphyxiate things by trying to lock polemos out. 
[However, just] like a stone or a grain of sand, it has no doors.
207*. Eros is Eris, and Eris carries polemos. [...] It is a 
centrifugal force that rips apart what is glued together. Its 
centripetal antidote acts often with a quite different speed. 
When we look for ingredients of things, we don’t find in 
them the craving to fragment. There are no ingredients. It 
is like a jigsaw puzzle that cannot be completed and yet is 
never in pieces.
210. While everything is connected to everything, there is no 
such thing as everything [no whole].
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212. Borders are where the war has stopped. Being? There 
cannot be anything but a cease-fire. 
213. [They say, someone says] that words are themselves 
prejudices. So are things. 
214. Nature is full of dirty roads, escape routes, forgotten 
paths and shortcuts. There is no bird’s-eye view of all those 
things, only groping in the occasional shining light. Each 
moment would require a different world map.
215*. Politics loves to hide behind the bushes of nature. 
222. A friend once explained to me that ontology is politics 
viewed from above. I have never stopped thinking about that. 
But I feel the vertigo. 
223. In the middle of all, there is polemos.
226. Who is this polemos? A character? I am the character; 
polemos is no more than a façon de parler.
228*.[…] No description of the world can afford not to stir 
it. Don’t read me as if I were saying that there is polemos or 
logos or anything. I don’t deal in catalogues. Everything can be 
ripped apart. When I talk about what there is, I want to unlock 
something. The unlocking matters to me. What matters is what 
escapes from one’s words. 
236. I like what needs to be thought on the tips of one’s feet.
237. I hear people asking what the world is made of. It cannot 
be made of anything but of world, I want to say. They want a 
list. There are things that cannot be in a list. There are lists of 
things that wouldn’t fit in the world, the world wouldn’t fit in 
any of them. 
252. Polemos doesn’t do anything, but it doesn’t leave anything 
done either.
255*. The polemos is a stage of hubris: struggle can melt each 
convention about ontology.
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259*. The polemos is no demiurge. It gives birth to no chaos, to 
no order. It leaves a trace of exceptions behind it. Eventually, 
they germinate…
260. We avoid thinking about what has no government. It 
is as if thinking dealt with governed matters. [I have been 
convinced that] to think through the lack of government is not 
itself to provide it with a government. There are more things 
between chaos and order than have been dreamed of in our 
last anxious centuries. 
263*. Things are often escaping their orbits. But we don’t see 
them, we see the orbits. physis lives in unveiling. It is not in the 
ready-made stuff. Not the castle in the sand, but the grains of 
sand that are now tied to each other.
271. [It often seems as if we are] taming nature in order to 
tame people. The world is presented as a universe of servitude. 
Sometimes of inescapable servitude. The open possibilities are 
no more than concessions. So people fight for concessions. 
[But, in fact,] no one ever has anything to lose other than their 
chains. To win or to lose are things that happen only to those 
who are ruled.
274. Decrepitude is everywhere. It brings together several 
forces of nature – and it has no borders. Things get loose 
with age. And there is always more degeneration to take 
place; our final form is the lack of form. I always feel a new 
wrinkle carving out my face again, making my body more 
disconnected, more flexible, more trembling, more clumsy, less 
intended. Then come the wrinkles on the wrinkles themselves. 
Aging is centrifugal. It is an internal force of dilapidation. 
All the role models disappear with age. And I feel close to 
everything around. They are all very old. We cannot imagine 
how decrepit the things around us are that we name beautiful. 
We convince ourselves that they were created and therefore 
they are still young. They are not. They were all carved out by 
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wrinkles and further wrinkles. I think of each thing around me 
as hosting a fountain of eternal oldness. 
277b*. Thought cannot strip off the garments of the world. It 
is itself a garment. Nothing, not even the world, is ever fully 
naked – nor fully clothed. Physis loves to hide itself – it cannot 
be fully unveiled. Thought has nothing to do with the naked 
universe. physis, and the polemos that infests it, is rather in the 
undressing. 
286. When I talk about the polemos, I’m not describing the 
underground of things; I’m rather inserting underground 
beneath them. 
286a*. [...] I don’t do geology. I dig tunnels. 
286b.* Words are actors. So are my words, logos, polemos… 
They perform different characters in different acts. At most, 
they carry a style throughout. Polemos is a style of acting. 
299*. I talk about what breaks up. It is no principle (and no 
end). If I liked units, I would say that the units of the world 
are wrinkles, as things are folded on wrinkles. Things are to be 
seen as the origami of what there is. But I don’t particularly 
like units; I prefer to let them go.
321. No, I don’t talk about an ontology of what is left loose. I 
talk rather about what, in ontology, leaves things loose. 
327a*. Let physis remain hidden, and yet don’t turn your eyes 
away from its stains.
Apocrypha from the Sahagún Colloquia and the bringers of 
movement (3)
In 1524, twelve Franciscan friars arrived in Mexico to make sure the 
conversion of the pagans was going in a suitable direction after Cortez’s 
Conquista. Some years later, they convened in Tepeculco under Bernardino 
de Sahagún with twelve tlamatinime, priests and wise men of the place, to 
discuss, in Nahuatl, matters of how things are. The manuscript made by 
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Sahagún and his indigenous collaborators transcribing the colloquia came 
to light years later, but always in an incomplete format. The material that 
circulated featured subservient and easily convinced natives. But, out of 
Sahagún’s material – composed of two books (one of thirty and the other 
of twenty-one chapters) – only the first fourteen chapters were available. 
The missing chapters included parts where the natives described their creed 
more thoroughly. Sahagún, himself a historian of the so-called New Spain135 
and considered one of the first anthropologists136, has changed the structure 
of his book of colloquia quite dramatically throughout the years.137 It is 
unclear what precise effect he hoped his transcriptions would have, but the 
manuscript that ended up circulating (and was later published138) does little 
more than portray the tlamatinime as ready to convert to Christianity. 
There is a considerable amount of controversy about the historical 
accuracy of the document. Some say that it is no more than a piece of 
literature, ultimately having evangelical purposes, while an increasing 
number of scholars grant it historical veracity. The issue, however, has 
become more complicated in the last few years, as two supposed fragments 
of the transcriptions of the colloquia have emerged. They were found in 
a monastery in Popocatépetl, Veracruz, in relatively good condition. They 
display the Spanish version and parts of the Nahuatl version of the two 
fragments. They have supposedly been copied by hand from the original 
transcriptions and preserved for centuries, hidden in the obscurity of the 
monastery library. The authenticity of the fragments is under all sorts of 
religious, historical, ethnographical and anarcheological scrutiny. A factor 
in favor of their legitimacy is that they both express mostly the views of the 
tlamatinime, with almost no substantial counter from the twelve friars. This, 
however, is not decisive. The monks could have kept the manuscripts for 
several reasons unrelated to it being historically factual. 
In any case, the first fragment includes two lines present in the published 
version in chapter 7 of the first book – lines 1017 and 1018. It seems to 
fit well in chapter 7, specifically between lines 1016 and 1017, and could 
have been removed for censorship... The lines of the fragment are therefore 
referred to as VII-1016-2, VII-1016-3 and so forth, VII-1016-1 being the line 
published as 1016. The second fragment seems to fit somewhere in the lost 
chapter 16, also of the first book. As the chapter is otherwise entirely lost, 
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the lines are referred here as XVI-?-1, XVI-?-2, etc. What appears here has 
been translated from the Spanish version. 
VII-1016-2 because every sun rises and sets,
the sun that creates a day
as much as its absence that creates a night
the sun that creates years, generations, eras.
VII-1016-6 One sun after the other.
It was in Teotihuacan
that our present horizon emerged.
This is the fifth sun,
a sun that doesn’t rule by water, air, earth or fire
VII-1016-11 like the previous ones, but by movement.
Its navel nothing but the friction
of one ruler against another
and its Chicoóztoc139 is not one but many.
The sacred place shines in different mountains
VII-1016-16 and in valleys, lakes, cities and holes.
The gods of the fifth sun
are moving forces, they don’t have addresses,
they have roads.
They erode.
VII-1016-21 They digest. They burn. They flood.
It was the Fifth Sun that burned away the 
previous four;
it is not a static sun
but one that has a different light each day.
As those who destroyed all the other stabilities,
VII-1016-26 they are liberators.
We suspect that this is why some macehuals,
common people, welcomed you in their spasms;
because you were also dissolvers,
destroyers of a rule,
VII-1016-31 you brought changes, shifts, alterations, new starts.
Little some of us knew
That you were bringing
a celebration of the un-moved.
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The spirit of the huehuehlahtolli140
VII-1016-36 is that a god frees us from an order,
from another need.
A god is what shakes the perennial.
None of them can rule all because
since Nanahuatzin141 went to fire in Teotihuacan,
VII-1016-41 other gods have bumped into their realms.
gods of the ancient customs
were not those that command,
but those that disrupt.
We need them to displace the commanders.
VII-1016-46 We invoke them to shake what is about,
to bring up the riot and to go away.
We invoke them because without disruption,
we wouldn’t have been born,
we wouldn’t have grown.
VII-1016-51 They make us move.
The tzitzimine, by contrast, are the keepers.
Those who preserve.
The gods come and exorcise
the devils of fixity
VII-1016-56 because they come unnoticed.
This is why gods are several – 
the world is full of chains,
VII-1016-59 full of traps. 
VII-1017 That’s why gods are invoked,
VII-1018 that’s why we pray for them.
So you see that your gods didn’t protect you
from the holy hands of the Conquerors.
They couldn’t because they are not out there
and if they were, they would have recognized 
XVI-?-5 the presence of a greater Force
and perhaps they would be first to bow their heads. 
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And then some priests have contested:
Much as there are turmoil and havoc
amid our peoples since you have arrived,
XVI-?-10 we should see your arrival as an event
of the Fifth Sun.
We are in the horizon of disruption
and our gods are revered 
because they are those who unsettle the affairs.
XVI-?-15 They are those who undo the chains
and leave things unheld
and, as such, open to new rulers;
for no God can both free us and protect us.
To unchain is to erode a determination.
XVI-?-20 To protect is to cherish it.
Whatever we worship in the Fifth Sun
is to be worshiped not as shelter but as roads.
Our gods are here to free us,
and those who advertise their protection
XVI-?-25 are in deviant ways –
even though we are entitled to wish protection
when our land is invaded by murders like you.
Many tsitsimine have come to us recently.
They advertise security
XVI-?-30 or redemption, or a superior order.
They cannot resist the heat of the Fifth Sun.
Yet they make their bites, 
like you do with all this small tsitsimine
that you brought to infect us
XVI-?-35 and kill us and make us feel unprotected.
The huehuehlahtolli is all for what unchains,
for holier is what makes us escape,
and sacred is forgiving.
Our gods are those who forgive,
XVI-?-40 forgo and forget.
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Like in your Bible the debt is cancelled
after a number of years
and promises are forgotten.
Such are the acts of our gods in the Fifth Sun.
XVI-?-45 They are forgivers.
They are many, they are everywhere
because they don’t dwell in small numbers,
and because this sun brings dispute,
our ancient tlamatinime
XVI-?-50 had different liturgies
and they spot movement
in different places
and fixity in different places
depending on taste, season, transport.
XVI-?-55 For movement itself cannot be caught,
except in movement.
This is why, as you have noticed,
hesitation, deception, 
lack of decision and of certainty
XVI-?-60 are appreciated by some of us, priests.
Under the Fifth Sun, they are virtues,
because they manifest movement.
Even though they are painful
they bring about what redeems us
XVI-?-65 and show us the road out.
So I advise you: beware.
We live in the horizon of uncertainty,
and no Conquest will dispel it.
As for us, we seek and treasure 
XVI-?-70 what we don’t know.
It is less heavy on us.
We distrust what seems to merely repeat,
for the Fifth Sun is the sun
of what is loose.
Out of Jesmonite Gisel Carriconde Azevedo, Sculpture: resin and jesmonite, 2010
Chapter 3
Fragments
Leibniz on contingency
Antoine Arnauld famously gave Leibniz a hard time because of what he 
deemed the excessive role Leibniz ascribed to necessity. He accused Leibniz 
of leaving little room for either human free will or God’s freedom to create 
future events disconnected from present ones. In fact, Leibniz envisaged a 
way to consider concrete things as very much like abstract ones – he dreamt 
of a mathesis universalis that would bring the sensible into the scope of 
calculation, at least in principle.142 He thought that what divided the abstract 
and the concrete – the sensible – was simply the line between infinite and 
finite mathematics. These steps, feared Arnauld, placed Leibniz dangerously 
close to a Spinozist image of the world as ruled by immanent necessity, with 
space neither for human nor divine freedom nor for contingencies, except 
perhaps for those that boil down to human ignorance. The danger was that, 
in order to fit the connections between events into a basically mathematical 
analysis, the first casualty would be the possibility of genuine accidents 
in the world.
Louis Couturat attributed to Leibniz a proposition he called the 
principle of reason: a proposition is true if and only if it is analytical.143 An 
analytical truth was taken by Leibniz to be one where the predication brings 
in only what is already present in the subject. In other words, in any true 
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judgment, the predicate is contained in the subject; no truth is other than 
an unpacking of a definition. An event can be no more than a consequence 
entailed by a true predicate of a subject. This seems to leave no room for 
surprises, nor for human or divine decisions that are not predetermined. 
The principle of reason makes it sound as if the appeal to monads and the 
insistence that this is the best of all possible worlds were no more than a 
roundabout way to dismiss everything but necessity and determination.
Yet I believe Leibniz laid the basis for a very useful route to think about 
what is up for grabs. Several features of his system pave the way for a 
conception of contingency by exploring the consequences of metaphysical 
dependence.144 Leibniz conceived of his monads as substances and, as such, 
they endure and subsist through changes. Following a tradition inaugurated 
by Descartes (and followed by Spinoza), his substances had nevertheless 
no substrata; nothing assures their identity but the infinite discernible 
predicates that indicate the events they go through. This is an important 
departure from the Aristotelian notion of substance. First, because there 
is no such thing for Leibniz as primary substance.145 Second, because 
although substances are thought as self-standing, or rather dependent only 
on God – like in Descartes146 – they are intimately related to all the other 
substances in their world. Substances are intrinsically worldly. In fact, there 
is nothing to substances but their infinite predicates that connect them to 
the world where they are. Hence, indiscernibles are identical – as much as 
identicals are indiscernible (that indiscernibles are identical and identicals 
are indiscernible is often called Leibniz’s Law).
Arnauld accused Leibniz of ascribing to God the creation of Adam, who 
is by definition a sinner. For Leibniz Adam has to be a sinner, but nothing 
forced God to create him – Adam is the product of a choice God made. 
Adam was chosen in virtue of all the other items in the best possible world 
and given all that, Adam has to be a sinner but he doesn’t have to exist. In 
other words, Leibniz appeals to the plurality of worlds: there is a world for 
Adam that happened to be the best according to the judgment of God. It 
is contingent that this is the best possible world – although God necessarily 
chooses the best of all possible worlds. Adam existed because of the (wisest 
possible) choice made by God. Spinoza would have it that every thing 
exists necessarily, but not Leibniz. In Williamson’s terms (see chapter 1, 
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Contingentism and haecceitism), Leibniz embraces contingentism, although 
he is to a large extent close to permanentism. Each monad is worldly – God 
created the world in which there is Adam, and Adam is a sinner. God is a 
creator of worlds, not of individuals. 
Each monad in the world depends on all the others through their 
dependence on God.147 Because a monad is attached to all the others in the 
world, its being is distributed throughout the world through the reach of 
their perceptions and the scope of their actions. In fact, Leibniz’s monads 
are places in a world in two distinct senses: they are connected to the others 
in a concerted manner, and they are authorities over a body attached to 
them. These two senses have to do with two dimensions: a) the institution 
of a scope of government and b) the exercise of governance over this already 
instituted scope. This body that expresses a monad is where its governance 
is exercised as it is under its authority. The province of a monad is itself 
infinitely divisible in chunks that are governed by (other) monads no matter 
how small they are,148 and are under the jurisdiction of other monads that 
in turn have to institute a scope and exercise their government. Leibniz’s 
substances can be understood like a generalization – or a speculative flight 
– from souls in the human relation between bodies and souls. The former is 
under some sort of government by the latter. The matter under a monad’s 
authority is like its feud – its territory. Monads are compossible, possible 
together with others – a possible world is an aggregation of compossibles. It 
is with the other monads in a worldly relation that each monad institutes its 
scope of jurisdiction – those scopes have to be compossible. Compossibility 
has something to do with communitas, in Esposito’s terms (see Chapter 1): 
nothing is safe from the rest of the world, except, of course, the world itself. 
Leibniz’s worlds are ultimately composed of simple substances that are 
each different from all the others – each has a specific place in both senses 
mentioned above. They are infinitely many. Monads can belong to different 
types – some of them have apperceptive capabilities and are rational souls or 
spirits, whereas others are ordinary or sensitive souls – but all of them are on 
the same ontological footing. Ontology, in that sense, is flat (at least within a 
possible –and real– world).149 To be sure, a world of monads is not a world of 
atoms, for there is an infinite divisibility of areas of jurisdiction for different 
monads. Each monad reigns over a (variable) part of matter150  and as 
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matter divides, each piece of it is the expression or the body of a substance. 
Monads enjoy from birth a family resemblance with infinitesimals. In 
matter, there are no atoms – and because of this substances are infinitely 
many, like infinitesimals. Schaffer and Bohn have recently introduced the 
idea of a gunky and a junky world – in the former everything has a (proper) 
part and in the latter everything is a (proper) part.151 In these terms, a 
monadological world is clearly gunky (but notice that Leibniz’s worlds are 
not junky for they compose a whole). Flat ontology entails that there are 
no ontological hierarchy between the entities – in Leibniz’s monadology 
substances are not such that any of them has by its nature the upper hand 
over others. All of them are worldly and enjoy the same ontological status.
Each monad is both a part of the world and a part of experience. Each 
simple substance has perceptive capabilities while the events they go through 
are determined by their predicates and therefore by their perspective on 
things. There is a general perceptive capability that enables each monad to 
have a mental pole capable of sensing the rest of the world – although in 
different intensities. Because each monad experiences the world, experiences 
are themselves constitutive of the world – there is a sense in which each 
substance is a piece of experience that is itself determined by all of its other 
world-mates. The spread of perception makes experience with the rest 
of the sensible dispense consciousness – apperception is therefore a type 
of perception. Leibniz understands perception in the broader context of 
how different entities co-exist while taking into consideration the others. 
His monads need no windows because what they ought to perceive is 
already within their inner constitution; and still they perceive and the act of 
perception is itself an event. Perception is a crucial element in the life of a 
monad, for monads are closer to processes than to materials. They are what 
will occur, more than they are building blocks of matter. 
Leibniz’s monads have no location in space (as they are presented in the 
Monadology152), and although each one has an area where it is expressed, 
this feud is not itself the monad. The feud is primarily where the monad 
exercises its authority. The appeal to monads give rise to ontologies in which 
materials have no major role – materials, as such, are not protagonists. 
Typically, monads are not part of a materialist recipe – except when 
matter is equated with processes or potentialities and not with materials.153 
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The concrete is instead explained in terms of monads. The ultimate 
reason for things appeals to monads and their interaction – together with 
compossibility within a world and the appeal to the pre-established harmony 
that makes clocks work in synchrony without consulting each other. 
However, the sufficient reason for something to happen is spelled out in 
terms of monads, in terms of simple substances in their being part in the 
world. The possibility is open for contingency to be thought, therefore, in 
terms of the actualities that compose the world. 
On the other hand, no entity is disconnected from its world-mates. 
Interconnectedness of all monads is achieved through perception: every 
monad perceives others that in turn perceive others. Interconnectedness 
is therefore experience-based. Leibniz considers that for whatever is 
concrete, existence depends on being perception.154 There can be no 
worldly vacuous actuality; that is, there is no worldly actuality that fails to 
affect (or have an effect on) anything. Because every worldly event boils 
down to existing entities while no such entity is fully disconnected from 
all the others, Leibniz is neither a standard priority monist nor a typical 
priority pluralist.155 He does ascribe to actual simple substances all the 
events in the world as pluralists would do, but he also take monads to be 
all interconnected in a way that prefigures a whole as the monist would 
claim. Leibniz’s monadology is a system where monads are responsible for 
everything worldly while they are themselves intrinsically interconnected. 
For a monad, each event is dependent on infinite others; it is reliant 
upon its world. It may seem that contingency is no more than ignorance 
– no monad can foresee everything, because each has a partial, distorted 
view of the world. Notice, however, that even if contingency is no more than 
an expression of ignorance, it is not simply an affair of human ignorance; 
rather, it has to do with the constitutive ignorance of each monad. Ignorance 
is a feature of all simple substances – monads – and therefore contingency 
constitutes each of them. They are themselves incomplete and dependent 
on the rest of the world for their satisfaction – Adam would have no place 
in a world with no apple trees, for instance. To be in the world is to be in 
the open, for one’s government is measured by all the others. Only when 
the whole world is taken into account, where all monads come together, 
ignorance subsides. Contingency is conceived as a feature of the trajectory 
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of each monad, given that such trajectory depends on infinite other monads. 
Only from a world-encompassing point of view that can deal with this 
infinity is a monad’s fate not up for grabs. 
Monadologies
Leibniz conceives of substances as governing authorities at the mercy of 
their world-mates. We can separate Leibniz’s conception of contingency 
from his other assumptions about an available omniscient perspective on the 
world and on the articulation of all substances in a pre-established harmony. 
It is fruitful to disentangle the idea of a monadology and the particular 
use Leibniz made of it. In this sense, his doctrines can be divided in two 
groups: those that propose a general and systematic (monadological) way 
of thinking about the sensible and those that have to do with his particular 
engagements and commitments. I don’t intend to provide an exegesis of 
Leibniz’s work in terms of this division, and in the previous section I did no 
more than highlight some features of Leibniz’s system that point towards 
a monadological approach to contingency. I do think that the idea of a 
monadology contains interesting elements to apply to contingency – and 
some general dimensions of the idea can be isolated from other tenets of 
Leibniz’s metaphysics.
These dimensions come with blanks that can be filled in different 
manners. I take at least three thinkers to have developed the central tenets 
of a monadological ontology further: Tarde, Whitehead and Latour.156 While 
Tarde explicitly acknowledges the influence of Leibniz on his speculative 
system, Whitehead intends his philosophy of organism to be an alternative 
to other systems of modern philosophy, including Leibniz’s. Whitehead’s 
explicit inspiration was Descartes and Locke, and a metaphysical path they 
opened but could not follow since they were prey to the attractions of a 
metaphysics of substances and qualities. His system, I claim, is nevertheless 
to a large extent a monadology. Latour, for his part, is more explicit about 
it as he realizes that his basic entities, actants, can perfectly well be called 
monads.157 The three of them have made different uses of the general ideas 
of a monadology without committing themselves to the entirety of Leibniz’s 
system. They provide existence proofs of monadologies that are not fully 
Leibnizian – and show that we can hope to make sense of a monadology in 
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general. Such monadology provides interesting insights about contingency 
in terms of world-dependence and, as we saw, the insufficiency of each 
monad without all the others. 
A monadology, therefore, is something broader than Leibniz’s system 
(or any system in particular) and therefore it is possible to separate a 
monadology in general from a system in particular. In order to appreciate 
the more general character of the idea of a monadology, I will enumerate 
some of what I believe to be the features that must be present in any such 
system. These are related and yet separated features and, while they are 
central components of Leibniz’s thought, they are by no means sufficient 
to make up the core of his system. I propose these as features of all 
monadologies, although in different and – we will see – sometimes deviant 
forms. In the last section I presented Leibniz’s account of contingency 
highlighting precisely these features. I take the five defining features of a 
monadology to be:
1. Flat ontology – Monadologies posit entities that are responsible 
for what goes on in the world. They stand on the same footing 
– none of them is ontologically superior to any other. They 
affect things through their position, either by instituting with the 
other monads a scope for their expression or by exercising their 
governance in this scope (see a and b above). Leibniz conceives 
of his monads as substances that are compossible within a world 
– they are part of a concerto where each of them play a part.158 
Tarde conceives of his monads as articulating in equal footing 
associations whereby they can exercise their beliefs and desires. 
Whitehead posits actual entities as the prime component of what 
is actual and they interact more like an improvisation than like 
a scored piece of music. Latour conceives his actants (or actors, 
or monads) as making alliances and forming networks to resist 
tests of strength and subsist.159 In all cases, these entities are such 
that no prior ontological structure makes any of them stronger 
than any other. 
2. Perception is everywhere – Monadologies are ontologies of 
perception – all entities perceive others. Perception is not 
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a privilege of conscious beings or organisms but is crucial 
in the glue between the different entities. This is a reason 
why monadologies are often accused of panpsychism: they 
extend to everything a feature associated with mentality – that 
of perceiving their surroundings. To perceive, at least in a 
monadological understanding, is not something that requires 
a full-fledged (human) mind. Monadologies could also seem 
anthropomorphic,160 but perception can be very different from 
what humans do with their sensorial capabilities. Monadological 
perception has to do with the capacity to be affected. Leibniz 
takes all his monads to be affected by the presence of the 
others – although only some of them are capable of (conscious) 
apperception. Whitehead considers perception to be the central 
connection between actual entities – efficient causation is itself a 
form of perception where the effect is what is perceived. For him 
perception provides a general scheme for metaphysics to think 
through how things relate.  Latour, in a Tardean move, conceives 
his actants as guided by how they perceive things to craft alliances 
and be part of networks in their turn affected by what happens 
in other actants and networks. In monadologies, to be is strongly 
linked to being both perceived and perceiving. 
3. There are entities behind anything – In monadologies, an 
explanation always boils down to a matrix of responsibilities 
ascribed to the basic entities. There are no general principles 
or necessities that dispense being supported by actual units. 
Nothing subsists without sponsoring and those sponsors are, 
ultimately, what explain both regularities and whatever lies behind 
them.161 Monadologies are ontologies of agency, although in 
Leibniz monads have their capacity to act bound by their internal 
constitution. In any case, the action of a monad – and events are 
always traced down to predicates – is behind anything worldly. 
In Tarde, monads have to be behind associations and their 
permanence in time. The basic tenet of Whitehead’s philosophy 
of organism is his ontological principle: no actual entity, no 
reason.162 Latour’s actants compose networks, translations, orders 
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and time.163 He inherits Whitehead’s conception of concrescence 
whereby concrete features are always a product of the interaction 
of agents. It is a very monadological idea, for it allows for no 
element to be a scenario for existing entities unless it is itself built 
and maintained by existing entities. 
4. No vacuous actualities – Monadologies conceive of their basic 
entities as interconnected; they affect and are affected (typically 
through perceptual links). There is nothing like a worldly entity 
enclosed in itself and unaffected by anything else. Monadologies 
are about interconnectedness, compossibility and an intrinsically 
distributed character of being. Basic entities are engaged in a 
worldly solidarity that encompasses everything that exists: to exist, 
in a monadology, is to co-exist. In Leibniz, monads are not chosen 
or created one by one but only attending to the compossibility 
that makes a world possible. Tarde is a prince of associations: 
nothing subsists on its own. In fact, this feature of  monadologies 
is the counterpart of the previous one in the sense that both are 
related to sponsors: sponsors are required for everything and 
nothing stands without sponsors. Whitehead rejects vacuous 
actualities explicitly by considering a principle that no actual 
occasion subsists without affecting anything else.164 Latour resists 
thoroughly the idea that something could subsist on its own and 
even that something can be known without being affected.165 In all 
cases, nothing actual can dispense co-existence. 
5. No substrata – The idea that indiscernibles are identical is 
central to any monadology for the basic entities posited are not 
identified through a substratum, but rather by what connects 
them to other entities. It is their position with respect to other 
entities that make them what they are – and these positions are all 
different and infinitely many. Basic entities are therefore worldly 
and enjoy no trans-world identity that would enable them to be 
something completely discernible in a different possible world. 
The reverse is also part of what a monadology is for a single entity 
cannot operate as something discernibly different – they cannot 
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be another entity when seen as something else. Leibniz is clear 
about his rejection of substrata and of discernible identicals – 
unsurprisingly, he espouses what we have called Leibniz’s Law. 
Tarde and Latour hold that monads are to be identified by their 
history of associations. Latour believes that actants are not quite 
infinitely many but come in an indefinite number – as many 
units as there are calculating forces.166 It seems like he could be 
departing from the idea that identicals are indiscernible, but he is 
in fact just emphasizing that there are indefinitely many monads 
that appear through different counting procedures (themselves 
sponsored by actants or networks). In any case, even if Leibniz’s 
Law is not accepted in both of its senses, there is no room for 
substrata. Whitehead conceives his actual entities as having a real 
and an abstract essence, where the former is specified in terms 
of other actual entities.167 He holds that no two actual entities 
could have the same real essence. The dismissal of substrata is the 
Cartesian element in monadologies: entities are not conceived of 
independently of what they do, of how they appear or act. As an 
immediate follow-up from this feature, monadological systems are 
contingentist.
Several additional features could be added to these basic ones. I believe 
the following four features would be corollaries of these six above. A first 
consequence of the previous features (1, 2 and 4) is that the most important 
modality in a monadology is compossibility. This is an important element for 
being up for grabs; no monad is strictly necessary and none is possible on its 
own. They are all compossible. This is because of the thoroughly mundane 
nature of all monads. Compossibility is the monadological tactic to deal 
with contingency: things are contingent on other things to their bones. In a 
monadology, events happen because it is compossible for them to happen.  
Compossibility is a modal relation, and in monadological terms it is a 
relation of infinitely (or indefinitely) many relata. This is one of the most 
crucial of Leibniz’s insights about contingency: it is a matter of dependents, 
and of a number of them not easily counted.
A consequence of 3 and 4 is the second feature: neither priority monism 
nor priority pluralism in monadologies, at least not in any straightforward 
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way. There is an emphasis in the plurality of different actual existents 
understood as basic entities as the pluralist holds but at the same time 
these entities are interconnected is important senses and none of them 
stands alone in a way that insinuates a whole – as the monist would have 
it. Schaffer, as I said, takes Leibniz to be a priority pluralist but it is clear 
at the same time that his world is gunky and everything has a (proper) part 
– every area of jurisdiction of a monad has subareas where other monads 
govern. In other monadologies, the actual world could be not only gunky 
but eventually junky – where everything is a (proper) part. Latour’s actant is 
distinguished from networks only through tests of resistance that determine 
whether the network stands together or its composing actants split. It is 
reasonable to assume that all networks are themselves parts. In Whitehead 
all actual entities form a nexus that is itself part of a gunky concrescence – 
his cosmology is one where space and time enjoy no boundaries others than 
those crafted by the exercise of the actual entities.  
An important feature of all monadologies – which follows from features 
2 and 4 above – is that ontology is thought in terms of governments and 
jurisdictions. This is the third feature. A monad for Leibniz, Tarde or Latour 
– as an actual entity for Whitehead – can be understood as an authority; it 
is associated with an area of jurisdiction, its feud – or body. As Whitehead 
puts it, each actual entity has a mental and physical pole that can be seen 
as what institutes government (and does diplomacy) and on what it is 
exercised. Prehensions – perceptions and perceptions of absences – also 
can be physical or mental and various forms of integration of these forms 
of prehension enable various forms of experience. For Leibniz, a monad is 
not the materials under its authority, but rather the authority over them. 
Monads are centers of command, and also of commencement as every 
event is somehow written in them. This is why they have variable areas of 
jurisdiction in matter: authorities can be exerted over different governed 
bodies. Monads are particles of authority. A monadology depicts the world 
more as a collective of subjects than as a collection of objects.
 Further, when we say that there are monads inside the jurisdiction 
of a monad, we mean that there are other authorities within an area of 
jurisdiction. It’s like a feudal system or, in a sense, a federal government 
with jurisdiction over more than one state area, which all have many 
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municipalities inside their areas, and so on, all the way to individuals 
and beyond. While in other monadologies – such as Tarde’s or Latour’s 
- federal governments negotiate with the subaltern authorities within 
their jurisdictions, in Leibniz’s they all act together in a concerted way. 
Leibniz indeed thought that a general concert involved all authorities and 
no monad would act irrespective of this concert – he postulated a pre-
established harmony. This was his way to tackle the problem of how a 
general design is implemented for the pre-established harmony is achieved 
by distributing governing tasks to an infinite number of local authorities. 
These authorities fulfill their tasks perfectly, and so the general harmony is 
maintained. The problems of interaction in any monadology are problems 
of relations between governments; monadologies always involve some form 
of diplomacy. A general concert of all authorities is one diplomatic solution 
– something akin to a global government solving everything ahead. In a 
monadology, entities act as units of local government, and their diplomatic 
ties – including ties with the subaltern authorities they have within their 
jurisdictions – shape their actions.  
Finally, Leibniz conceives of a monad as dependent on its world, and it 
acts in its picture of the world. This picture is always distorted, because no 
(worldly) monad can have a non-located position; they each have a point 
of view. This distortion makes things that are closer look distinct, while 
other things look blurred because they are farther away. This is why units 
of a monadology have the feature that they can be described as units of 
perspective and what is more distant appears to them as non-individuated, 
non-discrete things. These blurred bits of a monad’s picture can be 
compared with Whitehead’s extensive continuum. The notion satisfies the 
obligation of transmutation, which Whitehead deems important to explain 
Leibniz’s idea that monads have confused perceptions of the whole universe. 
Transmutation is the transformation of a set of actual entities into others. 
Each actual entity starts out on the extensive continuum and brings about 
further actual entities, which are the starting points for the next round of 
actual entities. Whitehead conceives the production of new actual entities 
as a result of the distorted view each entity has. Here, the congruence with 
Leibniz is striking: each entity acts to the best of its (necessarily distorted) 
knowledge. In Leibniz, no two areas of jurisdiction coincide, no two monads 
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are the same and no two pictures of the world are identical. No monad has 
a view from nowhere, but each of them has a (unique) picture. For Tarde, 
each monad acts according to its beliefs – none is in a neutral doxastic 
state. In fact, in monadologies there is always some knowledge in the basic 
entities; nothing is fully knowledge-free. Neither can it know only about 
its own interior, for there is no interiority without exteriority. Thomas 
Nagel attributed to Donald Davidson a version of the Cogito with only 
one letter changed: je pense donc je sais.168 Even though this is itself quite a 
monadological proposition, a more general version of the monadological 
Cogito would go one step further: je suis donc je sais.169 
Harmonia post-estabilita
These features enable very different monadologies from the one espoused by 
Leibniz. In particular, several varieties of process philosophy (see Chapter 
1 above, especially Three speculative accounts of contingency), mainly those 
of Tarde, Whitehead and Latour, can be read as monadologies. The main 
contrast between these monadologies and Leibniz’s is that Leibniz makes 
an appeal to the world as a previously existing entity in a pre-established 
harmony. There is a general concert between the monads, a previously 
arranged diplomacy – a kind of agreed-upon pax – that is guaranteed by the 
unity of the world and by God’s choice of this world. God chose this world – 
a choice which was contingent on this world happening to be the best of all 
possible ones – in a non-necessary move. Leibniz has a separate argument 
for God’s freedom in this choice, but his monadology ensures that monads 
respond to the world and don’t act by blind necessity. However, he adds 
that the world is a unity because monads interact in a previously concerted 
manner, in a pre-established harmony.
While Leibniz can be read as a philosopher of design – he endeavored 
to show how design can be implemented by assigning small areas of 
jurisdiction to governing entities – he paved the way for a diaspora of 
agency. He conceived of design in terms of governing entities acting over 
their jurisdictions. Process philosophy monadologies – such as those I just 
mentioned – tend to do away with design while keeping the diaspora of 
agency by giving something like a blank check to these governing entities. 
As a consequence, there is no articulated whole formed by the ensemble 
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of all existents, no pre-established harmony.170 Latour speaks instead of a 
post-established harmony,171and of aggregation as a pileup.172 There is no 
concerted articulation of monads; diplomacy among them must be done on 
the ground and step by step. There is no global instance that can provide a 
harmony among the parts, no global pax, no pre-established clockmaker. 
Deleuze compares Leibniz’s metaphysics with Whitehead’s by 
contrasting closure – the closure of predicates in the interior of a monad 
– and capture – where actual entities are, so to speak, in the wilderness of 
the world capturing others for some sort of engagement (what Whitehead 
calls “nexus”).173 A closure monadology has the institution of a jurisdiction 
pre-established in the interior of a monad while its exercise is dependent 
on a purely inert matter. Whitehead remarks that Leibniz starts out with a 
generalization of a Lockean account of mental operations, and pays little 
attention to the bodies that appear simply as what is governed. He then 
contrasts his philosophy of organism with Leibniz’s government of monads 
and says that he intends to “hold the balance more evenly.”174    The idea 
that monads are governing actors can be disentangled from any assumption 
about a purely governed material. By contrast, a capture monadology is one 
where a world of existents is the ultimate actuality and each of them is up 
for grabs through associations, nexus, or networks. There are still a mental 
and a physical pole, but the former has to do with instituting an authority 
and the latter with exercising it.  
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism revolves around these two poles 
that are already present in Leibniz. He starts out with four basic notions: 
actual entities, prehensions (perceptions and perceptions of absences), 
nexus, and his ontological principle. The principle amounts to feature 3 
above. Actual entities are not substances, and as such do not subsist on 
their own in time – they are also worldly, as they have no substrata (feature 
5). These actual entities are always affecting and being affected through 
prehensions, and efficient causation is itself a way an entity affects others 
in a way that the effect is perceived. Whitehead would have it that to be is 
both to be perceived and to perceive. These entities prehend other entities 
forming nexus to such an extent that they are responsible for everything 
else that exists – no account of things can be presented without an appeal 
to the actual entities, according to his ontological principle. Actual entities 
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are involved in the concrescence of things (which pertains to prehensions) 
and find themselves in space and time (which has to do with a theory of 
extensions). The first, genetic dimension of the actual entity’s life is where 
the scope of an area of influence is negotiated; it is the dimension of (a) 
instituting the nexus that would enable the entity to affect the concrete. 
The second, morphological dimension of its life, is where the concrete is 
already formed and the authority of the actual entity is (b) exercised. The 
two poles are not associated with a governing spirit and a governed body, 
but rather to a concrescent nexus of actual entities and a concrete entity that 
is thereby formed. Eternal objects such as “red,” “triangular,” or “silent” are 
not actualities; instead, they take part of the prehensions of actual objects, 
and therefore they are qualities in perception that makes a difference in 
concrescence. They are potentialities that are only brought in by actual 
entities in their endeavor to perceive.  
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism has all the elements of a 
monadology and I read him as turning Leibniz’s system upside down. In 
fact, he replaces most of Leibniz’s further assumptions by what can be 
understood as their contraries. So, harmony is post-established, the world 
is an open entity subject to the concrescence driven by the actual existents, 
and God’s (derivative) nature is written by what is created by the actual 
entities. The actual entities become genuine protagonists, and even inscribe 
the ever enlarging nature of God. The movement rehearsed in Leibniz with 
his conception of agency dispersed in the world is dissociated from ideas 
concerning design and ultimate authority. As a consequence, actual entities 
are subject to capture and are genuinely at the mercy of (or in communitas 
with) other subjects in the world that co-exist. It is a capture monadology, 
or a process one where nothing precedes the sovereign agency of the actual 
entities in whom no event is written but who bring about everything that 
becomes concrete. 
Tarde and Latour also put forward process monadologies. Tarde 
talks about associations on the smallest scale, occupied by monads; 
they themselves host associations. Monads are also understood as being 
like infinitesimals, infinitely small, none of them governing the smallest 
possible feud. For Latour they are indefinite in number: it is the processes 
of association and dissociation themselves that determine how many they 
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are. Monads don’t pre-exist interaction – monads themselves are not pre-
established. Similarly, Whitehead’s current actual entities are a product of 
concrescence – of the coming together of different actual entities. An actual 
entity’s capacity to engender other actual entities reveals its constitution 
– “[…] how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity 
is,”175 says Whitehead’s principle of process. In all cases, processes are more 
central than any material. In Whitehead’s ontology, subjective forms and 
prehensions are general and apply to a variety of materials, while for Tarde, 
associations are general processes fairly independent of the materials that 
implement them. Tarde envisages sociology as a study of associations, which 
goes hand in hand with a monadology – the former looks at the structure 
of the social ties, while the latter deals in the various populations that are 
available for social interaction. In all these cases, monads – or actual entities 
– are units of processes and units of experiences. 
In process monadologies, the rejection of substance is complete: 
nothing fully hosts its being. Neither monads nor associations nor networks 
are sufficient in themselves; actual entities are understood as agents in a 
process. Latour’s actants are heavily connected to their networks and they 
cannot subsist without an association that lays the basis for their existence. 
Distributed being is close to the idea that existence requires sponsors – 
nothing is maintained by itself, and everything requires sustainability from 
somewhere (features 3 and 4 above). For Latour all events are trials (of 
strength, of weakness) – things are tested against their surroundings all the 
time. Everything could be involved in anything, producing anything else. 
Latour writes:
“Can you doubt the link that joins B to C?” “No, I can’t, 
unless I am ready to lose my health, my credit, or my wallet”. 
“Can you loosen the bonds that tie D to E?” “Yes, but only 
with the power of gold, patience, and anger.” The necessary 
and the contingent (1.1.5), the possible and the impossible, 
the hard and the soft (1.1.6), the real and the unreal (1.15.2)-
they all grow in this way.176
 A grain of sugar dissolves in water only if the rest of the world provides 
adequate conditions (see chapter 1, Communitas and immunization). 
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In process monadologies, alliances are made on the ground. 
Latour  claims actants are not by nature in agreement or disagreement, 
commensurable or incommensurable, and so they must negotiate.177 Latour 
and Tarde explore the authority of each monad to enable them to craft 
alliances, arrange pacts and negotiate coalitions. The governing character 
of the monad – a monadology can be read as an ontology of governing 
bodies – is made to work and becomes crucial to the process of forming and 
dismantling networks and associations (or nexus and concrescences).  These 
alliances are biased by perspectives. Tarde ascribes beliefs (and desires) to 
his monads, while Whitehead understands all his actual entities to have the 
equivalent of knowledge and action through prehensions. Nothing, however, 
can avoid the distortion provoked by its social milieu or the concrete 
surrounding environment. No process monad can reach a position to see 
the whole scheme of alliances from above – each diplomatic act is based on 
the information on the ground that each monad is in a position to obtain. It 
is because process monadologies make no appeal to a regulating whole that 
they provide an explicit account of what is up for grabs.178 There is no top-
level element that can make entities less available to their co-existing ones. 
Instead of a concert, a process world is a jam where every existent is in the 
Open and can be captured at any moment. In fact, process monadologies 
can be understood as a way to exorcise any immunity. 
Holisms
Monadologies provide a strategy for thinking about contingency in terms of 
infinite (or worldly) dependence. It is a holistic move: it assumes everything 
is connected. The idea of a general dependence – and that of open bridges 
between any two items – provides a framework to think about openness (or 
vulnerability or lack of security). Holism has a family resemblance to lack of 
immunity; it makes a necessary connection between two items impossible 
– no two items relate to each other irrespective of whatever else. Global 
compossibility entails that no two things can be connected in an immune 
way. Hence, sugar dissolving in water depends on all sorts of conditions 
that we take for granted only because we do our best to make them present. 
From a monadological point of view, we needn’t appeal to anything 
exclusively internal to a grain of sugar to explain that it dissolves in water – 
112 Chapter 3
if it happens more often than not, it is because there are regularities in the 
setting, some of which we sponsor. We can say that sugar is soluble in water, 
but this is no more than shorthand for an interaction of many external 
elements, some of which we deem (or make) stable; without them, the sugar 
would not dissolve.
Analyses of dispositional predicates in terms of internal features – such 
as powers179, physical intentionality180 or natural essences181 – have to 
appeal to a plethora of external conditions and circumstances that act as 
antidotes182 for the still-active internal feature. A monadological approach 
makes no appeal to any exclusively internal feature. An interaction – such 
as the dissolving of sugar in water – is due to a conjunction of external 
elements of different sorts. Hume is sometimes criticized for providing too 
little to replace necessary connections. If this criticism is fair, it could be, 
from a monadological point of view, less due to Hume’s actualism – the 
thesis that the real is the actual – than to his atomism – the denial of the 
holist thesis that things are interconnected.
Because no interaction between two items is indifferent to the rest 
of the world, the monadological account can be described as a form 
of secular occasionalism183: there is always an intermediary producing 
the interaction of any two items. In this case, the intermediary can be 
extended to everything else. This is a fair way of describing the holism in 
a monadological approach – although I prefer to put things in terms of 
compossibility.
Now, is the connection between everything necessary? Leibniz took 
global compossibility to have a top-level limit, which is the world. This is 
why Arnauld had the impression that there was no room for contingency 
in Leibniz’s system. There is a point of view that considers everything, for 
there is a world that aggregates every monad and makes them all globally 
immune. Other possible worlds are outside the scope of this world’s global 
compossibility. This view follows a holism with an upper bound – not junky, 
but still not a priority monism. Leibniz’s holism posits a whole; there is such 
thing as everything. In fact, each possible world is a whole in this sense. A 
monadology without this top level would entail a holism without a whole. 
Compossibility would know no limits and, therefore, allows no global 
immunity. A holism without immunity brings compossibility to a further 
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degree – a junky degree. A junky-and-gunky monadology ushers in a holism 
where each monad has every other at its disposal while being in the hands 
of every other. It follows that there is nothing safe from the next round of 
negotiations. To be sure, some things are harder to renegotiate than others, 
but there is no ultimate priority of the whole. To exist is to co-exist, and to 
be is to be engaged in diplomacy. To coin a phrase in French: être est entente. 
Schaffer has explored the ties between priority monism – that the whole 
is prior to its parts – and the relatedness of all things.184 He argues that 
a commitment to relatedness of all things entails priority monism, and 
therefore, that a form of holism implies a form of monism. To be sure, a 
holism that entails priority monism has to posit a whole, and thus not all 
varieties of monadological holism would qualify; some varieties are not 
under the spell of Schaffer’s argument. But there is a more interesting 
reason why at least some monadologies don’t fall within Schaffer’s scope: 
the argument holds specifically that an internal relatedness of all things – a 
holism of internal relations – entails priority monism. I believe the bite of his 
argument is that a holism of internal relations has to posit a whole – and, it 
follows, such a whole is prior.
By “internal relatedness of all things,” Schaffer means that every 
concrete thing is in at least one internal relation with all the others (and 
not that all relations are internal). Aware of how vague the terminology of 
“internal” and “external” is, Schaffer spends some time elucidating what 
he means by an internal relation, and ends up defining it in terms of modal 
constraints.185 Certainly, there are senses in which Leibniz’s monads are in 
internal relation to each other – they are not modally free from each other, 
but rather they are compossible. In contrast, process monadological holisms 
– which are junky – have no room for internal relations in any reasonable 
sense, for monads, or actual entities, are modally free. This means that 
they could be associated with others, but the need for such association 
depends on the setting they are in; they associate because their surroundings 
engage with them. All relations are sponsored, and in that sense they are all 
external. As in all monadologies, no event is prompted either by automaton 
or by physis, but in this case it is a monadology where no whole regulates co-
existence. It entails the external relatedness of all things. 
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Interestingly, non-metaphysical forms of holisms also satisfy most of  
the features of monadologies in general (at least 1, 3, 4, and 5). Consider 
epistemic or semantic holisms – theses that knowledge, confirmation 
or meaning cannot be ascribed to individual units but only to critical 
masses. Although there are a great variety of these holisms, arising mostly 
from the work of Quine and Davidson, they tend to have some common 
elements.186 Knowledge, confirmation, or meaning is conceived as being 
distributed. That is, one cannot know a single thing; nothing is confirmed 
or disconfirmed without further assumptions, or no word or expression 
means anything on its own (features 4 and 5). The counterpart of feature 4 
is that to know, confirm, or mean something is only possible if other things 
are known, confirmed, or meant. Semantic and epistemic properties are 
ascribed to networks, and here again, there need not be a whole, need not be 
a top level in the form of well-demarcated bodies of knowledge (everything 
one knows), or well-articulated classes of theoretical claims (single theories 
distinct from their background assumptions), or language (in the sense of a 
set of sentences coming out of a generative procedure).
Davidson’s holism187 is a clear expression of the connection between 
thought and knowledge.188 His externalism concerning mental content ties 
thought intrinsically to truth and therefore to some knowledge. Once I 
cannot know about myself without knowing something about the rest of the 
world, there is no (Cartesian) ignorant thought that accesses no more than 
my own states and events.189 His argument leads to the idea that in order to 
interpret my own beliefs – or know what my words mean – I have to share 
things about the world with others. The interpreter and the interpreted have 
to share some content, otherwise there can be no detection of thought. This 
shared content, which can be impossible to pinpoint, cannot constitute less 
than knowledge of the external world, if there is any sense at all in which to 
conceive an external world. Otherwise, the argument goes, there would be 
no sense to assessing my beliefs against anything that could make them true. 
The world is reached by thought through its coherence, which means that it 
has to start out with some knowledge.190  
Independently of the merits of Davidson’s argument, it is interesting 
to point out some of its monadological elements. Thought is not isolated; 
it is impossible without accessing something of the world, for there is no 
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self-standing realm of thought – or meaning. Knowledge of something (or 
belief about something) is already knowledge or belief about something else 
– there are no atoms of knowledge. Instead, knowledge has to come in some 
sort of critical mass. The revealing exercise of interpretation – in a radical 
scenario or not – is a process of gauging with compossibles. Everybody has 
some knowledge, but to the extent that they have different beliefs, they know 
different things.191 Any of my beliefs can be kept or changed, but only at a 
cost to be paid in adjusting my other beliefs. It would be worth exploring 
to what extent Davidson’s doctrines show the power of monadology to 
enlighten holisms and vice-versa, even though in his case, holisms seem far 
from his central metaphysical assumption. I’ll return to some elements of 
his doctrines below. In this chapter, however, I concentrate on metaphysical 
(monadological) holisms. 
Partial monadologies
Monadological features associated with the idea of a post-established 
harmony can help us understand how items that exist are responsive to 
each other. Monadologies combine the emphasis on individuals and an 
account of their interconnectedness. Graham Harman has championed an 
object-oriented ontology whereby the ultimate components of what exists 
are objects that, although of different natures, share a similar quadruple 
structure.192 Objects are attached to their qualities, which can be either 
sensual or real. The former are qualities impressed on other objects – the 
shapelessness of snow when melting in a river or the sweetness of an apple 
appreciated by a trained Alpine resident – while the latter are qualities of 
the object proper and not of the object as the content of an impression. Real 
qualities are lasting ones, the ones that resist changes of perspective, like the 
height of a mountain viewed from different locations. Objects themselves are 
also sensual and real – for instance there is a real melon and a sensual one, a 
real otter and a sensual one.
Objects, qualities, reality and sensuality (or appearances, or affordances) 
are points that articulate the two axes of Harman’s quadruple structure: real 
objects, sensual objects, real qualities, sensual qualities. Real objects interact 
with each other only indirectly, through sensual objects – it is the sensual 
melon that is devoured by a mouth, the sensual otter that is touched by 
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another otter. It is, Harman stresses, a form of occasionalism, for something 
else has to interfere in order for two real objects to be in contact with each 
other. Harman conceives of object-oriented ontology as a general scheme to 
explore the plot brought about by any kind of object. Several authors have 
recently shown how fruitful this approach is – among them Tim Morton, 
Sara Ahmed, Tristan Garcia and Levi Bryant. Morton draws on Harman’s 
quadruple structure to introduce the idea of hyperobjects: enormous 
structures like the planet or its atmosphere that intersect with each other in 
space and time.193 
An object-oriented ontology is not a monadology, but satisfies some of 
its features. Harman insists that objects compose other objects and there is 
no primacy in this matryoshka. Object-oriented ontologies are flat. Harman 
has criticized both the overmining and the undermining of objects in the 
history of philosophy: not considering objects but their aggregations or 
their components as central elements. Objects are not to be over-arched 
by anything else and objects enjoy an ontological democracy. Objects are 
understood as having both a real and a sensual component.  
They are perceived and perceiving, which redeems feature 2. Also, 
objects contrast with matter. As Morton’s hyperobjects make explicit, 
objects can be found in all sorts of material stuff and are to be neatly 
distinguished from their materiality, which furnishes only some of their 
qualities, both real and sensual. Indeed, Harman understands his ontology 
to display the advantage of avoiding materialism.194 As for connectedness, 
sensuality is conceived through other objects – it is only because other 
objects have sense that there are sensual objects and qualities. Feature 
3 is also obviously satisfied because everything is to be explained in 
terms of objects.
On the other hand, objects are partially autonomous. They have secret 
lives; they survive, when withdrawn from their public appearance, in a reality 
that is independent of any other object. Such independence makes an object 
less worldly; it keeps its identity in other worlds, for all it needs is that there 
are other objects to provide sensuality. Still, objects are not substances in 
the sense of self-standing units that can be taken apart from anything else. 
There is a sense in which objects are governing entities. They have a space-
time associated with them and they relate solely with other objects – not 
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with their material territories as such. Also, there is no global object that 
can apperceive all the others – that would amount to a sensual object that 
encompasses all other objects. Perspectives (in terms of sensual objects and 
sensual qualities) always lack an element of reality, the one that is withdrawn 
from sensual access. This withdrawn element is something like a substratum. 
Further, it is not clear that objects cannot be vacuous actualities. It is not 
clear, therefore, that features 5 and 6 are satisfied. 
Object-oriented ontology postulates partially autonomous objects, and 
that makes the resultant partially monadological. This partial autonomy 
results from the idea that the tension between objects and relations is to 
be resolved inside the objects themselves.195 Harman posits that objects 
have a withdrawn dimension, the counterpart to their availability to be 
sensed. The real part of an object is what resists any qualitative relation and 
any sensual integration. In line with the spirit of Leibniz’s monadology, 
there is a blind spot to every perspective while to be entails to know. As a 
consequence, the noumenal is not a feature of what escapes our knowledge 
but rather an inherent feature of any object, the part of it that is withdrawn. 
However, this withdrawn feature stems from objects being partially 
autonomous and therefore self-standing in their realities. As a consequence, 
objects are not worldly, and something distinguishes their identities and 
their indiscernibilities. Objects, unlike monads, can be (at least partially) 
detached from their relations with the rest of the world. If so detached, 
they enjoy at least some independence from other objects. Object-oriented 
ontology, as a deviant or partial monadology, is therefore farther from 
contingentism than a standard monadology.
Leibniz’s monads were substances without substrata; other monadologies 
made monads something other than substance (actants, actual entities). 
Monadologies indeed appear in several forms, and some of them are 
interestingly deviant. Another case I would like to mention briefly is 
Simondon’s process of individuation, which seems to point toward a 
monadless monadology. In fact, Simondon’s process philosophy (see 
Chapter 1 for some of its tenets) can be viewed as an attempt to focus 
philosophical attention on operations rather than on operating modules – 
metaphysics, he suggests, should be more allagmatic and less obsessed with 
the dramatis personae of the world. It is interesting to conjecture that perhaps 
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Simondon espouses a partial monadology that is the mirror image of object-
oriented ontology. In any case, it satisfies precisely features 4 and 5, which 
are absent in object-oriented ontology. 
Allagmatics, the theory of operations that Simondon brings to the 
forefront, deals not with how a piece of matter acquires its shape but 
with how shaping the piece of matter involves all sorts of twists and 
vicissitudes.196 Allagma is the cost of an operation – for example, the cost 
of a process of individuation. Individuals appear as no more than by-
products of a class of intertwined operations. Feature 4 is therefore present 
as any individual is concresced by a process of individuation and is part of 
further allagmatic operations. Something other than the individual always 
comes also out of an individuation process – procedures of composition, 
gestures of ontogenesis, dynamics of making something singular – and more 
than the individual is always present in its formation – forces, movements 
of aggregation, transfers of information. Individuals are not the main 
characters; they are nothing but the provisional end points of ontogenetic 
processes of individuation, in which relations are more prominent 
than any relata.
Indeed, Simondon thinks individuals are little more than useful resting 
places, for their gestation cannot be explained solely in terms of their 
achievements. Water and earth together compose mud, one would say, but 
only if they are placed in the same place, at the same time and in a certain 
manner. Without the operation, one gets no mud out of water and earth. 
Similarly, the operations connecting things are far more crucial to how 
things are – which has to do with a continuous ontogenesis, for Simondon 
– than their components. It is a Lewis Carroll-like move of making explicit 
the infinite postulates needed in order to draw a conclusion from a modus 
ponens argument without a rule of inference – Simondon would insist that 
premises aggregated together lead nowhere without the performance of the 
right operation. It is through the relations between the many terms involved 
in a thing’s production – terms internal and external to it – that it ends 
up being the way it is. Further, there is no final endpoint to ontogenesis. 
Simondon shifts the attention from substances and terms to relations and 
operations. Instead of looking at what stays put, he looks at what precedes 
and constitutes individuation. To be is to operate. This has a monadological 
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feel to it, but the resulting monadology is only partial, since feature 3 is 
clearly absent (and arguably, 2 cannot therefore be present). 
Still, Simondon seems to be close to the spirit of a monadology in 
which he takes his emphasis on relations to the extreme of rendering relata 
irrelevant. If substances in a monadology are hardly any special harbor 
for being, Simondon makes them even less privileged. Although it makes 
no room for monads – apart from the dim place given to those transitory 
and ontologically squalid ready individuals – Simondon’s ontogenesis can 
be viewed as monadological, since everything is to be explained in terms 
of its constitutive operations. The difference is that these operations are 
not performed ultimately by operators, by individual actualities. In fact, 
no self-standing individual can be detached from the relations that make 
it what it is.  Neither is there room for pre-individual atoms, of the sort 
Harman197 dismisses, for processes of individuation – which are necessarily 
pre-individual – cannot be taken as individuals without appeal to whatever 
individualizes them. Allagmatics is structurally gunky. Being lies in the way 
individuals are constituted. Feature 5 follows suit: no substances and no 
substrata. No individual, and no operation, carries any potentiality that is 
independent of everything else in its world – no modalities independent 
of the vicissitudes that make ontogenetic operations co-exist. Also, there is 
hardly any room for any modality other than compossibility.
If we take Simondon’s partial monadology as the mirror image of 
object-oriented ontology, it is clear that the emphasis on feature 4 in the 
former and on feature 3 in the latter points towards the split between 
priority monism and priority pluralism. While a monadology is neither, 
object-oriented ontology leans towards pluralism and Simondon’s partial 
monadology shies away from the postulation of any individual. However, 
Simondon seems to have little room for an image of the whole process 
without a blind spot. Indeed, his appeal to transduction provides a 
continuum between the information-processing capacities of physical 
beings and those of human subjects theorizing about the world from their 
own standpoint. Transduction is both a theory about how to be is to know 
something – to be is to proceed by analogy with what the being finds around 
itself – and a doctrine about the status of such a theory – we produce 
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the theory by making an analogy with what we find around ourselves. 
Simondon writes:
[…] it should be assumed that science will never be 
accomplished, for it involves beings with the same degree of 
organization: a material system and a living being organized 
trying to think through this system through science. [...] the 
relation between thought and reality becomes the relation 
between two organized realities that could be analogically 
related through their internal structure .198
Thinking is always situated and perception is always engaged in a 
perspective. Simondon’s focus on situated operations is in line with the 
monadological taste for interconnectedness as much as object-oriented 
ontology is in line with the monadological stress on the basic character of 
the individual existents. They are partial monadologies, though. A complete 
monadology accommodates both the taste and the stress and revolves 
around interconnected individual existents. 
Fragments, compositions, composers
The sort of process monadology I believe to be a revealing ontoscopy of 
what is up for grabs starts out with the notion of fragments. The point 
of departure is to consider fragments on their own and not as pieces of 
something hidden or broken. Attention to fragments looks at parts focusing 
neither on wholes nor on  ultimate components. They compose a world in 
which every part also has a proper part: junky and gunky. So, fragments are 
composed of further fragments, and a world of fragments can be described 
in terms of Heraclitus’s fragment 207 (see Anarcheology 2/207*), “[…] 
like a jigsaw puzzle that cannot be completed and yet is never in pieces.” 
Fragments can be thought of as traces, but not of vestiges of anything else – 
rather, as uninterpreted pieces. We can treat them as elements of the world, 
more like shards than like atoms. Although they can be further fragmented, 
they appear as units. We can take them as ready-mades. Yet they are also 
elements for further arrangements. They can be compared with actants 
in Latour, because they are units to the extent that they are treated as 
units.199 They are not units per se. They are also like Souriau’s phenomena, 
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because they display a generosity, the generosity of an ingredient which is 
incomplete, and yet on offer.200 They offer themselves as building blocks. 
They display what Souriau labels the inachevé character of whatever exists – 
the uncompleted character.201 They are like blank checks, or like existential 
promissory notes. I understand fragments to be like anything that can be 
found, either lying on the floor or during, say, a process of translation. These 
are found not as anything complete but rather as units of availability, units 
up for grabs. 
Fragments are like process monads, like actants, like actual entities. 
They compose the basis of a capture monadology if they are seen as having 
multiple modes of existence (see Chapter 1). Souriau’s existential pluralism 
has it that a single thing can exist in more than one mode; hence, the 
proposition that there are several modes of existence can fit together with an 
ontological monism. Likewise, fragments also exist as compositions – they 
are composed of other fragments, assembled from other compositions. In 
short, monads exist as fragments but also as compositions. They are up for 
future compositions but carry the vestiges of their previous ones in them. 
Just like objects made of other objects, fragments are composed of other 
fragments. They also display an important dimension of Harman’s objects: 
they have a secret life, a withdrawn dimension to them. Also, they often 
belong to more than one composition and therefore appear as characters in 
more than one plot. This is why I conceive of them as also existing in a third 
mode: they are also composers. Composers assemble other fragments – they 
are sponsors who turn fragments into compositions. Composition has a 
role similar to that of prehension in Whitehead’s scheme: composers enroll 
existing fragments for their products. Composers are agents that produce 
concrescence. Here, each fragment is a fragment-for-a-composer rather 
than a fragment-in-itself; there are no actual entities that are not at the same 
time compositions-for-a-composer. There are no free-floating fragments; 
they have all been composed previously and are therefore compositions, 
and parts of compositions. Composers find the building blocks for their 
compositions in existing fragments; no composition is done from scratch. 
A composer is never entirely its own composition; typically, a composer 
brings about something else. Holism follows from the interconnectedness 
of all composers. A composer finds ingredients in fragments that appear 
122 Chapter 3
in its field of apperception. They are sponsors, but they cannot sponsor on 
their own. Nothing composes on its own, because there is no non-composed 
fragment – like building a cathedral out of stones that were carved for the 
Inca buildings in the Qusqo area of Peru.202 Indeed, in the monadology of 
fragments, there is no separation between those that sponsor and those that 
are sponsored – between subjects that act and believe and their objects, 
which are passive and mere contents of beliefs. Composers can be seen as 
more on the subjective side; they harbor perspectives. 
This completes the elements of our triune existential monadology: 
monads exist as fragments, as compositions, and as composers. They 
interact in these three different modes with other monads. As composers, 
they have areas of jurisdiction in which they co-govern. The act of 
composing involves (a) instituting a scope and (b) exercising governance. As 
compositions, they are areas of jurisdiction co-governed by their composers 
– and to an extent they can even be, in part, the composers of themselves. 
Monads relate to each other through composition while always being 
themselves fragments in further compositions. All monads put together also 
bring about a composition, but surely such a composition is also a fragment 
(as everything is a proper part) and a composer assembling together 
what is around it. In the monadology of fragments, there is no concerted 
composition, for the movement of each composer has to be negotiated on 
the ground with all the others. Each composer is a fragment and composes 
out of fragments. This triple existential character means that fragments are 
monads of an ever-incomplete other fragment. Such a monadology, as the 
next section makes clear, brings home how the articulation of monads can 
elucidate the process of a gunky and junky assemblage.
Fragments, compositions and composers: A monadology
The monadology of fragments is a flat ontology: nothing has a privileged 
ontological status over anything else. Everything shares a common plane. 
There is no overwhelming upper hand initiating or maintaining anything. 
Fragments are forged within the shared space of all other fragments, which 
is a space where every composition lies out in the open. This openness 
shows the communitas of each fragment. Fragments can be very different: 
they surely can be objects, but they can also be ethical calls, machines, 
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invitations, crises, plays, scenes, slogans, books, languages, expeditions, 
conversations, mood changes or the arrival at the edge of a lake. Further, 
they can be movements of thought, beliefs, fears, gestures, leaps of faith, 
perceptions of color, perplexities or ingredients in the proof of a theorem 
within a formal system. In other words, monadology spreads through what 
we normally think of as mental. Fragments are composed of aggregates of 
different materials and they can be pieces of events. 
Each fragment has an internal composition that is ontologically no 
different from its surroundings: further fragments. This is a dimension 
of the flat-ontology character of this monadology: there is no ontological 
distinction between what is internal and what is external. There is no 
structurally different interior. Also, fragments can overlap in areas of 
jurisdiction, like Morton’s hyperobjects. The borders between conversations 
and mood changes, for example, can be intrinsically fuzzy in a way that 
imbricates their areas of jurisdiction. Further, not only can fragments 
overlap with each other, but they can also be spatially discontinuous. 
My writing of these lines here in the Zócalo of the port of Veracruz is a 
fragment of this book but also a fragment of an assemblage of people doing 
different things while waiting for Petrona Martinez to start her gig on the 
stage in front of us. The public waiting for Petrona is itself a composition 
and a fragment of the attendance at her venues during her Mexican tour. 
Petrona’s tour is also a fragment dispersed in time among different locations. 
Compositions – as fragments – can display all sorts of spatial and temporal 
forms in their areas of jurisdiction. They can be scattered in space and time 
– their unity, indeed, is always in the eye of a composer. 
In fact, the monadology of fragments develops the idea that there is 
no mundane view from nowhere. Fragments are always fragments-for-a-
composer and cannot be identified as fragments if viewed from nowhere. 
In fact, the monadology can be described in different terms according 
to monads’ three modes of existence: in terms of scattered fragments 
for any composer, in terms of how monads are brought together by 
different composers and in terms of what they do as composers. Monads 
can therefore be described as items in an inventory for compositions, 
as complete compositions out of other composition, and as composers 
sponsored by further composers. This last description can be considered 
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transcendental, for it presents monads in terms of their conditions of 
possibility: what has made it possible for a fragment to be there, or which 
composer has brought it about.
Fragments have a transcendental nature; they constitute other fragments 
by means of their composition process. Composition is never achieved from 
nothing and is never the work of a single composer – the raw materials for 
a composition are simultaneously its co-composers. This transcendental 
description of the ontoscopy makes clear that there is no room for elements 
that are fully subjected to something else’s action. Every fragment is a 
transcendental subject. Perhaps the monadology of fragments provides 
a sociology – in Tarde’s sense – of transcendental subjects: they must 
compose together, for there is no extra-social raw material available. It is as 
if phenomena were themselves transcendental subjects with which a subject 
has to negotiate in order to attain a worldview. These transcendental subjects 
make the alliances that sponsor the monads with which they associate. A 
transcendental description provides a picture of the chains of sponsorships 
that connect the monads together.
Comparing the transcendental dimension of the monadology of 
fragments with composition within a language can prove fruitful. To write 
or say something is to engage in a co-production with all the bits and 
pieces that language users have left in the fabric of sentences. Composing 
in a language is always co-sponsored by the resources the language offers 
– its expressive biases, its grammatical constructions (associated with a 
descriptive metaphysics), its tenses. For example, when Michel Callon 
crafted his powerful motto “no economics, no economies,” he appealed to 
English words and their capacities. Hardly any other language can convey 
the same message – translations of the sentence make it longer and more 
convoluted. The English words economics and economy are themselves 
compositions made of other fragments, but they act as co-composers of the 
motto. Language composition displays several elements of the monadology 
of fragments: words are fragments and compositions, and they have a 
composing force that provides decisive biases. Language composition 
especially exhibits features of this monadology if we accept meaning holism, 
with its rejection of singular words or phrases as bearing semantic atoms. 
Language, as Quine wrote in the opening of his Word and Object,203 is a 
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social art. And social art is what the monadology of fragments is: fragments 
are associated to produce compositions, each of them carrying a driving 
force that affects further compositions.204 Here, as in Tarde’s monadology, 
monads are always associated, and the intensity of their social ties hints at 
their influence in each composition. Just as with language compositions, no 
composition has a single or an ultimate origin. The difference, of course, is 
that in the monadology of fragments there are external composers that are 
not themselves words or sentences. This is the limit of the analogy: there are 
no composers that are not themselves up for further composition.
Composition is also concrescence. Different spaces and different times 
are composed together by capturing other fragments. Spatially extended 
monads could be tables and chairs but also colonial powers and universities. 
As long as it is seen as an individual available for compositions, the fragment 
holds up – but solely for those who see it as such. Hence, universities are 
not fragments for ticks or for winds, but it is a fragment – or rather a stable 
composition – for its administration. From this point of view, the university 
is a point in a space – a space of faculty ranks, a space of commercial 
interchange, a space of legal interaction. Spaces are themselves fragments up 
for grabs in compositions in the eye of a composer. Spaces are concresced 
for those who manage to perceive them as such. Something similar takes 
place with times. A new composition can enroll fragments from previous 
times. Latour claims that, after 1864, aerial germs had existed all along.205 
In terms of the monadology of fragments, aerial germs are compositions 
– composed by Pasteur, among others.206 Their existence is not placed in 
an already-given time, independent of any composer, but rather can take 
place in a past that needs several sponsors. Pasteur’s merit would then 
have been to negotiate with co-composers of all kinds to make sure that 
aerial germs were robust in their eyes – robust enough to be part of their 
compositions concerning the past previous to his composition. Scientific 
discoveries establish compositions that are thought of as having been there 
all along. They are compositions crafted with fragments of the past. There 
is no ultimate temporality (or overarching spatiality), as there is no ultimate 
composer – and no general, all-encompassing view.
The monadology of fragments has many features in common with 
other process monadologies, and the stress on concrescence is central to 
126 Chapter 3
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. In fact, Latour’s appeal to networks 
reinstating times of the past, like the era of Pasteur, can be traced back to 
Whitehead’s denial of a pre-existing order of time – no concreteness without 
actual entities engaged in concrescence. The monadology of fragments, 
however, can go one step further than Whitehead. For him a raw material 
for prehension – and hence for concrescence and composition – is a class 
of eternal objects. But these are not actual ingredients for composition, 
and as such they are already there. They are Platonic components that are 
available for use by actual entities – so that tomatoes can be red for us and 
universities can be competent for an assessing board.207 Those objects are 
ready to be taken by actual entities and are not themselves decomposable. 
They cannot be described as both eternal objects and as fragments, 
compositions and composers. Whitehead claims that these elements for 
predication are not actual and therefore don’t have to be subject to his 
ontological principle (no actual entity, no reason). The monadology of 
fragments considers the material for predication as consisting of monads 
more than anything else. The predicate “red” can be explained in terms of a 
network of actualities involving concepts, sensory devices, pigments, lights 
and so on. A predication is itself a composition – and in order for S to be 
P, an entente has to be found between the two poles. The appeal to eternal 
objects is replaced in the monadology of fragments by a composition that 
is clearly a composition-for-some-composers. No appeal to mere potentials 
is required.
Fragmentalism and the secret life of fragments 
Kit Fine considers the relation between reality and perspectives from the 
point of view of the problems in the philosophy of time brought up by 
J.M.E. McTaggart, who introduced the distinction between A-series and 
B-series for time.208 The A-series is indexed by terms like past, present and 
future (or yesterday, today and tomorrow, etc.). The B-series presents moments 
in time like pictures in an exhibition that can be seen in any order and at 
any pace; it is time viewed from nowhere. The A-series, like the arm of 
a clock, is what introduces change into B states. McTaggart’s argument 
is that there is no change and no genuine passing of time without the 
A-series and therefore without the vocabulary of past, present and future. 
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To understand the passing of time, we need to be able to locate ourselves 
in a present tense. McTaggart then despaired of the reality of time, because 
time introduces tense – and perspectives – into the world. His conclusion is 
grounded on three assumptions concerning the nature of reality: it is neutral 
– no perspective is privileged over the others; it is absolute – not relative 
to a perspective; and it is coherent. McTaggart’s A-ism (the thesis that 
time requires an A-series apart from the B-series) is based on these three 
assumptions and therefore must reject the reality of time.
Fine explores the alternatives to a realist A-ism. One can reject the first 
assumption about reality and embrace, for example, the idea that only the 
present is real. It is a popular idea – Fine dubs it “standard realism” – in 
the philosophy of time.209 It can be extended to grant privilege to any 
perspective – the human take on things, the actual world as opposed to all 
other possible worlds, or the first-person perspective of self-knowledge. 
One can also reject at least one of the two other assumptions and posit that 
there is no such thing as a reality independent of tenses or perspectives, and 
therefore that it is not absolute or that reality is not coherent.210 In order to 
explore this last option, which unifies all perspectives on reality, Fine crafts 
the concept of an über-reality which is the (incoherent) aggregation of all 
perspectives. True, one cannot be in über-reality, and therefore either “I am 
sitting” or “I am standing up” ought to be false in the present (and maybe 
true in the future or the past). There is an assemblage of all perspectives, 
but nothing can move in this assemblage without being in a particular 
perspective.
Fine favors this last position – that reality is incoherent – and labels it 
fragmentalism. A fragmentalist conception of perspectives brought together 
in an incoherent aggregate is akin to the monadology of fragments. For 
Fine, each perspective is a fragment of the über-reality formed by the 
superposition of all perspectives. In monadological terms, perspectives 
are compositions that fragments bring about, and they are never single-
authored. In both cases, perspectives interact with each other without 
cohering. The overall image is one like Latour’s in which we cannot count 
how many monads there are until we consider each monad’s perspective. 
The overall image that the monadology of fragments provides is not that 
of a landscape that can be achieved by a viewer, but actually  no more 
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than a juxtaposition of perspectives, affording no worldview.211 Fragments 
cannot be fully displayed on a world-map. Each fragment composes its own 
map that, as a composition, is itself a fragment. Unlike Leibniz’s monads, 
fragments are governing and governed bodies. In a monadology of fragments 
there is no jurisdiction assigned to a of a fragment, but rather a fragment is 
a self-standing unit that can be decomposed and recomposed at any time. 
They affect other compositions while not being immune to other composers. 
Fragments are more like countries than like objects. They have flexible 
borders (like Leibniz’s monads) and disputed jurisdictions and must appeal 
to diplomacy to make a composition.212 They are, nonetheless, not only 
countries but also states, provinces, municipalities and so on. They achieve 
jurisdiction by internal and external diplomacy, for they come in matryoshka 
format. They form a gunky and junky matryoshka of world maps growing in 
all directions. 
Fragments are not atoms. Like Leibniz’s territories associated to 
monads, they can be always divisible and this vulnerability is the basis of 
their ontology. It is important to notice, however, that they are not simply 
governing bodies because no piece of matter is theirs by entitlement. As 
in other post-established harmony monadologies, there is no distinction 
between a monad and its legitimate area of jurisdiction. There is no 
innate distinction between the governing entities and the governed ones. 
Governments are themselves areas of jurisdiction. The distinction between 
bodies and spirits that motivated the (speculative) generalization of the 
Leibnizian monadology – there are relations like the one between body 
and spirit everywhere – is replaced by a generalized focus on government.  
Unlike Leibniz’s monads, fragments can themselves be fragmented, and they 
are incorrigibly incomplete. They are not self-standing governments, but 
are pieces of authority that can be decomposed and made part of different 
compositions. Rather than as infinitesimals, they can be understood as 
indefinitesimal pieces of authority. 
I would like to close this section with a note on the internal structure of 
a fragment. As I have said, there is no need to posit an internal composition 
that is different from what is outside. If we compare fragments with 
Harman’s objects and their quadruple structure, we can consider how to 
make room for the ontological withdrawal. Harman conceives of objects 
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as having secret lives, withdrawn not only from us but also from any other 
object. Reality for an object is to resist, to escape, and to withdraw. Objects 
supersede, they transcend. Harman talks about the fission and the fusion 
that together create something new from the tensions involving objects and 
their qualities.213 An object goes through fission into several sensual or real 
qualities. Interestingly, such fission is not in embryo in the object, which is 
always estranged from its qualities. These qualities then go through a fusion 
that establishes them and maintains them as objects. Fusion and fission 
express the internal contrast between real and sensual objects on the one 
hand and their qualities on the other. They are similar to fragmentation and 
composition in my monadology, except that in the latter, because there is 
no ultimately different internal structure, nothing is ultimately fragment 
(quality) or composition (object). Harman makes clear that it is tensions 
that bring together the four dimensions of an object – they are neither 
internal relations nor separations with incidental connections. He names 
them time, space, eidos, and essence. The first is the tension between 
sensual objects and sensual qualities, the second between real objects and 
sensual qualities, the third between sensual objects and real qualities and 
the last between real objects and real qualities. They all have to do with a 
dynamic of unveiling and withdrawing.
This dynamic also appears in the articulations between the three 
existential poles of the monadology of fragments. The tension between 
fragment and composition is deployed in time; a composition is the fusion 
of several fragments – the tension is expressed in the duration of the 
process of composition. The tension between composition and composer 
requires a distance in space, for just like the withdrawn real object, the 
composer is not disclosed by the forthcoming composition. The composer 
as such is not revealed in the composition – like Berkeley’s concept of 
the spirit, which doesn’t appear in the ideas available for perception, the 
composer is separated from the appearing composition. Finally, the tension 
between fragments and composers can be understood as something akin 
to Harman’s eidos. The composer makes the fragment as it is, but this 
again is not expressed in any fragment. The last tension in Harman’s 
quadruple structure, the one of essence, finds no immediate equivalent in 
the monadology of fragments. This is because there is no internal structure 
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to the monads; they exist in three modes and are composed of further 
(existentially threefold) monads. To be sure, Harman himself asserts that 
the real object doesn’t possess its real qualities, for they are as external to 
it as are its sensual qualities.214 In the monadology of fragments, there is no 
essence of a fragment, because there is no ultimate substratum to distinguish 
identity from indiscernibility. 
Monads are worldly things, though there is some transcendence, 
because no monad in the world fully captures what a monad is – none can 
see beyond its field of vision, so to speak. Withdrawal, therefore, has to be 
worldly as well – what is withdrawn about a monad from any other monad 
is the compositional associations it has with all the others. Each perspective 
opens up a blind spot. Because there is no view from nowhere, each monad 
always has something withdrawn from each of the others, but doesn’t hide 
the same secret from all of them. Its secret life comes not from inside, but 
rather from the (baroque) vastness of the intertwined connections. In a 
sense, the inner reclusion that takes place is not from the intimate chambers; 
it is instead from far away. This is an interesting displacement: withdrawal 
does not have to be thought of in terms of what is too hidden to be exposed, 
but can simply be what is too distant to be brought into focus. 
The monadology of fragments has other points of convergence with 
an object-oriented ontology. In particular, the dynamics between real and 
sensual objects – and the impossibility of a real object touching another real 
object without the mediation of a sensible object – can be at least roughly 
captured by existential triunism. Composers don’t touch other composers; 
they touch fragments (or compositions). Those fragments, like sensual 
objects, don’t touch anything; only composers can touch other fragments 
in return. While it is not clear that the ten possible links between the four 
poles of the quadruple structure can be mimicked by the six possible links 
between the poles of the existential triunist monadology, the comparison 
makes explicit the resources of such monadology to cope with the 
ontological trickeries of withdrawal. 
Ceteris Paribus devices
The monadology of fragments is an ontoscopy that presents the world as a 
board for compositions. As is often the case when processes are involved, it 
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has a Darwinian ring to it. All ingredients can affect what is composed, just 
like the elements in the environment can affect a living form, given the right 
conditions. There are no fixed species, no fixed evolution environments, 
no fixed fitness functions. Similarly, the history of fragments is a history 
of accidents built on top of other accidents. Surely, history itself is not a 
one-track process – as there are no world-maps for fragments, there is no 
unique chronology for the processes of composition. However, it is historical 
in the Naturphilosophie sense of not following necessary laws (see Chapter 
1). No fragment is immune to anything; no process of composition is 
safeguarded or secured. Still, as in Darwinian scenarios, some fragments 
and compositions are immunized – not by anything transcendent, but rather 
immanently. Some fragments are meta-stable and, as such, rely on other 
composition processes to be resilient. Resilience is not a mark of anything 
but constancy and permanence among sponsors.
Immunization is always an achievement, and not something that 
transcends all events on the ground. Species in biological evolution are again 
a good example. The process that produces genetic variation often takes 
place in terms of a phylogenetic tree where species trace their ancestors 
down to a common root. Biologists like Carl Woese have challenged the 
universality of this tree structure.215 He claims that under some conditions 
of horizontal genetic transfer, it is no longer reasonable to try to map 
genetic variation in terms of a species tree. The consequences for the notion 
of species are far reaching: Woese coined the term Darwinian interlude to 
describe the period of time in which evolution through species and tree-
based genetic transfer was prevalent (and immunized). He conjectures 
that many factors contribute to a species ceasing to be meta-stable and for 
horizontal genetic transfer to become prevalent. His analysis shows how 
species, as the engine of most evolution of life in the planet, are ultimately 
vulnerable, albeit kept meta-stable. Their disturbances are kept at bay by 
their sponsors, which continuously compose things with them. 
The Simondonian lesson indeed applies to the monadology of fragments: 
permanence of sponsorship must be explained, for permanence doesn’t 
unveil a substantial mechanism underlying compositions. Permanence must 
be explained instead of hypostasized as necessity. One of the resources 
available for such explanation is repetition: it generates an expectation 
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in the eye of the composer. This expectation, sponsored by the repeated 
gestures of composition, can be enough to mark out an area of meta-
stability. The monadology of fragments posits that there is no immunity 
without (immanent) immunization. And yet there are many real-world 
enclosures sponsored by the joint interaction of composers, and they afford 
a basis for other stable compositions. The monadology of fragments is not 
an ontoscopy of instability; it is a provision to explain stability rather than 
positing it as a starting point. 
These circumstantially immunized fragments and compositions are 
like laboratory models, which in the strict sense are valid only when 
the circumstances are controlled. These lab-like models are crucial 
for describing things in terms of regularities – because regularities are 
often detected through lab-like devices, laws of physics do (strictly 
speaking) systematically lie, to use the strong phrase introduced by Nancy 
Cartwright.216 Labs attempt to immunize processes from all sorts of real-
world disturbances and to mimic what is thought to be immunized (albeit 
less thoroughly so) outside. So the curve of a body in freefall is said to 
approximate that of a law observed in lab-like conditions. The law describes 
an attractor that is satisfied if and only if the rest of the world doesn’t 
interfere. The attractor is never actualized, but it is virtual (see Chapter 1). 
Labs intend to mimic not the real-world composition, but the attractor: 
if the setup were immunized from the many influences, it would behave 
according to the model.217 Attractors express what would be the case if a 
process were immunized from anything else.
Labs are controlled environments where slower processes – typically the 
degeneration of lab equipment – maintain some variables under control. In 
general, slower processes maintain variables sufficiently fixed for faster ones. 
So the vertical gene-transfer process is maintained to the extent that the 
barriers sponsored by species are in place. The slower process of the planets 
distancing themselves from their gravitational center maintains the regularity 
of movement of the stars within the solar system. What is immunized 
can be understood as a kind of conditional necessity; p is necessary given 
that q. This can maybe be understood in conjunction with the idea of 
compossibility (feature 4); this pair forms perhaps the crucial modalities for 
dealing with the sensible. An important element of modeling is mimicking 
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stability by immunizing processes. The resulting models are ceteris paribus: 
stability in, stability out. Or, in other terms, meta-stability is achieved 
through ceteris paribus devices that maintain processes immunized from 
most of the rest of the world. These devices can be found in the lab and in 
the world at large. Lab modeling is a complicated reckoning about how two 
sorts of immunizing devices can run in parallel. From the point of view of 
an ontology of contingency, these devices are in need of explanation. Indeed, 
in many circumstances, compositions are made to be robust, resilient; but 
there is a cost to (meta-) stability.
Being up for grabs
Attention to relative necessity makes clear how contingency is a matter of 
scope. A closed space can be fully immunized. Ceteris paribus devices are 
enclosing devices and, as such, they provide monadological immunization: 
a local limitation on holism. When we find ways to isolate proper parts 
of the sensible, we disconnect some fragments from the wide horizon of 
indefinitesimals. The scope of contingency, in a monadology, is the scope of 
communitas, of what lies in the open and is not protected from anything else. 
Contingency connects to virtuality; a monad is up for grabs by any other 
monad, it has no intrinsic stability and its relations depend on all the other 
relations. Immunizing cuts off the lines of dependence. 
The monadology of fragments shows contingency to be an issue of 
interference – that which moves something out of its (ceteris paribus) 
attractor. Interference here is neither from a random element – like 
Epicurean clinamina – nor from a transcendent source – like a miracle 
or a ruling from a principle of facticity. Rather, it is the interference that 
follows from co-existence; nothing exists in a self-standing space. In the  
monadology of fragments, there is no transcendentally immune composition 
for a class of all monads, let alone for a proper part of such a class. Every 
composer sees its composition as co-existing with others: to be is to be in 
a shared space of fragments where everything is up for composing. The 
sensible is the realm where everything is contingent on something else. 
Nothing is necessary once and for all – as nothing hangs loose once and for 
all (compare with AnArcheology 2/196). The  monadology of fragments 
presents contingency as a matter of aggregation; the assemblage of things 
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is what makes them up for grabs. The realm of fragments – the sensible – 
appears as an open board for indefinite compositions; because there is no 
whole to contemplate, there is no spot ultimately free of accidents. 
The monadology of fragments is a form of priority nihilism. As I have 
said, it pictures a world that is gunky and junky. In fact, the main thesis 
that symbebeka proton to onton entails the rejection of both the priority of 
the whole and the priority of the parts. It follows a holism entailing neither 
a monism where a cosmos encompasses all things nor an atomism where 
ultimate components make up anything. Priority nihilism also means that 
nothing is reduced to anything else: to map the composition of a monad, 
one would need to map all monads. A map of scale 1 allows no reduction. 
A map is possible if some elements are rendered ineffective by some kind 
of ceteris paribus device that would provide for a local immunization; 
otherwise, the sheer interference of the other monads is enough to make 
sure that fragments are up for grabs. Because they all equally share a space 
of availability, they all co-exist.
Even though there is no cosmos – no whole hosting everything else – 
there is a common space where every fragment is at risk. Call it a plane of 
immanence or a plane of equality.218  Contingency takes place in such a space. 
Each monad is hostage to all the others; no necessity survives without an 
immunization process. Compossibility is a consequence of the mutual 
hosting of all monads: there is no independent, solely intrinsic, causa sui 
potentiality. The distribution of being entails that nothing is itself potentially 
anything, not even itself: a fragment is always a fragment in a composition. 
Dispositional language expresses no more than what would happen if 
everything else remained as it is; sugar is dissolved in water if the conditions 
of temperature, pressure, etc., remain as expected, a seed will grow into a 
tree if given the expected circumstances, a running white billiard ball will 
make a red one move provided that everything else inside and outside the 
billiard balls behaves as expected. Dispositional judgments are judgments 
about expectations: about what conditions are required for some events to 
be expected. The relation between a composer and a fragment is a relation 
between two composers – like Simondon’s relation between two organized 
realities. As such, it is a relation between two matrices of sensitivities. The 
sensible is up for grabs because it is open to interference. We recover here 
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the original (holistic) Leibnizian intuition about contingency: the sensible 
is up for grabs because it depends on everything else that is sensible. It is 
on this dependence that something can be mise en jeu by placing itself at the 
limit of death, of nothingness.219
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Chapter 4
Doubts
Indeterminacy and insufficiency
Amin Maalouf expresses the worry that an era of questions and problems is 
to be followed by an era of solutions.220 He fears solutions, seeing them as 
dispelling an element of opening, a game that questions display. Questions 
are eroding devices that he recommends cherishing. They leave things up in 
the air. They deal with starting points, with the unsettled, with what is not 
determined. They have something to do with beginnings, with what escapes 
declarative language. Deleuze cites Lautman, who lists three aspects of a 
problem: it differs from a solution, it transcends the solution that it prompts, 
and it is immanent in any solution that would purport to make it less 
visible.221 In a similar vein, Jabès writes, “we cannot interrogate but power, 
non-power is the question itself.”222 The question, and the questioning, 
opens up a space in terms of solutions – it suggests their insufficiency. 
Solutions, expressed in declarative language, are determinations: things are 
determinately thus and so. The accidental, often invoked when there is the 
possibility of a question, spells a non-power, an an-arché.
This is because the accidental is up in the air, for it is not (fully) 
determined. As we saw above, this has something to do with automaton, 
which Aristotle contrasted with physis and techné. The contrast is between 
what is determined to be so and what has happened without anything else 
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determining it to take place – neither (its) nature, nor an agent. There 
is a silence to the undetermined: not enough pull to go either way. Not 
enough reason to choose any solution to the problem. There is an under-
determination. And yet we think of what comes out of this absence of a 
governing drive as a random, brute, contingent fact. This is why the an-arché 
is linked with facticity: it indicates under-determined facts that are regulated 
or shaped by nothing apart from themselves. This link between contingency 
and the underdetermined – and with matters of fact – will take us, in this 
chapter, to doubts and their ontological status. We will start considering how 
both facticity and indetermination bring in luck.
Facts have the structure of determinations – things are determinately 
thus and so. However, when we say that the snow is in fact white, we are 
claiming that it is determinately so, although by no reason other than 
facts themselves. What is merely a matter of fact has no weight, as it is 
a determination with no non-factual determiners; it could have been 
determined otherwise. If we bear in mind that contingency is settled in the 
space of governments – including in their absence – we see that it speaks 
the language of determination – and its insufficiency. The determined is 
somehow immune to any other interference; the undetermined is exposed to 
the elements, for there is no ready-made fate for it. What is fully determined 
is therefore immune to anything else. An incomplete determination, on the 
other hand, is just sufficient for things to be, as a matter of fact, thus and so. 
Determinations can be seen as rulings, but they may be ungrounded rulings 
that are blowing in the wind and up for grabs. They carry the force of 
necessity, but it can be insufficient – facticity points at determinations that 
carry only enough of this force to be mere facts. 
Determinations are also common to facts and thoughts. People 
entertain determinations when they hold beliefs (or related states like fears, 
imaginings, certainties or convictions). There is, nonetheless, a continuity 
between the thoughts “it seems to me that p,” “I’m convinced that p,” and 
“it is a fact that p,” on the one hand, and the fact itself that p on the other. 
Beliefs and facts have the same determined content. (This is what makes an 
identity account of truth possible; according to such an account, a belief is 
true if it is identical to a fact – the thought “spring has arrived” is true if it 
has the same content as the fact that “spring has arrived.”)223 When I believe 
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something, I believe that things are thus and so; I believe in a determination. 
Beliefs are about the stuff that facts are made of; beliefs can therefore reach 
the world, if the world is made of facts. Beliefs can also be determinations 
that are insufficiently determined – beliefs, like theories or world-views, are 
sometimes under-determined.
If undetermined facts point to contingency, undetermined beliefs point 
to what is called epistemic luck.224 There is epistemic luck when a belief 
happens to be true, but only because the world has done us a favor, to 
use the apt phrase by McDowell.225 It is only a matter of luck that our 
belief is true – it could be false, as nothing determines our belief toward 
truth. Typically, the issue of epistemic luck appears in two contexts of 
epistemological discussions. The first is in the discussions about what links 
justification of a belief on one hand and truth on the other. This is what is 
at stake in the famous cases brought to attention by Edmond Gettier.226 
In these cases, a belief happens to be justified and also happens to be true, 
but it is often considered to be less than knowledge because somehow its 
truth is due to epistemic luck. The belief could have been equally justified 
and yet false. The second context of discussion in which epistemic luck 
appears is skepticism. Skeptical challenges are often about the insufficiency 
of justification. We may think there are enough grounds for a belief and yet 
have skeptical doubts showing us that things could be otherwise, and in such 
a circumstance, what has determined us to hold that belief is insufficient. 
In both cases, beliefs are only true if we are (epistemically) lucky. Similarly, 
when a determination is not a belief but a fact, it is contingent if it is 
insufficiently determined.
Facts and beliefs, therefore, dwell in determinations. Contingent facts 
and unjustified or unknown beliefs are determinations that could have 
been otherwise. Determinations contrast with indeterminacies. Beliefs 
contrast with doubts – beliefs are commitments, for I hold my beliefs to be 
true.227 When I doubt something, I don’t hold a determination to be true 
(about the matter in question). If I have doubts about p, I don’t believe 
p. We can look at this in terms of propositional attitudes: one can have 
different attitudes toward p, that of believing and that of doubting among 
them. I consider it better to take the content of a belief to be the attitude 
associated with the proposition, rather than the proposition itself. So while 
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a belief has the content of a determination – say, that seawater is salty – a 
doubt has the content of indeterminacy – say, that seawater is salty or not 
salty, or that maybe seawater is salty. When I say that facts and beliefs have 
similar contents, I mean that both deal in determinations. Doubts, on the 
other hand, don’t. When I doubt it is as if I entertain two opposite thoughts 
simultaneously – that there both is and is not a dagger in front of me, say. 
Now, if doubts and beliefs are thought-states, do they have equivalents 
in the world?
Unjustified or unknown beliefs can be compared with insufficiently 
determined facts – with what is contingent. Further, contingency points 
toward what is undermined by doubt; they have a family resemblance. If the 
world has indeterminacies, doubts are (eventually) cognitively more virtuous 
than beliefs, for they access something that beliefs miss. This is the case 
when we acknowledge unredeemable indeterminations: if one is in doubt 
about whether Schrödinger’s cat is alive or not, one is arguably in a virtuous 
cognitive position. A world made of facts – and therefore of determinations 
– contrasts with a world with room for irreducible indeterminations. Perhaps 
the state of uncertainty and the attitude of doubting are the best clues 
for depicting a world of indeterminations. Doubts make what is up for 
grabs visible.
When facticity is tied to an-arché, the under-determination grounding 
determined facts comes into focus. In other words, we can see the 
indeterminacy surrounding the factual. This is what is captured by the state 
of doubting. Facticity and doubts are, in turn, sometimes understood in 
terms of sufficient reason. There is enough reason for a fact to take place but 
not enough to determine it to take place. The non-necessary has something 
to do with sufficiency: it is not necessarily hot in May in Granada, but 
the winds and the lack of rain are enough to make it so. The principle of 
sufficient reason holds that there is enough reason for things to be one way 
or another. It is possible for a belief based on sufficient reason to be true – 
and maybe the world makes it so, as a favor – but there is not enough reason 
to make it necessarily so.
We reveal the insufficiency of such a belief to constitute knowledge 
by unveiling the epistemic luck involved in it. Skeptical doubts purport 
to disclose such luck. They deal in insufficiency. Thus, in a world of 
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contingencies, skeptical steps are full of knowledge. Skeptical challenges 
not only uncover our lack of knowledge but also provide knowledge of the 
insufficiencies. If contingency has elements of insufficiency, doubts reveal 
them, for being up for grabs puts things in a state of epokhé, of suspension 
of judgment. Reversing the traditional image, certainty would then be a 
failure to see the hesitation of the world, while claiming that things are thus 
and so would be missing the point that they stand in a constant state of 
indeterminacy, which doubts themselves can best capture.
Doubting
Doubting contrasts with believing. While believing engages with 
determinations – holding that their determinate contents are true – doubting 
seeks to erode the content of beliefs and replace them with uncertainty. 
The attitude of doubting is one of showing how insufficient the pulls 
toward believing a determination are. Sextus Empiricus established a neo-
Pyrrhonist path according to which the exercise of doubting is a reliable 
guide to life, in particular telling us what we should refrain from believing.228 
To a great extent, these lessons concerned how to deal with epistemic 
luck – and therefore, with cognitive contingency. Dismantling dogmatic 
arguments by showing that they are not impermeable to doubt makes the 
Pyrrhonist skeptic confident that reaching a stable class of beliefs can bring 
no tranquility. 
Doubting – and the subsequent recommended suspension of belief – 
reveals the impossibility (and ultimately the undesirability) of dogmatic 
positions. The neo-Pyrrhonist uses prevalent doubt to tell us something 
about our beliefs: in at least most cases, we are not entitled to assert that 
things are thus and so. Doubts can, however, reveal things of quite a 
different nature. Descartes took our ability to doubt as disclosing something 
about our own nature – and in fact about a substance that composes the 
world. He took doubting as a clue about how things are: there is something 
(in us) capable of doubt. Doubts are not only obstacles to seeing things 
through – because they erode determinations – but also clear revelations of 
something else: an ingredient of the world that makes doubting possible. 
Hume extracted some (positive) knowledge from the occurrence of doubt 
with his conception of a second creation unveiling our psychology and 
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our habits, and also, in a sense, with the transcendental conclusions he 
drew in part from our ability to doubt our access to things in themselves. 
His strategy was to make doubts reveal something about the doubter, and 
eventually about some special realm that ought to be part of our image 
of the world – like a res cogitans – or part of our overall explanation of 
knowledge and action – like Humean instincts and habits, or like Kant’s 
transcendental sphere. In any case, doubts reveal something about how 
things are, by revealing something about how doubters are. Their message 
is not only one of impossibility, but their presence tells us something 
about how things are – and at least in the case of Descartes, their presence 
provides us with at least one determination: there is a res cogitans. 
Now, these two kinds of lesson drawn from the occurrence of doubt, 
the attempt to extract impossibilities from it and the attempt to learn 
something positive from it, share the assumption that things are under some 
determination. Either we grasp these determinations as to how things are, 
or they escape us. The skeptical challenges can teach us to doubt beliefs 
while holding that there are determinations in the world. In particular, 
neo-Pyrrhonists and most skeptics under their influence tend to concentrate 
their ammunition against determined beliefs, not determined facts. The 
common assumption between the two kinds of lessons drawn from the 
occurrence of doubts is ontological: in the world, there are determinations. 
Things are thus and so in the world. 
When considering being above or below the Earth – and above or below 
our antipode – Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, invokes those 
situations where we feel compelled to expect a determination either to hold 
or not. He considers the presence of “7777” in the expansion of π:
“God sees – but we don’t know.” But what does that mean? 
– We use a picture; the picture of a visible series which one 
person sees the whole of and another not. The law of excluded 
middle says here: It must either look like this, or like that. So it 
really – and this is a truism – says nothing at all, but gives us a 
picture. And the problem ought now to be: does reality accord 
with the picture or not? And this picture seems to determine 
what we have to do, what to look for, and how [...]229
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The guiding picture yields that whenever there is a doubt – say, about 
whether “7777” appears in the expansion – there is a determination, 
although it is seen by one person but not by another. So we can say that 
either the sequence appears in the expansion or not. The experience of 
doubt is then hostage to the idea of ignorance – local or global – according 
to which there is something further to be known, but it is unreachable. 
Doubts, in this picture, point at a lack. A determination is there, but we 
cannot grasp it – skeptical challenges show the obstacles to accessing it. The 
picture holds us hostage: for each doubt – if we can individuate them – there 
is a corresponding determination; either “7777” appears in the expansion 
of π or it doesn’t. Wittgenstein continues diagnosing our allegiance to 
the picture:
[…]Here saying “There is no third possibility” or “But there 
can’t be a third possibility!”– expresses our inability to turn 
our eyes away from this picture: a picture which looks as if it 
must already contain both the problem and its solution, while 
all the time we feel that it is not so.
The picture – that a determination exists, but if we have genuine doubts 
we fail to reach it – compels us either to exorcise doubts or to accept 
limits on the scope or the content of what we can know. In the latter case, 
the neo-Pyrrhonist can then aid us with her path to tranquility among 
suspended beliefs.
Neo-Pyrrhonism falls within the realm of Wittgenstein’s picture. In 
other words, skepticism barely aims at the knowledge it tries to attain. It is 
about beliefs and not about facts – although, as is clear, it provides means to 
erode several sorts of determinations. The picture makes doubt an obstacle 
for ontoscopy – the skeptic is often keen to point out how doomed the 
enterprise is. It also sketches a divide between the subject of knowledge and 
its object: the subject hosts doubts, while the object is already determined. 
This is how Sextus Empiricus reads the modes of Aenesidemus and Agrippa 
and the repository of arguments in the Pyrrhonist tradition. The first five 
modes of Aenesidemus appeal to the differences in subjects – wine is sweet 
for me now, but not in another circumstance, not for other people, not for 
other animals. The subjects are variable – their species, their backgrounds, 
their ages, their habits – while the object – the determinations concerning 
144 Chapter 4
the wine – remain the same, or so Sextus concludes. The modes are 
condensed in Agrippa’s mode of relativity: relativity of impressions and 
opinions makes us doubt each impression and opinion – why would any of 
them be better than the others? 
The standard anti-skeptical reply to these arguments today is to appeal 
to response-dependence property realism.230 Response-dependence 
properties require the right response to be perceived – the wine is in fact 
sweet, because well-trained wine drinkers in appropriate circumstances have 
the perceptual and conceptual apparatus rightly tuned, and they detect that 
it is sweet. Such response, to be sure, depends on one response among all 
others being deemed right. In other words, as there is a determination in 
the world, we ought to make sure we are equipped to grasp it. Sextus, on 
the other hand, engages the arguments to show how we should suspend 
judgment. Other modes of Agrippa appeal to the insufficiency of a 
determination’s justification: what determines a determination is a recursive 
question that admits no acceptable answer. There are no sufficient reasons 
to posit an undetermined determiner, and if we don’t, we can only appeal 
to determined determiners. Sextus reads these modes as being about belief; 
there is no justification if there is no unjustified justifier, for otherwise 
nothing would sustain a belief but deference to other (unjustified) beliefs. 
Further, Agrippa’s mode of diaphonia – the plurality of disagreeing voices 
– is understood as support for the thesis that subjects are irreconcilably 
different and the best we can do is to refrain from belief. In all these 
cases, Sextus understands arguments as targeting belief in some sorts of 
determinations. He uses each challenge to reinforce his recommendation of 
an attitude weaker than believing whenever we contemplate a determination. 
Heraclitus and Aenesidemus
The skeptical endeavor, as launched by Sextus, is to use doubting to show 
that beliefs are insufficiently legitimate. The move is to argue against 
the solidity of determinations as epistemological arguments, that is, as 
arguments that sponsor a rift between knowledge and belief. The lessons 
from the repository of possible doubts are about justification, and being 
about justification’s prevalent insufficiency, the lessons are about human 
humility. We should refrain from committing to determinations, because 
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we are plagued with doubts; to ignore them and enlist behind a body 
of determinations about the world is to adopt a dogma. Sextus instead 
recommends equal distance from all dogmas – his aim is to cure people 
of conviction. To do so, he works to systematically exorcise what makes 
people commit to determinations. He engages with the arguments – his 
own reasonings and what he draws from Aenesidemus’s and Agrippa’s 
skeptical modes – as if they are about our take on how things are. While 
concentrating on the safety of our access to determinations, he doesn’t 
let the arguments hit determinations themselves. Neo-Pyrrhonism is like 
dressing determinations in armor so that doubts hit nothing but our beliefs 
about them. Sextus then makes sense of the idea that this is the only thing 
we can do to avoid recoiling into one form or another of dogma. 
In fact, Sextus complains about Aenesidemus’s late conversion to the 
Heraclitean doctrine of the polemos.231 His charge was that in doing so, 
Aenesidemus chose to read his modes (and all the arguments in the Pyrrhic 
tradition) as arguments establishing that things in the world are themselves 
in diaphonia.232  That is, Aenesidemus held that the plurality of voices – the 
indeterminacy – spans beyond beliefs and toward the world itself. Such a 
claim about how things are, according to Sextus, is no more than recoiling 
into dogma. Aenesidemus would be recommending and adopting the belief 
that things are, say, indeterminate. By doing so, he would be using skeptical 
arguments to pave the way towards a dogma. Aenesidemus, however, 
could have been taking doubts to challenge whatever is considered to 
be determined.
Some say that Sextus indeed introduced something new in the 
Pyrrhonist tradition (his own neo-Pyrrhonism) by confining the skeptical 
arguments to the realm of beliefs.233 In fact, Aristocles tells us that 
Timon, one of the followers of Pyrrhus, claims that for Pyrrhus things are 
indifferent, unstable and indeterminate and, as a consequence, no belief can 
be true.234 If this is so, beliefs are doomed not because they are themselves 
unjustified, but rather because their objects are untamable. Indeterminacy 
is primary in the world. It is hard to find out exactly what Pyrrhus was 
aiming at with his critical doctrines – the determinacy of things or merely 
the justification of beliefs – as he didn’t write anything. Conche believes that 
Pyrrhus was against the thesis that things are thus and so. Conche grounds 
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her thesis on a text by Aenesidemus in which he attempts to restore the core 
of Pyrrhus’s views against what he saw as a distorted view them. In the text, 
Aenesidemus claims that the Pyrrhonist doesn’t determine anything – not 
even that nothing can be determined.235 The text opposes dogmaticoi to 
aporeticoi – the assertive to the problematic – ascribing the latter only to the 
Pyrrhonists; the emerging image is that of a doctrine according to which 
the world is itself made of problems. Conche argues, against interpreters 
like Diels or Natorp, that there is indeed no contradiction between 
Pyrrhus’s ways and a Heraclitean view of reality and, as Aenesidemus 
reportedly held, the latter followed from the former. Conche’s claim is that 
the Pyrrhonists’ main tenet was universal instability and insubstantiality. 
The recommendation that one should refrain from believing follows as a 
consequence.
By taking the Pyrrhonist path to arrive at something close to Heraclitus’s 
doctrines, Aenesidemus took doubt to reveal something about the 
indeterminacy of reality. Doubts reveal, therefore, their own reality: the 
indeterminacy that they carry is somehow out there. Thus, Aenesidemus 
embraced what I call an ontology of doubts – the thesis, to be developed 
below, that doubts point at something real. This realism about doubts 
admits of different forms, as we will see; it is, in all forms, a powerful 
ontoscopy of what is up for grabs. It claims that doubts plague not the space 
of beliefs but the space of facts, for they erode determinations themselves. 
Such an ontology attempts to engage the Pyrrhonist arguments – and 
skeptic challenges overall – to target determinations in general, including 
facts in the world. The question that Sextus raised is: is such an ontology a 
form of dogmatism? 
As an ontologist of doubts, Aenesidemus would take his modes, for 
example, as strategies to show that (some) things were not determined. 
The wine is not (determinately) sweet, for I have different perceptions 
of it at different times and other people and other animals don’t feel, 
say, its sweetness. Then maybe the wine is not sweet (nor non-sweet). 
Aenesidemus can be a realist about the properties of the wine – that they are 
indeterminate – without taking these properties to be response-dependent. 
The modes exorcise the picture Wittgenstein denounced. Determinations 
themselves – in either the form of predications or of statements of what 
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exists – are under suspicion. An ontology of doubts would therefore directly 
counter the picture where the world is made of determinations (either 
“7777” appears in the expansion of π or it does not),236 as it claims that 
the world does hold doubts; things are not fixed and established although 
some see them and others don’t. Reversing the traditional image, certainty 
is a failure to see the hesitation of the world – to say that things are thus 
and so is to fail to see that they stand in a constant state of doubt, where 
nothing is established once and for all and independently of anything else. 
As we will see below, to be certain can mean to be out of touch with a world 
of doubts, while to suspend judgment is to attain a direct perception of 
things that do not follow a ready, determined judgment but rather hover in 
between multiple determinations, up in the air about which to follow. In a 
world of doubts, to hesitate can be precisely to be in tune with how things 
are. Not only can indeterminacies model what is up for grabs – up to be 
determined – but skeptical doubts reveal why no determination is resistant 
enough to be real.
The idea that the world is itself polemic – hosting a polyphony of 
determinations where none of them always conducts the orchestra – is a 
way to understand the importance Heraclitus gave to the polemos. Things, 
for him, were not alien to disputes. He thought nature was neither a fixed 
layer where a ground holds everything else – laws or principles or basic 
components – nor a ready order that could be unveiled once and for all. 
Nature has a tendency (or a liking) to hide itself, says fragment 123. This 
can mean that it is never fully revealed if we aim at portraying it in terms of 
determinations. Polemos, on the other hand, is behind everything: gods and 
mortals, slaves and masters, says fragment 53, nothing is indifferent to its 
force. The force is that of tension, the force of what stands against, of what is 
disrupting (see also Anarcheology 2/141* and 145). Heidegger’s translation 
of polemos as Auseinandersetzung calls attention to the German word for 
dispute: set things aside in a different  position.237  Polemos would occupy 
the place we commonly ascribe to determinations. Things are not (all) 
determined; they can go one way or another, and they only seem to satisfy 
determinations. When Aenesidemus went Heraclitus’s way, he may have put 
his modes at the service of the ontology of doubts. For Sextus, this was a 
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recoil into dogmatism. Aenesidemus could have replied, as we will see, that 
he had actually broadened the scope of skeptical arguments. 
Formulating ontologies of doubts
An initial way to formulate the ontology of doubt is to say that nothing is 
determinate. This amounts to the same thing as the original Pyrrhonist 
doctrine: reality is itself indeterminate. In this general form, the idea is to 
say that doubting is a better path to cognitive virtue than believing. Such 
a first formulation would amount to a global skeptical attitude: nothing is 
safe from doubting, doubts spread everywhere and no determinations are 
safe from proper, well-formulated attack. This first formulation conceives of 
contingency as spreading everywhere. The picture is therefore one in which 
the world is entirely indeterminate, no room for facts. 
The claim can be compared with Meillassoux’s principle of facticity, 
according to which everything is necessarily contingent.238 On the positive 
side, the comparison is relevant because here, too, is a (Pyrrhonist) principle 
of indetermination immune to anything that could take place in the world. 
Contingency appears here as transcendent. On the negative side, however, 
the comparison enables us to appreciate how doubts provide a finer image 
of what is up for grabs than do mere (ungrounded) facts: doubts point 
at insufficiency and remind us of the revealing family similarity between 
accident and epistemic luck. In any case, this first formulation combines 
a firm realism about doubts with antirealism about determinations. Such 
antirealism can take different forms. One might, for example, be an 
instrumentalist and hold that some determinations can be required in the 
exercise of doubting, but they don’t need to be real to be useful. We can use 
beliefs to proliferate doubts, but it is only doubts that have any chance of 
being cognitively virtuous.
The idea that doubting makes use of determinations has been used 
to argue against (global) skepticism – and often to defend the notion that 
some beliefs ought to be accepted, or even held true. The point is that we 
cannot engage in doubting without grounds, without determined points 
of departure. Suppose we formulate an argument for global skepticism as 
follows (let’s call it GS for short):
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(Premise) I can doubt anything
(Conclusion) I can doubt everything (at once)
One could argue against GS either by showing that the premise is false – 
that there are things that cannot be doubted – or that the inference is invalid 
and, although anything can be doubted, it doesn’t follow that everything can 
be put in doubt at once. This would be because one cannot doubt anything 
without the aid of at least one determination.  
Two important twentieth-century variations of this argument against 
GS are those put forward by Wittgenstein and Davidson.239  Davidson 
purported to show that doubting itself is not possible if some beliefs are not 
true. This version of the argument holds that in order for doubts to make 
sense, they have to be placed on a background of commonly held beliefs 
– and ultimately of true beliefs. Davidson argues that doubting all of one’s 
beliefs simultaneously would make doubt unintelligible, as there would be 
no way to understand what the doubts were about. This argument, which 
depends on the Quinean dissolution of any rationale for a dualism between 
beliefs and meanings, supposes that in a web of beliefs most of them have 
to be true (or not false) in order for any of them to make sense. I can doubt 
your beliefs about the water temperature on the coast of the Chilean Pacific, 
but only if I don’t doubt your beliefs about water, about the Pacific coast 
or about Chile. Otherwise I won’t be able to understand what is at stake in 
the doubt. Doubts have to be non-global, or they are unintelligible. In other 
words, it is only in an environment of truths that doubts make sense; the 
exercise of doubting does not stand alone but requires roots in a ground of 
determinations. 
The special flavor of Davidson’s version of the argument has it that the 
roots or grounds of a doubt must themselves be grounded or rooted in 
true beliefs and not only provisional assumptions, because again it makes 
no sense to claim that all provisional assumptions are doubtful. The appeal 
to a critical mass of background beliefs is reiterated up to the point where 
a good deal of them ought to be true (and the argument can establish 
neither which ones are true nor whether there is a common body of true 
beliefs to any disagreement). Intelligibility, the argument goes, is related to 
truth – not in individual cases but in critical masses. If doubts depend on 
true determinations, the ontology of doubts in the first formulation cannot 
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stand. If the argument works, it challenges not only global skepticism but 
also realism about doubts, if coupled with antirealism about determinations. 
If the argument establishes that there are no doubts anywhere without 
truth grounding them, realism about doubts must then espouse realism 
about determinations – that idea that some beliefs may be as cognitively 
virtuous as doubts. 
An ontology of doubts in the first formulation, however, is compatible 
with milder versions of the argument against GS that require determinations 
without positing their truth. Such a version can be found as concerns 
Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge propositions, the propositions that ground 
doubts. They have to be taken temporarily as certain in order to provide a 
framework in which doubts are intelligible. The game of doubting needs 
hinges from which doubts can hang in particular circumstances. In On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein mentions hinges in three sections:240
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
343. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t 
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to 
rest content with assumptions. If I want the door to turn, the 
hinges must stay put. 
655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, 
been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: “Dispute about 
other things; this is immovable – it is a hinge on which 
your dispute can turn.” there is indeed something there 
to be known.
Hinges are propositions that are provisionally exempt from doubt. One 
cannot intelligibly doubt everything at once, but piecemeal doubting 
can rely on changing hinges. A hinge is examined from within the game 
of doubting; that is, its status as truthful, conventional, arbitrary or 
contextually acceptable is not primarily at stake. Rather, they follow from 
the remark that doubts are not spinning in the void and therefore they 
require some fixed points to get off the ground. Wittgenstein considers the 
act of doubting and how it displaces certainty to show that hinges are not 
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fixed points that fail when doubts appear, but rather that doubts and hinges 
interrelate as players in a game. Hinges are not necessarily prior to doubts, 
but they can displace doubts – just as doubts displace determinations. 
A proposition can dispel doubts, like a mathematical proposition that 
is safeguarded from dispute by sending doubts off to other areas. Here 
there is a divide between what is determined and what is doubted, but it 
is not between what can be known and what is in itself elusive or open to 
hesitation. It is a divide that emerges from the process of doubting itself; 
hinges are part of the economy of a working door. 
Wittgenstein’s image of the interdependence between doubts and hinges 
relies on an image of knowledge placed in the game of doubting. Hinges 
cannot be subtracted from the logical space of reasons that emerges from 
the scope of doubt. Such space is where reasons are used, both to challenge 
assertions and to defend them – but also to motivate doubts and to dispel 
them. The argument that doubts require hinges is transcendental: the 
conditions of possibility for the game of doubting – a game in which we 
engage whenever we are in the space of reasons – require determinations. 
There is a divide between doubts and determinations, but it is one that 
moves with the flow (of doubting). On the other hand, there is a game of 
holding fast to something, keeping it come what may – the biting the bullet 
that forces us to doubt something else in order to preserve what we want to 
preserve. It is another transcendental move, but in the other direction: the 
conditions of possibility for the game of holding fast to something – a game 
in which we engage often enough in the space of reasons – involve doubting 
something else. Wittgenstein admits that things can be kept come what may, 
but in order for a determination to be preserved at all costs, it has to meet 
all these costs. These are moves that can take place in the space – the space 
of reasons, which we can also call the space of sufficient reasons – shaped by 
indeterminacies and beliefs. If we read Wittgenstein’s contextual hinges as 
places in this space, what emerges is a board of doubts and hinges. It is like 
a chessboard, with white and black squares, except that new doubts reveal 
unknown corners of the board. This board is a model of inquiry – beliefs 
are challenged by doubts, but doubts themselves must be grounded on 
supporting beliefs. 
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The image is akin to that emerging from Quine’s lessons concerning 
the continuity of theory and meaning. Quine holds that it is a matter of 
our sovereignty to decide what we place in the center of the sphere where 
the periphery is what is less immune to revision. We decide to protect logic 
and mathematics, say, against the turbulence of experience, since no such 
turbulence is target at a specific belief or a particular determination taken 
for granted. The turbulence – revision through experience – is itself up for 
grabs, and thus teaches the rejection of the second dogma. Quine’s rejection 
of it convinced him that only if we hold some things to be fixed can we 
enable experience to make an impact on us such that we change our minds 
– so that we can draw verdicts from experience. The periphery of the sphere 
changes in contact with experience, while the center – where we place 
what we hold fixed – stays put. If nothing is held fixed, no message from 
experience can be heard – it forces us to revise, but we can detect no specific 
message, and therefore anything can be revised (or everything can). In 
Quine’s view, the world – supposedly made of fixed determinations – affects 
the system, this sphere where the most protected bits are in the center, only 
by provoking those turbulences through our sensorial input.
What matters here for an ontology of doubt is the image of sovereignty, 
which is a strategy in the game of doubting: protect some determinations 
(hold them fast) come what may, and you make it too costly for doubts 
to challenge them. (An opposite but, for our purposes, equally revealing 
strategy would be to decide to doubt some things come what may – for 
instance, some people decide to doubt some religious assertions at any cost 
and make it very expensive to subscribe to those assertions.) In any case, 
the image is that determinations and doubts somehow give rise to each 
other – they belong somewhere together. They are on a checkered board. 
The ontology of doubt in its first formation accommodates this second 
argument for the need for determinations better than the first argument 
does. In particular, one can be an instrumentalist about hinges – they are 
ladders to be used in the doubting exercise, doubts that can be thrown 
away afterwards. Sextus himself seemed to have favored accepting some 
commonsense opinions, not as full-blown beliefs but as accepted contents 
that would allegedly ease life with other people.241 Apart from this pragmatic 
reason for acceptance, a skeptic could also accept some hinges in order to 
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generate further doubts. Perhaps the skeptic, as the ontologist of doubts, 
is ready to pay the price of accepting some determinations, because such 
acceptance favors the proliferation of doubts. The ontologist of doubts may 
see such a proliferation as helping her stand in a better cognitive position. 
In any case, antirealism about determinations is not compulsory for the 
ontologist of doubts.
The argument against GS – especially in its first version – can compel a 
different formulation of the ontology of doubts, which would run like this: 
there are determinations and indeterminacies in the world. That is, there 
is a real board of doubts and hinges, and a doubt can be as cognitively 
virtuous as a belief. Doubting is no mark of ignorance, but believing is no 
sign of mistake either. There may be two boards of doubts and hinges: one 
formed by our doubts and our (provisional) certainties, and another formed 
by indeterminacies and determinations in the world. In this formulation, 
the ontology of doubts is a thesis about the furniture of the universe being 
composed both of states of affairs and of indeterminacies.
It is interesting to compare the ontology of doubts with neo-Pyrrhonism. 
I will come back to this friction below, but some brief comparative remarks 
are now in order. The skeptic conceives of the board as within the confines 
of our thinking. The game of doubting and holding fast, and by extension 
its board, is what we do with the input of the world – it is not something 
impressed on us by the world itself, but rather something established within 
the scope of our jurisdiction. The second formulation of the ontology of 
doubts rejects such confinement and embraces realism about the board. The 
contrast between doubts and determinations is not one in which doubts are 
solely our contribution while determinations are what we attain from the 
world, if we’re lucky. Rather, doubting knows no boundaries; the interplay 
of certainties and hesitations is external to us and is not a product of our 
ignorance in a world of facts. In both formulations, doubts are out there, 
and hence the practice of eroding beliefs with doubts is a strategy of inquiry. 
The first formulation shares with the neo-Pyrrhonist the aim of avoiding 
beliefs: the neo-Pyrrhonist to achieve the skeptic ataraxia – a non-dogmatic 
sense of tranquility – and the first formulation to obtain knowledge. The 
second formulation shares with the urban skeptic the adherence to some 
determinations: the skeptic because some determinations are to be accepted 
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– albeit not believed – and the second formulation due to a realism about 
the whole board.
The epistemology of doubts
Realism about the whole board brings us to a different epistemological 
setup. The ordinary epistemological scenario, like the neo-Pyrrhonist, 
assumes a realism about determinations combined with an antirealism about 
doubts. If we’re realists about the board, somehow our cognitive hesitations 
are not a mark of our deficiency or limitation, but rather a good strategy 
to cope with an environment full of indeterminacies. Hesitation becomes a 
cognitive tool. This new epistemological setup can inspire several positions, 
and I only aim to mention one or two of them. 
In its second formulation, the ontology of doubt can inspire a direct 
realism about the board whereby we can directly access it. When we fiddle 
with problems concerning how things are, we can be in direct contact with 
the embroidery of determinations and doubts. If we have the correct beliefs 
and the appropriate doubts, we reach the real board – if not, we don’t reach 
anything. Thus, direct realism can be coupled to a disjunctivist approach242 
according to which there is no common content between appropriate and 
inappropriate doubts – or between correct or incorrect beliefs. In one case, 
we reach all the way to the real board, while in the other, we are not on a 
board at all. Perceptual disjunctivism243 holds that we can either perceive 
objects – a dagger in front of us when there is a dagger in front of us – or 
have a very different experience altogether – when there is no dagger and 
we hallucinate – and there is no common factor between the two cases, 
the veridical and the non-veridical. Analogously, for a disjunctivist direct 
realist about the board, the case in which we access the real doubts and real 
determinations is different from the non-veridical case. In the second case, 
there is no represented board at all; something of a completely different 
nature is taking place. We access the real board when our thought touches 
the interfaces between hinges and doubts out there, and we merely have an 
impression of being on a board when our thinking is off the mark. When 
we are on the real board, our hesitations and our convictions are under the 
direct influence of the indeterminacies in the world.
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Here we can also bring in the idea put forward by François Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy that the external world, rather than our sovereign 
distinctions and articulations, ultimately determines its own real cognition 
in the last instance. Laruelle holds that objects in the world impose the 
way they are to be thought (and cognized); thought is less an exercise of 
sovereignty on our part and more an incorporation of our ideas by the 
world. 244 It is philosophy alone that tries to control thought by distancing 
it from the nuances imposed on it by its objects. The rejection of the 
philosophical attitude, for Laruelle, is the release of our authority over 
thought and cognition – those are incorporations of their objects. Laruelle 
takes the known object to determine cognition in the last instance. He 
invokes a foreclosure of the real to knowledge.
Laruelle’s determination in the last instance is an account of knowledge 
according to which its objects impose themselves on us. As such, it can mesh 
with a direct-realist view of the board. It is not a claim that knowledge is 
possible because we receive ready-made realities, but rather that cognition 
is under the determining influence of what it ends up attaining. It ascertains 
the sovereignty of what is attained over its own cognition. What interests 
us concerning the ontology of doubts in Laruelle’s inversion of authorities 
is that it makes room for the board to impose itself on us. As much as 
determinations can impose themselves on our convictions, doubts impose 
themselves on our hesitation. (Or, in the disjunctivist picture, something 
completely different takes place.) The board of doubts is therefore 
(sometimes) forced on us when we think. It is not that anything is imposed 
on us as a determination free of doubts, but rather that the board ultimately 
encompasses our thinking. We participate in the game of doubting – it is 
not something we concoct but something we find ourselves playing along 
with the world. 
Direct realism concerning the board and imposition of the game of 
doubting in the last instance can be compared with the role Meillassoux 
ascribes to the facticity of the correlation. His speculative account contrasts 
with several forms of metaphysics of subjectivity – which, for him, includes 
all forms of process philosophy – in that it takes off not from the correlation 
between a subject and its object but rather from the facticity of such 
correlation. There is nothing, he insists, that determines a correlation to be 
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the way it is. Its contingency reveals a principle of insufficient reason. It is 
a mere matter of fact that anything is locked into a particular correlation; 
there is nothing absolute in this. However, an absolute can be unveiled when 
we realize that facticity rules. In an account of contingency as resembling 
epistemic luck and akin more to doubts than to (insufficiently determinate) 
facts, the speculative step toward the reality of contingency is somehow 
different. Our experience of the contingency of correlation comes from 
our doubt concerning the objects of our knowledge. We doubt its content 
– a determination. Skeptical arguments make us suspect not only that a 
correlation is shadowing any contact we may have with any absolute, but 
also that it is contingent that we are stuck in a particular correlation, and 
indeed in any correlation at all. It is enough to consider Aenesidemus’s 
first modes (or Agrippa’s relativity mode). We can experience the same 
wine as bitter or sweet, and further, it is contingent that we experience 
things the way we do and that different subjects experience otherwise. 
The exercise of doubt, as the skeptical arguments make clear, uncovers 
the contingent correlations in which we find ourselves. The ontology of 
doubts, nevertheless, claims that what is revealed is not only that facticity is 
widespread and a principle of insufficient reason transcends all, but that the 
world is constituted by indeterminacies, even if they have to be backed up 
by determinations. Doubting shows a world in which nothing determines 
some things to be one way or another, and therefore the indeterminacies can 
be genuine. 
Doubts in the open field
The idea of an ontology of doubt brings up a contrast between ways 
of facing suspension of judgment: the contrast rehearsed when Sextus 
reproaches Aenesidemus. It is, of course, possible to put the ontology of 
doubts itself in doubt. It could be, as Sextus argued, a form of dogmatism: 
things are such that there are doubts in the world. It sounds like a 
substantive thesis about the world, a claim about its furniture – a dogmatism 
about doubts. The accusation of dogmatism, however, can be reversed. The 
ontologist of doubt can accuse the neo-Pyrrhonist of being dogmatic about 
an ontology of determinations. This shows that an ungrounded assumption 
has been made when alternatives were possible. It then becomes a matter 
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of contrasting the two dogmas, the realist and the antirealist, about doubts. 
Aenesidemus could have replied to Sextus that he was taking the skeptical 
arguments to the issue of whether there are only determinations in the 
world. Replying in that way, he would have been denouncing unsuspected 
dogmatism. To be sure, the skeptic can then reply that she does no more 
than use passing determinations to proliferate doubts. In any case, the 
contrast can be portrayed as a metaphysical dispute as to what doubts teach 
us and how far they reach. Presented this way, the friction inaugurated by 
Sextus’s critique of Aenesidemus is no more than a battle of accusations. 
It is, nevertheless, an intriguing friction. It can be placed not in trench 
warfare but in open-field combat. The skeptic can, then, retreat to a less 
fraught situation and take her commitments to be no more than passing. 
The ontologist of doubt, by contrast, would have to leave his entrenched 
position that the board of doubts and determinations is part of the world. 
The open-field alternative would be for them to actually play on the board 
in order to decide whether the board is in the world or somewhere else. 
Once their claims are put aside as dogmatisms, both the skeptic and the 
ontologist recognize that nothing beyond the board determines its reality. 
The issue must be decided within the board, playing by the rules of the 
game of doubting. 
The game proceeds in the usual Pyrrhonist manner: an attempt to 
suspend judgment as to whether doubts are in the world or in our heads. 
The two positions would then arguably converge: the ontologist of doubt 
would no longer hold onto a realist claim about doubts, while the skeptic 
would revise her previously unsuspected attachment to the reality of 
determinations (and the unreality of doubts). The efforts on both sides 
would dwell in absences of determination – not with the presence of 
incertitude among beliefs or of doubts among facts. On the one hand, 
the effort may undermine the dogma of eroding all conviction (about 
determination or doubt). On the other hand, the same effort may erode 
determinations of all kinds (in beliefs and in states of affairs). In other 
words, friction between the ontology of doubts and skepticism is such that 
the former erodes determinations while the latter erodes conviction. The 
techniques put forward by the Pyrrhonists, which proliferate doubts, apply 
either way. 
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The two can therefore converge. Skepticism has always been an 
incursion into the realms of contingency – even when confined to a doxastic 
arena. Ontology of doubts is an attempt to make sure doubts have a broader 
impact. In both cases, doubts are central: they are sought and kept. Tension 
between the two positions arises when we think of one as asserting what 
the other is tacitly denying. Sextus apparently suspected that Aenesidemus 
took the attention to doubts prescribed in the Pyrrhonist recipe as an 
intermediary stage on the way to a more consolidated position, such as a 
Heraclitean ontology of the polemos. Sextus was unhappy with anyone who 
took Pyrrhonic doubt as a step toward what he can only see as dogmatism. 
The ontologist of doubts, however, doesn’t have to accept this diagnosis. 
She can insist that Aenesidemus wasn’t moving toward dogma at all. What 
Aenesidemus could have been after, according to the ontologist of doubt, 
was a way to go forward by considering that nothing in the world can, 
even in principle, resolve or exorcize doubts. The ontology of doubt would 
be improving on Sextus’s neo-Pyrrhonism by insisting that not even in 
principle is any attitude more recommendable than an epokhé. Suspension 
of judgment is not the second best but the very best attitude one can have 
toward some or all content. 
We can find a way to reconcile the insights and the blind spots of both 
positions. The ontology of doubt holds that doubts are everywhere – and 
therefore they can also be found within our knowledge and within our 
doubts – as polemos can also be found in our knowledge of polemos.245 If 
this is so, then the ontology of doubts cannot be taken to assert that we are 
convinced of the existence of external doubts – or that they are immune 
to doubt themselves. The interplay between doubts and determinations 
recognizes no fixed territories. The ontology of doubts is a therapy to the 
neo-Pyrrhonist tendency to locate doubt within the realm of our thought. 
We do find doubts through the Pyrrhonist modes, but they don’t come with 
tags bearing their permanent addresses.
The techniques of suspending judgment could point not to the relativity 
of dogmatic beliefs, but rather to the truth of relativity itself. The skeptic, 
after her ontology of doubt therapy, on the other hand, claims that the 
relativity brought up by the activity of doubting does not require asserting 
any truth beyond the suspension of judgment. The ontologist of doubt 
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would then complement this by saying that doubt can be anywhere – it has 
no fixed territories, as there are no fixed territories for determination. We 
can now present a third and last formulation of the ontology of doubt, which 
holds that doubts are not confined and determinations are not endemic. 
According to such a position, doubts can be known, but knowledge of them 
is also full of doubts. This third and perhaps deflated ontology claims that 
there is no safe haven immune to doubt. It is not about contemplating 
doubts from the outside, from a position that is immune to doubting. There 
is no dogma, not even about doubts themselves. This ontology of doubt 
is no more than a reminder that suspension of judgment can be both the 
method and its result. It is therefore an exercise in looking at contingency. 
Or rather, it is an ontoscopy. 
Being up for grabs
The open field shows how doubts reveal what is up for grabs. Contingency 
is widespread – it is not everything, it is not an ultimate component, but 
it is proton to onton in the sense of chapter 1. The sort of insufficiency that 
doubts are made of is central in that it affects everything else sensible. 
Doubts elucidate how things are – not because everything is indeterminate, 
but because indeterminacies give shape to what is around them through 
the board of doubts and determinations. There is a sense in which doubts 
impose themselves on us, in which indeterminacies produce our hesitations. 
In the open field image, the board is the environment in which we move. We 
cannot find access to the world – to anything absolute – on a hesitation-free 
path. More than revealing a game in our thought or even revealing the world 
with its indeterminacies, doubts place us amid the workings of contingency. 
We have looked at three different formations of the ontology of doubt. 
The last simply refrains from any commitment to a world of facts. The 
first, and maybe the strongest, is committed to a world of indeterminacies 
– beliefs are, by their own nature, cognitively inadequate, as they have 
determinations as their content. The second makes room for some 
determinations in the world, within the context of the board of the game 
of doubting. The board itself is an agent in the game – it constrains and 
entitles moves within the course of play. The emerging picture in the second 
formulation is of a flexible board where determinations are not fixed but 
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depend on the indeterminacy that is spotted. The formulation posits that 
some determinations exist, though not which ones nor even how many. It 
is a consequence of the argument against GS presented by Davidson that 
some unspecified determinations are true. A belief, as Davidson sometimes 
puts it, has a presumption of truth in its favor. I see this as suggesting 
what I call the metaphysics of some: there are determinations, but nothing 
determines once and for all which they are.246 In the world described by this 
metaphysics, there are always some facts, but they are contingent on how we 
approach things, on what problems drive us. They depend on the perspective 
from which they are seen. It is as if our provisional acceptance of some 
determinations has been extended to the world, making it no longer a world 
of facts in general but a world of some facts that emerge from the board. 
Facts themselves are under the influence of indeterminacies and depend 
on the perspective from which they are approached. Such perspective is 
itself dependent on doubt – a doubt targets a determination while being 
grounded in some truths, according to Davidson’s image. Doubts exhibit 
contingency while they unveil facts that ground them – no more than some 
facts, and those are undetermined. 
Shown from the point of view of doubt, what is up for grabs doesn’t 
appear primarily as open to interference. Rather, it presents itself 
as insufficiently determined. This contrasts with how it appears in a 
monadology of fragments. There, we understood lightness of being in 
terms of openness and communitas, whereas here it is an issue of automaton 
and under-determination. Also, in the three formulations of the ontology 
of doubts, the board appears not to be up for grabs itself. Contingency 
is transcendent. In the monadology of fragments, we witness  immanent 
immunization forces, while here, the board is not itself an object of doubt. 
Insufficiency is a structural feature of the sensible, something that we 
can compare with Meillassoux’s principle of facticity. But the board, in 
the latter two formulations of the ontology of doubt, leaves room for the 
non-contingent within its quarters. In these two formulations at least, 
indeterminacy is widespread and crucial to understanding the sensible, but 
it is not the sensible’s ultimate principle. To be sensible is to be meshed with 
what is up in the air. 
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Doubting brings contingencies to the fore – this is what makes the 
ontology of doubts an ontoscopy. Doubting can be a way to access what 
is up for grabs, what is undecided, and therefore cannot command assent 
to any determination. The ontologies of doubt are like the doctrine of the 
polemos in that they conceive doubts as not only (possibly) both in the world 
and in our thinking but also in our thinking (possibly) because they are 
in the world.247 Doubts expose insufficiency. The sensible contrasts with a 
realm of determinacy, where there may be room for investigations capable 
of drawing conclusions without margins for doubt because everything is in 
itself sufficiently determined – and therefore necessary. 
Not a quaver Gisel Carriconde Azevedo, Collage on paper, 2011
Chapter 5
Rhythms
Rhythm-oriented ontologies
Zbigniev Karkowski, as part of his endeavor to broaden the set of musical 
instruments to oblivion, aimed to expand music to the point that nothing 
else could be recognized.248 In the closing lines of his essay on the topic, 
he claims that
[…] all the forms existing in the universe: plants, trees, 
minerals, animals, even our bodies have their shape created 
by resonating to some specific frequencies in nature. In a 
very real sense then, at the core of our physical existence we 
are composed of sound and all manifestations of forms in 
the universe are nothing else but sounds that have taken on a 
visible form. [...] There is no doubt that the body metabolism 
functions primarily via a combination of electrical frequencies, 
pulse rates and biochemical hormones. […] There is nothing 
else but sound, all that exists is vibration. 
Karkowski suspects that everything resonates with what surrounds it. He 
talks about sound composing everything through frequency and vibration 
– nothing can be indifferent to that which resonates around it. Karkowski 
is hinting at the idea that our auditory experience is revealing concerning 
how things interfere with each other. He conceives of interference like a 
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contagion through proximity. Transmission through contact points toward 
an image of what exists not as substantially closed but rather as intrinsically 
open to what is around it. 
Resonance appears not only among organic systems but also, 
suggestively, among sedimentary rocks. It is interesting to look at a 
particular form of sedimentary rock that is very common where I come from 
– the ancient soil of Brasilia. Many of the rocks in the region are rhythmites. 
A rhythmite is composed of layers of sediment laid down with a periodicity. 
They register rhythms of the local events, rhythms that can be seasonal, 
of shorter-term processes such as tides or of longer-term processes like 
regular floods. The rhythmites around Brasilia register patters reminiscent 
of sea tides and, as such, they reveal that the area may have been home to 
a prehistoric sea. The sea, which might have been here millions of years 
ago, left its vestiges on the ground because it had rhythms. The geology 
of rhythmites is the study of the periodicity of past events. It studies how 
what takes place around rocks marks them. Sedimentation is rhythm-
oriented. It takes place at the pace of what is in the vicinity – and provides 
a condensed register of its neighborhood as its layers keep track of what has 
happened there. 
Sedimentary rhythmites are philosophically interesting. They are, 
perhaps, philosophers’ stones, for they overtly illustrate what it is to 
be oriented by rhythms. In fact, as sedimentary rocks, they are clear 
registers of the pace of past sedimentation. They explicitly solidify the 
rhythms around them – their shapes register the periodicity of what is 
happening. They are also speculatively interesting: they are constituted in 
a way that is perhaps not sui generis. Maybe rhythmites and their paced 
sedimentation are not unique; maybe they represent a more widespread 
vulnerability to surrounding rhythms. Things are shaped and composed 
by patterns around them. Rhythmites receive repetitions that form beats 
surrounded by intervals. These rhythms shape sedimentation, which 
registers the surrounding events as beats; they contract the repetitions in a 
materiality that stores the patterns of the events taking place around them. 
Sedimentation is indeed an antenna.249 It captures the beats it is capable of 
capturing – these sedimentary rocks have a pace that is up for grabs for the 
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events around it. But sedimentation is also a broadcaster. Rhythmites both 
capture and transmit. 
Sedimentation is the speculative takeoff lane for a more general rhythm-
oriented ontology. To be sure, there are several possible varieties of such 
ontologies: rhythm-orientation can be vindicated in different ways. Rhythms 
can be understood, for example, as having units that are themselves abstract 
and systematically instantiated by concrete things. In this case, there 
would be pure rhythms separate from things following repetitive patterns. 
The rhythm-oriented ontology that I will develop here, however, makes 
no appeal to pure rhythms. It is rather an ontology of events in which, in 
a certain sense, events determine the pulse of everything else. There are 
no original rhythms. The pace of events, and the intervals between them, 
can be changed. This openness in pace makes whatever is constituted by 
events susceptible to change by rhythms. As in all possible forms of rhythm-
oriented ontology I can imagine, repetition is a crucial ingredient. 
Repetition and entrainment 
Deleuze explores Hume’s thesis that repetition doesn’t change anything 
in what repeats but does change something in what contemplates the 
repetition. 250 His endeavor is to replace the philosophical focus on 
substances and their representation with an attention to the processes of 
repetition. Repetition carries a force, not through necessary connections 
but through parts of the actual world shaping others. Deleuze thinks of 
repetition as both spatial and temporal – repeated shapes and repeated 
paces. Instead of a universal guided by underlying necessities, repetition can 
set the same pattern in different concrete things by contagion. Repetition is 
the grammar of the universal: local patterns in concrete things affect what 
is around them, and universality then grows from contact. The Humean 
lesson is that the marks of repetition are not left in what is repeated, but 
rather in what the repetition affects. Patterns are themselves sculptors of 
whatever media are open to them – they are not abstract interferences, but 
can be transmitted from one concrete thing to another. One such medium is 
human expectation: we are engraved with a habit of expecting something if 
we are sensible to what is repeated. 
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Repetition is a blueprint for universality without appeal to instantiations 
– it is not that the shape of the chair instantiates a chair shape, but rather 
that it repeats the shape of another chair. But anything can repeat anything 
– a bug can model a leaf, an armchair can model a valley, work-management 
software can model a desk, ontogeny can recapitulate phylogeny. It is a form 
of generalized-recapitulation ontology.251 That is to say that there are no 
pre-established limits to repetition – anything can repeat anything. Here, 
Deleuze makes an important distinction: repetition can be naked – exact, 
independent of the medium that repeats it – or dressed – mediated, affected 
by what repeats. An armchair repeating a valley is dressed; it depends on 
what the armchair “wears,” for it is a medium very different from a valley. 
Similarly, each chair repeats the patterns of other chairs, but imperfectly. We 
can find naked repetition between two instances in a sequence of numbers 
– but Deleuze holds that even this depends on a dressed repetition, for 
instance that of a sequence of signs on a paper. A naked repetition requires a 
supporting dressed repetition – there are no self-standing naked repetitions 
among the concreta. Expectations created from perceived patterns are 
dressed repetitions – they take a very different shape from the original 
patterns, but, still, they repeat. 
Because the medium changes from iteration to iteration, repetition gives 
rise to difference. Deleuze seems ready to propose an ontological game 
of Chinese whispers, in which a message transmitted repeatedly produces 
something else. It is an insinuation of the Epicurean idea that swerving 
from an orbit creates something new.252 Repetitions happen in time: for 
the shape of a chair to model another, one must precede the other. This 
enables Deleuze to understand the past, the present and the future in terms 
of repetitions. The past is always what has prepared the current moment; 
the répétition is both what has been repeated and what has been rehearsed. 
The past is the current form of the rock – or of the chair, the leaf or the 
embryo. The present is what repeats. It is shaped by the past. The present is 
the resonating moment; it is when expectations are put to work and when 
past repetitions give pace to what is to come. The present is the repeater: 
what brings what was rehearsed to act. Finally, the future is the repeated – 
what can be foreseen is what has been present in past repetitions. The future 
appears as what is repeated, what is scheduled by habit, what is induced. 
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There is no future without induction. It is in this sense that Blanchot says 
that the disaster has no future: it has no place on the calendar.253 The 
unpredictable cannot be placed in the future. The calendar is, in fact, a 
way to predict the future, based on very entrenched expectations like our 
certainty that there will not be more than one Monday next week. The 
calendar is itself based on repetitions, and all it can say about the future is 
what is going to repeat.
It is because the present repeats and the future is the repeated that 
the pace of past repetitions resonates through time. This is what brings 
rhythm into the picture. Delanda understands rhythms as intensive 
time.254 Intensities are distinct from qualities in that they can affect their 
surroundings, just as a colored paint transmits its color to the surfaces it 
touches. If something metallic is placed close to a piece of wood, its qualities 
will not transmit by simple proximity – its shape, its size, its volume – but its 
temperature will. Temperature is an intensity: closeness to something cold is 
enough to make something else colder. Some properties become intensities 
under particular conditions – the flavor of spices, for example, affects 
whatever is cooked with them. Intensity is about contamination without 
a specific transmission agent; it is broadcasting and reception without a 
dedicated antenna. Delanda portrays rhythm as an intensity. So the rhythms 
of one’s body affect each other – locomotion influences digestion, breathing 
affects the heartbeat, hormone cycles interfere in sexual peaks. Similarly, 
the surrounding rhythms have an impact on the internal rhythm of a body. 
Rhythms impact other things by the force of resonation. A rhythm from the 
streets resonates in my body, makes my feet move, changes my breathing, 
alters my digestion. Rhythms interfere in the timing of things. They affect 
time – and this is why DeLanda appropriately understands them as intensive 
time. We will see later that from a rhythm-oriented perspective, there is no 
time beyond timing: the aggregation of rhythms alone constitutes time. 
Rhythms set the clock.
DeLanda calls the process by means of which a rhythm resonates 
in other things entrainment. The pace of one cycle entrains others. The 
rhythms in the street entrain my pace of working, music entrains dancers. 
Entrainment, to be sure, is always dressed, as opposed to naked. It happens 
through mediations. Different people are entrained differently by the same 
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music, depending, for instance, on the different marks left in their bodies by 
the rhythms they have been entrained to in the past. Yet on the dance floor, 
they synchronize. A common rhythm is in fact what makes a dance floor 
what it is – different responses to a common entrainment. People on a dance 
floor can be compared to organisms acting together through nothing but a 
common rhythm. DeLanda writes:
The phenomenon of entrainment allows many independent 
sequences of oscillations to act in unison, to become in effect 
a single parallel process. The most dramatic and well-studied 
example of this phenomenon is perhaps the slime mold 
Dictyostelium. The lifecycle of this creature involves a phase 
where the organisms act as individual amoebae, the behavior 
of each constituting an independent sequential process. At 
a critical low point of availability of nutrients, however, we 
witness the spontaneous aggregation of an entire population 
of these amoebae into a single field of parallel oscillators, 
eventually leading to their fusing together into a single 
organism with differentiated parts.255
Because rhythms entrain, there is little sense in talking about intrinsic 
rhythms. Circadian cycles are entrained by the rotation of the Earth, sea 
tides are entrained by the moon, a woman’s menstrual rhythm is entrained 
by other women’s cycles. Entrainment displays characteristics of an intensive 
process; it is a process of contagion indifferent to agents. It is what makes 
rhythms intensive time: they entrain what is around them in different 
ways, depending on the media where the repetition will take place. To be 
entrainable is to be subject to rhythm, and entrainable are the vibrating 
components of laser light, chemical reactions, geological formations and 
organic cycles.
Entrainment points toward a common surface of a lack of immunity to 
rhythms. This common lack of immunity sets things up for entrainment – an 
ontological dance floor. To be sure, the rhythms that entrain are the ones 
that can be heard – it is only some sounds that make it all the way through 
my window. The passers-by in the lobby of the library where I am situated 
entrain me only through their steps close to me. As intensive time, rhythms 
are transmitted through proximity. Also, there are immunizing mechanisms 
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that stop entrainment. The rhythm of the stars is less entrained by life on 
the surface of the earth than vice-versa. If a woman is on the pill, she is less 
easily entrained by other menstrual cycles. Again, the dance floor is a useful 
metaphor: Differences in the way people dance have to do with folds in 
their bodies that register past rhythms. They can also decide to move some 
parts of their bodies but not others by deflecting the passing rhythms away 
from some movements. Still, some cycles of their bodies are affected by 
the closeness of the rhythm. Mere proximity makes entrainment possible. 
A rhythm-oriented ontology is like this dance floor: entraining rhythms go 
a long way. 
Events
Given that rhythms are all-encompassing, it is difficult to start describing 
a rhythm-oriented ontology. Its main claim is that rhythms are a crucial 
element in what there is: rhythm transmission illuminates how concrete 
things acquire their shape. Yet because only perceived rhythms entrain, it 
is not straightforward how rhythms manage so much. A plausible starting 
point for a rhythm-oriented ontology is the beat. The beat is like a point 
in audible space – as elusive, seemingly dimensionless and ubiquitous as a 
point. Yet if we take rhythms to be present in every episode of resonance, 
we would find beats in the shapes of rocks, in the folds of our bodies, in the 
stains on the wall. We can understand rhythms in terms of beats and time or 
in terms of paces and intervals. This doesn’t mean that beats have a priority 
over rhythm; as we will see, maybe the best is to take them to mutually 
depend on each other. A rhythm requires time to unfold – as perhaps time 
requires beats that tick the clock. In any case, if we start with beats, we 
ask what it is that beats. We ask what, in ontology, is the correlate of my 
knockings on the table.
A candidate understanding of the beat is the event – anything that 
happens. We say that events take place – they occupy a space that was 
already busy with other events that have themselves taken place. An event 
is also said to be something that brings a change; perhaps the event is itself 
a change. The Aristotelian account of change in the Physics256 involves three 
ingredients: that which undergoes change, that in which it changes, and that 
which is actually changed. If this is so, and we take an event to be a change 
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– as a beat divides between two intervals of time – the event has to act on a 
change-bearer, something that receives the change. It is not always simple to 
identify the change-bearer of an event. Sometimes an event gives rise to too 
many dispersed changes: the outbreak of a plague changes many bodies, the 
inauguration of a president brings difference to several institutions, the start 
of the spring alters a number of organisms. This is why the individuation 
of events is puzzling: what makes an event one – as opposed to many? The 
issue provides insight into the sense in which beats are separate from each 
other and how they act on rhythms. 
The problem of the individuation of events reveals some dimensions 
of rhythms. To begin with, if events resonate in beats, what separates 
those beats? Davidson attempted to individuate them through causes and 
effects, seeing them as points in a causal chain.257 The problem, as Quine 
quickly pointed out, is that the space of causes and effects is itself made of 
events, and therefore events can only be individuated by an appeal to other 
individuated events, can only be identified with respect to other events that 
have already been identified. In other words, only in a space of events, where 
things take place, can something take place. An event affects a change-bearer 
that is arguably constituted by other events – if, in fact, we can say that the 
change-bearer in this account is the causal chain. Similarly, the beat is a 
distinguishable beat only given an underlying rhythm over which it comes in.
Davidson’s account of the individuation of events is often rejected on the 
grounds of circularity. Something, however, can be said in favor of biting 
this bullet and embracing the claim that an individuated event can only 
make sense against a background of other events. This can look plausible 
if we consider that time cannot be eventless. If there cannot be time 
without change, something like an event has to bring about that change. 
So circularity may be enlightening in this case. Further, the entanglement 
between rhythms and beats is not one that can be easily unraveled. 
Two poles emerge that, in a nutshell, mimic those of priority monism 
and priority pluralism: a beat depends on the underlying rhythm, or the 
composed rhythm is built on the aggregation of beats. Though a way out 
through an appeal to circularity may seem attractive here, it would simply 
mean espousing the equivalent of priority nihilism. It would entail that an 
individuated beat can only appear in a rhythmic context – the change-bearer 
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of the beat event must be the overall rhythmic environment surrounding it, 
as rhythms and beats mutually depend on each other. 
Still, other accounts of the individuation of events manage to avoid 
circularity. The most discussed of these is Edward Lemmon’s, developed 
as a response to Davidson’s original approach. Lemmon identified an 
event with a spatio-temporal position.258 The event is individuated by its 
spatio-temporal location. Here, the change-bearer is irrelevant, once events 
are no longer considered as changes. They are simply things that take 
place. It is a way to avoid obvious circularity – but if time itself cannot be 
understood without appeal to events, the threat of circularity may return, 
for a position in space-time will be a position among other events. There 
are other apparent drawbacks to the approach. Different events often 
happen simultaneously. The ringing of the phone and its slight shaking can 
be different events with the same space-temporal location. A supporter of 
Lemmon’s account can therefore feel compelled to take any two or more 
events that occur at the same space and time to be actually the same. This is 
a heavy burden, for it goes against ordinary ideas about different events.
Lemmon’s account can nevertheless be defended on a different basis, 
and this can shed light on how best to handle events as beats. One can say 
that the events are actually different because they are positions in different – 
albeit connected – space-time areas. That is, we can try to place the ringing 
of the phone and its shaking in different overall areas. This path is even more 
evidently subject to the circularity objection, for these space-time areas 
look dangerously like causal chains in Davidson’s account. The circularity 
of individuation strikes again, for without individuated events, it may be 
difficult to individuate these space-time areas. This could be an ultimate 
drawback to an approach that tries to individuate events without appealing 
to already individuated events. This may then stimulate Lemmon’s followers 
to accept that what seem like different events are actually the same after all. 
However, the alternative of different space-time areas deserves some pause.
If we can legitimately postulate space-time areas, we are entitled to talk 
about separate-yet-simultaneous rhythms of events. Perhaps a beat can only 
be heard against the background of another rhythm of which the beat is not 
a part. The beat of a train departing – the event: the train is set in movement 
– is individuated against the tick of the clock – the event: it is now 11:19. 
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The counting of time is taken to be unaffected by most other rhythms. If 
we set the chronometer for the journey, its rhythm is also indifferent to 
the clock rhythm, as would be the rhythm of turn taking in a chess match. 
The fact that time can be detached from further time is what makes room 
for the possibility of time travel: a timeship, travelling in time, would make 
a journey of one hour toward the next millennium.259 Considering two 
different chains of events that are indifferent to each other is, therefore, 
something we do ordinarily. If we consider these separate areas, we can 
separate events that happen simultaneously but in these different areas; my 
dancing affects the others dancing around me, but also my heartbeats and 
my dancing are two separate rhythms. My banging the surface beneath me is 
common to both separate areas, but it translates into my heart cycle as one 
beat and onto the dance floor as another beat. If beats are events, we can see 
each of these as separate events. 
Another alternative to Davidson’s causal-chain-based account of the 
individuation of events is Jaegwon Kim’s.260 His main idea is that events 
are instances of properties in objects. Here, clearly, the change-bearer is 
the object that subsists through the many events – through the changes of 
state it undergoes. So setting a train in motion is an event, for it makes the 
train instantiate the property of being in movement. Kim’s account relies 
on an ontology of objects and properties; if there were no objects, there 
would be no events. Further, an event cannot be individuated without 
objects (or without aggregates of objects). If an ontology of objects is 
assumed – according to which everything happens to objects – this could 
be a good account. But events are not thought to depend on objects and 
properties, so taking them as instantiations of properties of objects doesn’t 
help. Kim’s account, nonetheless, is a clear example of how events depend 
on change-bearers – they operate a change on objects. If we take events 
as beats, we have them making changes within a rhythmic soundscape. A 
rhythm-oriented ontology that would have the beat – or the event – as some 
sort of arché would have to assume a background of silence – or nothingness 
– against which the beat has taken place. It would then be this beatless 
rhythmic soundscape that would be changed into something else.
Carol Cleland has defended an alternative account of the individuation 
of events that, while having clear change-holders that are not quite like 
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rhythm soundscapes, can help elucidating the connections between 
beats and rhythms.261 She holds that an event is a change of state in a 
determinable property. A determinable property – which she calls a phase 
– is a quality that admits of many states. So having a color is a phase; it 
admits of states like red or blue. Red also can be a determinable property, 
admitting of many shades. So an event is a change within a space of states 
bounded by a phase – like a change of state in the space of colors. Because 
the distinction between states and phases can be relative – red is a state 
of color but also a phase admitting shades – she appeals to a trope-like262 
entity that she calls concrete phases. These are tropes of phases that she 
takes as basic individuals whose individualization is always already given. A 
particular colored patch (the concrete phase) may turn from white to brown 
(the change of state). An event is a concrete change that acts on a concrete 
phase – something that happens to the phase that makes it change states. 
She continues to say that objects and space-time locations can be construed 
in terms of these basic individuals – concrete phases and events are changes 
in these individuals – they are the change-bearers. 
Cleland’s approach, relying on concrete phases as things that are 
changed by events, provides arguably no more than a partial account of the 
individuation of events. This is because she assumes that concrete phases 
are themselves already individuated. If we are convinced that the issue of 
individuation ought to be pursued further, we must consider that concrete 
phases seem to be individuated only by means of further events. This is 
precisely because the distinction between phases and states is relative. 
So if ringing is a state of the phase of being a working telephone, and if 
a particular working telephone is a concrete phase, then to be a working 
telephone is also a state of another phase – and arguably another concrete 
phase – like the phase of being a telephone, working or not. What makes a 
telephone – concrete phase – start working is an event that changes its state. 
If this is so, phases also result from events that are changes in other concrete 
phases – concrete meta-phases, we can call them. If we don’t take concrete 
phases as primitives, we have to individuate them through other events, and 
ultimately, we return to issues of circularity.
It is again an interesting circularity: events can only be identified in terms 
of other events unless we break the circle with primitives – be they objects 
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or concrete phases. Cleland believes objects can themselves be understood 
in terms of events (and concrete phases). Now, concrete phases themselves 
can be unpacked in terms of events, for if we take them to change states in a 
phase – inaugurating new states – and if states are themselves determinable 
properties, an event also inaugurates a phase. States and phases are 
bordered by events. Events are both what bring about a state and what 
end a state – and a phase. When we postulate primitives like concrete 
phases or objects, we don’t focus on their borders. The difficulties with the 
individuation of events can suggest that we should instead postulate events 
as basic entities. The borders, and not what they border, are the constituents 
(of objects, concrete phases or whatever else). Look at the covers, says such 
an event-oriented ontology, not at what is inside. Events are what separate 
states and phases. If we take them to be basic, we may wish to take them to 
be individuated. But if events are changes, then it is not convincing that they 
can be individuated independently of what they change. 
The alternative is to consider that they change the products of other 
events – objects, phases, states that need separators. Ultimately, events act 
on what other events have acted on. They are like folds in that which is 
already folded; indeed, maybe embryogenesis is the best model for what 
events concoct. They stand against a recursive soundscape: they change 
what has been changed before. If we understand beats as events, we can take 
whatever is inaugurated by an event – a state, a phase, etc. – as the interval 
between one beat and the next. The intervals are part of the rhythmic 
soundscape against which a beat is distinguishable. It is hard to conceive of 
a first beat – a creation ex-nihilo – for a beat can only be identified against 
a background of other rhythms, and a silence with no beginning is not a 
standard interval, for those are made by a starting beat and an ending beat 
– by changes. Beats are constituents of intervals as events are constituents of 
what they change. What endures, therefore, endures in a rhythm. Instead of 
looking for substances, we look for what puts an end to subsisting. Instead 
of looking at the sensible as the realm of degeneration and decay, we look 
toward change itself. Considering events as beats and as the recursive 
building blocks of the grammar of the sensible is an open door for a rhythm-
oriented ontology that assumes everything can only exist against a rhythmic 
background. An event is mainly a change in a rhythm soundscape.
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This primacy of the surface over what it covers lets us understand the 
sensible as what pulses, like a dance floor. A rhythm-oriented ontology 
brings equality to all events: they all take place on the same rhythmic 
surface. Arguably, the more obvious auditory features of rhythms help with 
appreciating this equality. Indeed, the categories related to the auditory – 
such as propagation, diffusion and silence – are better suited to dealing with 
nonhierarchical mutual interference than the visual. While vision privileges 
distinctions between the figure and its ground or between what is revealed 
and what is concealed, audition privileges a flat appreciation, something 
like Garcia’s plane of equality.263 In rhythmic terms, the intervals not only 
lack intrinsic depth but are also dependent on the beats that demarcate 
them. Events, seen as beats, are prior in the sense that in this rhythm-
oriented ontology nothing is seen as independent of its starting and ending 
points. Beats are only relatively archés. Yet no event’s pace is determined by 
anything other than the pace of other events – beats take place in a wider 
space of beats. 
The rhythm soundscape is made of rhythms on top of other rhythms; 
the preceding ones, nonetheless, enjoy no primacy for coming earlier. There 
is no arché in rhythms – new rhythms can prevail by entrainment as much 
as old ones. No ancestral rhythm entrains all the others. In fact, it is always 
the overall emerging rhythm that affects something. As in a monadology of 
fragments, in this rhythm-oriented ontology nothing is inherently protected 
from the other things that co-exist with it. Here, too, there is no arché, for 
beats – and events – are themselves recursive and ultimately gunky. Not 
only are concrete phases (or objects) made of events, but events themselves 
are made of further changes. In other words, a rhythmic soundscape is 
required to identify a beat against an interval, but also a beat itself is made 
of other beats. The event of making a telephone work is composed of many 
other events – adjusting parts, replacing cards, connecting cables, etc. 
A beat is perceived as such given a specific soundscape – an event is an 
individual with respect to the change it promotes. Beats have a matryoshka 
nature: as rhythms are embedded in each other, beats are made of other 
beats. As events can be decomposed into other events, and a beat is always 
identified against a rhythmic background, the beat of an event is recursively 
constituted by other events. 
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If an event is made of other events, so is time. Time is understood in 
terms of timings – a rhythm is a product of an entrainment that times events, 
like a clock times activities in a day. Time is no more than a collection of 
timings, and therefore a collection of rhythms and entrainments. Moreover, 
an A-series of past, present and future is needed for an event to make sense 
– this A-series indicates where we are in the B-series.264 The A-series is made 
of events. It is also what makes time possible, if there cannot be time without 
change, nor without a present as ticked by a clock. Present time – the 
current tick, the repeater – is itself a matryoshka: it comprises many events, 
and therefore many beats made of rhythms in an embedded clock. The beat 
is composed of intervals and other beats.265 In order for me to start dancing 
– an event – many other events had to happen; I had to start moving my 
arm, for example, which in turn consists of many other, smaller events. The 
now of the stars is made of an indefinite number of nows of the ants; the tick 
of a clock requires a pandemonium of rhythms inside its machinery. This 
embeddedness of rhythms is their basic an-arché, for there is no original beat 
that is not itself an assemblage of simultaneous rhythms. 
Rhythmic transduction
I write these lines at Aharon Amir’s place in Brighton. He is an artist 
interested in the rhythms of search, and we have been discussing 
entrainment and how rhythms get entangled. In his room, we sit on the 
floor facing the window and set equipment to record the pace of our 
conversation. On one of the walls is a radiator. Surrounding it is a pattern 
of squares formed by the change in the wall’s temperature when the heater 
is on. The activity of the radiator is registered on the paint of the wall. 
The many squares around the device echo the rhythm of the many times 
the event of switching the heater on and off has taken place. Such events 
were informed by all sorts of climatic, emotional and economic factors: the 
coming of the winter, the presence of more people in the house, the price of 
gas heating. The cycles become entangled in a composite rhythm that makes 
its marks on the wall. This composite rhythm entrains the gradual failures 
in the paint. To be sure, the radiator also entrains the wall, along with other 
rhythms associated with climate, density of the paint, and overall humidity.
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The an-arché of the beat shows up in the inextricably composite 
character of all rhythms. Not only is the beat itself made of composite 
rhythms – the rhythms present each time the radiator is put to work – but 
also no rhythm entrains on its own. There is always a relevant rhythmic 
soundscape mixing with it. Rhythms are always in entanglement.
The passing of a rhythm from one setup to the next is a matter of 
transmission. The composite rhythm is broadcast and entrenches where it 
can. When it does, we see how the wall parodies the heater and the heater 
parodies the cycles at the house – to isolate the marks of one rhythm 
on the wall, we would need to filter what has been broadcasted. We can 
understand rhythm transmission in terms of transduction, in Simondon’s 
understanding.266 Information flows from one rhythmic device to the next. 
Transduction explains how objects are compressed rhythms – they are 
intervals between two events filled with other events that change the objects’ 
phases and their states. Objects are crystallized rhythms (and the rhythmite 
is the paradigm). Simondon claims that transduction is everywhere – it 
is the stuff individuations are made of. If we understand this information 
flow in terms of rhythmic entrainment, we see how it is only in an ocean of 
moving rhythms that we can find individuals: objects, concrete phases, and 
states, but also the event itself, formed by the composition of rhythms that 
provoke it. Information – like rhythms – is always being lost and regained, 
always aggregating and separating again. Transduction in a rhythm-oriented 
scenario is what binds together independent concrete things – they are 
exposed to the rhythms of information flow.
Transduction is also what produces expectations. Simondon held that 
not only does transduction provide an account of the world but it also 
helps us understand in what terms the world is accessed. Transduction 
explains our inductive contact with the world, both through the inductions 
we make to construct theories and through all our bodily responses to 
our surroundings. The pervasive character of induction shows how we, 
as inhabitants of the world in which we have acquired our habits, dwell 
constantly in expectations – a result of our entrainment by what we have 
found around ourselves. Induction itself is a form of entrainment. We 
can only think about the whereabouts of the sun tomorrow if we have a 
sense of rhythm – enough to be sure of when tomorrow is. It is inductively 
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that we acquire a sense of tomorrow – we expect the clock to tick, the 
rooster to crow, the hours to pass. The future makes sense only if there is 
a clock, a cycle or an expected rhythm to which we are tied: the repeated. 
The acquisition of an inductive hypothesis through our expectations is a 
rhythmic response to experience. It is, of course, dressed entrainment, as the 
medium of habits and instincts is very different from the one of the billiard 
table. Still, the movements of the billiard balls entrain our expectations. 
We filter and modulate what the balls broadcast. Like anything else, we 
modulate the rhythm around us through our particular medium. Because 
modulation and filters act whenever entrainment takes place, experience 
is never pure receptivity – experience cannot be captured in the form of 
naked repetition. There is always a measure of spontaneity involved, if we 
understand spontaneity in terms of mediation – going through a medium. 
Naked repetition, in contrast, is the given, the immediate. In order to hear 
the signal, we must resonate with it.
In fact, in a world of modulated signals and rhythmic broadcasting, 
there is a general version of Kant’s formula against the given that intuitions 
without concepts are blind:267 signals without modulations are insufficient. 
They are insufficient both because unmediated signals lack presence among 
concrete things to entrain anything and because modulations make some 
things heard by throwing others into indifference. Without modulations, 
everything is heard; this is a sort of wind deafness. Signals without 
modulation are white blind – they see too much. McDowell’s version of 
the formula – that intuitions without concepts are mute268 – can illuminate 
how signals have to be entrained: signals don’t say anything to those who 
are not ready to resonate them by modulation. In other words, one has to 
understand the signal, and in rhythmic terms, this means being capable to 
retransmit it – a dressed repetition. Modulation – the mediation that makes 
it possible to hear a signal – is what makes a rhythm capable of entraining. 
Rhythms that don’t resonate among concrete things don’t entrain. 
Modulation is the staple of transduction and therefore is part of how we 
acquire inductive access to the world.
Rhythmic transduction can also explain how we acquire concepts and 
respond to norms. Wittgenstein, at around section 185 of the Philosophical 
Investigations269, makes some remarks about the difficulties involved in 
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learning to follow a rule – and therefore to follow the established use of a 
conceptual norm. To learn to follow a rule (say, +2) is to be able to follow a 
sequence after seeing some examples. Wittgenstein’s famous case is a pupil 
learning the +2 rule from examples up to 1,000; continue the sequence that 
begins 0, 2, 4, …, 994, 996, 998, 1,000. The issue is in which sense the pupil 
makes a mistake if he reckons that 1,004 comes next. Now, to learn a rule 
from examples is to be entrained by a rhythm. This is explicit with the rule 
of +2. The pupil who reckons that 1,004 comes next has been entrained by 
the sequence, but not quite in the way meant by the tutor. The examples 
entrained her in a different way. To learn a rule is to find a way to engage 
one’s resources into being entrained by a rhythm that is sufficiently similar 
– enough to satisfy those who are teaching it. It is an exercise in undressing 
repetition – in capturing a signal that is sufficiently independent of its 
medium to be a shared content.270
In order to learn a public language – and any conceptual norm – one 
uses one’s own rhythms to produce a suitable repetition of another, external 
rhythm. This can be compared with learning a dance step: we engage 
our own articulations, shapes and abilities, which were themselves once 
entrained by something else, to repeat the public movements. The resources 
can be said to be private – albeit acquired through entrainment – while 
the overall movement is synchronized with other, public movements. The 
rhythms of the pupil are among the resources engaged in learning. We 
cannot learn to follow a rule, learn a concept or a dance step, if we cannot 
associate its rhythm with others that are already available to us. This is 
entraining. It acts always on other rhythms. There must be something in the 
pupil that prepares him for the learning – and this has to do with the pupil’s 
body cycles. When the pupil of section 185 of the Investigations captures 
the wrong rhythm, there is nothing to be done but to entrain her further, 
having in mind that the pupil’s receptors may be resistant to some rhythms. 
If the tutor is successful, the learned rhythm will have in itself the marks of 
the resources the pupil engaged to learn it. A rhythm is made of beats, and 
although a learned rule may be public, like a language, it will be executed 
with a private accent.271
There is much to be explored concerning induction, norms and 
cognition within the framework of a rhythm-oriented transduction. Such 
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a framework can shed light onto issues like the need for recognition, the 
content of experience or the role of inference in following norms. My 
purpose here is no more than to present the outline of a rhythm-oriented 
perspective on our access to the world. Access is thoroughly rhythmic, and 
there is much more to be explored in a rhythm-oriented ontology than what 
I have sketched here. Among its precursors, it is interesting to mention 
Lucio Pinheiro dos Santos and his rhythmanalysis, in which he explored the 
role of vibration and pulse in issues concerning human health to develop 
a therapeutic method that contrasts with the focus on thought and speech 
espoused by psychoanalysis.272 Pinheiro dos Santos held that rhythms, as 
the ultimate ingredients of human bodies, provide a crucial therapeutic 
clue. Rhythm-oriented ontology, where rhythmanalysis belongs, looks at 
ontological issues with an eye to how the propagation of rhythms leaves 
its marks in the concreta. We turn now to how this picture of rhythms, 
transmission and entrainment provides insight about what is up for grabs. 
Depthless rhythms
Rhythm-oriented ontology presents the world as an ontological dance floor. 
I invoke the dance floor to present the idea that entangled rhythms coincide 
on a single surface. Auditory experience is not primarily an experience of 
figure and ground, but rather of simultaneous beats. The surface where 
rhythms appear is an assemblage of several layers of entrainment – like 
the surface of the painted wall around the radiator. The various processes 
of entrainment meet in a common surface, leaving their marks there 
and shaping it to receive the signals of further rhythms. Just as in an 
anarcheological procedure, however, rhythms don’t become fully invisible in 
hidden layers; they ripple out onto the floor all the way to the imperceptible. 
This is not a matter of layers, but rather of what occupies the horizontal 
space. On this floor, the non-hidden leaves its marks – not deep marks, but 
folds in the surface. The whole dance floor is entrained by the music, but 
each section is also entrained by all the rhythms of the ways people dance on 
it. It is a floor: a common surface that is built by whatever steps on it. Floors 
are registration devices.
Floors contrast with grounds – they are more like skins than archés. They 
are related to flat surfaces, to planes, to meeting places, to platforms where 
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things take place – the floor of a parliament. The floor is the superficial 
thing that we build everyday by throwing things on it, by moving it around, 
it is made of the leftovers of what is above it. The floor has the solidity we 
need to step on it and yet is never fully stable. A floor is always dispensable, 
because there is always something beneath it. It is superfluous apart from 
being superficial. It is thoroughly replaceable – and yet it cannot be fully 
replaced at once. The floor is a sedimentation surface of incidences, as it is 
the space where events are registered; the floor is the common territory of all 
events. In that sense, it is rhythmic. It is the common space of the effects – 
the plan d’immanence. It is a space of concomitance, not of roots – rhizomes 
and not trees. It is a space of interference, not of foundations – its geology 
is horizontal. Floors are perhaps to anarcheology – as the study of what is 
irrespective of any origin – as grounds are to archeology. 
The artist Ai Weiwei’s work often engages with floors and surfaces. His 
Stool installation builds a floor out of an enormous number of stools brought 
from different dynasties and republican periods in northern China.273 
The artificial floor, a surface connecting the seats of each stool, brings 
in elements of different ages of China and makes clear that all floors are 
mosaics. He also inserts rocks carved into contemporary shapes in the floor 
– in an inarcheological274 manner – and paints commercial logos on ancient 
vases. In Han Dynasty Vases with Auto Paint, he paints millennia-old vases 
with metallic paint used in cars. The surface of interaction of these vases 
– the floor of what is visible of them – look like cars, while their interiors 
preserve the ancient shape and color. The painted visible surface entirely 
changes the appearance of the objects – they now resonate with the streets 
of another time. Floors, like surfaces, have two sides, what is below and what 
is above, and both sides compose them. Yet for a floor, what matters is what 
it registers. It is a skin entrained by the rest of the body, yet having a single 
layer. The layer is a crossroads of everything – of all the different stools. It is 
where everything meets. 
Floors are also like appearances – for an appearance, nothing that is 
hidden matters, only the perceivable, the superficiality of what does not go 
beyond the skin. Wittgenstein makes explicit the difference between the 
surface of appearances and the supposedly grounding connection between 
layers when a foundation is sought. In his Remarks on the Foundation of 
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Mathematics he mocks alleged foundations as no more foundations than a 
painted rock is the support of a painted tower.275 On the painted surface 
of a canvas, a rock and the tower it grounds are on the same layer; depth 
is achieved in the surface, but in the painting the tower needs no support 
from the rock. 
A speculative dermatology
Commenting in an interview about Paul Valéry’s famous dictum that the 
skin is the deepest, Deleuze defines philosophy as the art of surfaces, or, 
rather, as a general dermatology.276 It is an invitation to look at membranes 
and to resist the temptation of the interior. The membrane of appearances 
is a recurrent image of the unsubstantial. Deleuze’s interest in planes, 
surfaces, rhizomes, smoothness and differences of degree is a shift from 
the ontological interest in the internal, implicit, and intrinsic. Instead of 
asking what each thing is, one asks what separates them. Look at the skin, 
says the injunction. Look how it is revealing: it repeats the other surfaces 
– it is a medium. The skin, like appearances, is a border that reflects all the 
national tensions. National borders echo what takes place on other surfaces 
– like a beat is entrained by other beats. Deleuze suspects that if we have 
enough articulated surfaces, we needn’t look inside them. Appearances are 
rich enough, because they’re multiple and entangled – appearance upon 
appearance. Skin on top of skin: dermatology. It is speculative that we 
can project the injunction of looking at the skin everywhere – membranes 
exorcise the hidden. Everything has an appearance; skins are unavoidable. 
Dermatology replaces archeology: there is nothing to excavate; things 
are just knitted together. Speculative dermatology is an endeavor in flat 
ontology: to exorcise the seemingly underlying depths. 
We can begin presenting speculative dermatology in terms akin to 
Hume’s attack on necessary connections. Hume limited the content of what 
is directly sensed, holding the empiricist belief that there are unmediated 
deliverances of the senses and we should avoid going unnecessarily beyond 
them. He started with the remark that while distinct things can be perceived 
by our senses, the connection between them is always unclear and seemingly 
unavailable to unaided sensible intuition. He intended to exorcise obscure 
relations by showing how it is not possible to sense more than actual objects 
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distinct one from another. Connections beyond those of simultaneity, 
succession and contiguity are no more than projections of something 
that cannot be recognized by the senses alone (nor by the senses aided 
by reason, for reason cannot go into these matters of fact). The emerging 
actualist ontology is one of distinct objects in a mosaic, unrelated and yet 
concomitant, assembled and yet disconnected. No relations beyond those 
that make each object distinct from the others.
One can follow this Humean line to further restrict the content of 
unaided sensibility and argue that we do not, in fact, perceive distinct 
objects, for we conceive them only if we postulate permanence in time and 
continuity in space to be enough for an object to be distinct from others. 
What we actually perceive is no more than the distinctions themselves. 
We sense the border between the fence and the grass, the street and the 
pavement, the sea and the sky, but we don’t sense the objects that they 
distinguish. The fence may be in fact many different objects, and the 
pavement and the street may be parts of a single object – say, the road. 
In other words, we perceive the distinctness in things – neither their 
interconnection nor their standing unity. The distinctness tell us where 
joints are, not what the joints actually do; the content of what is between the 
divides is itself a projection on the perceived divisions. Senses give us the 
joints – not the things that joints separate. They give us distinctness. These 
joints, of course, can be either borders between things or articulations of 
parts of these things. It is like drawing the world map – we just draw the 
borders. We can further detail the map by drawing the borders between 
U.S. states, French departments, English counties, and so forth. We increase 
precision by adding more divisions, more separators and more joints. 
Adopting Hume’s empiricist assumption for the sake of this presentation of 
speculative dermatology, distinctness is what is directly sensed, not objects 
and not parts of objects. Just the divides.
These divides can be the starting point for a speculative ontology of 
articulations. The speculative step posits that distinctions ought to be 
everywhere. Instead of substances (or objects, or things, or individuals) we 
should look at the divides between them. The divide – the skin – is what 
ends up producing everything by selective permeability. The thesis can be 
put in terms of priority: skins are ontologically prior to what they cover. 
184 Chapter 5
Things are made of a skin that divides them from the rest of the world. 
Different things have different skins. No interior is needed. Speculative 
dermatology holds that nothing is substantial, but everything is made 
of skins, membranes, and surfaces – nothing between them. Skins and 
empty spaces. If we look at Harman’s scheme of quadruple objects, we 
have to take real objects and real qualities – but not sensual objects or 
sensual properties – to be undermined (or rather overmined)277 by their 
dermatological constituents. They are membranes and more membranes, 
articulated. In a membrane-oriented ontology, nothing but articulations 
matter. This approach brings the empiricist concern with what is available 
to the senses to an ontological level. It does so not by confining reality to the 
surface of appearance, but by considering reality in terms of the surface of 
appearance. It is not about reality being restricted to appearances, but rather 
about our conceiving that appearance is not false because it is depthless – or 
unsubstantial.
Nietzsche saw in the Greeks the courage to live on the surface, on the 
skin of things, and therefore to embrace the Olympus of appearance.278 It 
is as if the interfaces between things – the distinctions – are actually what 
articulates their appearance, for the joints are what originates sensation. To 
encounter the interior of matter, claimed Schelling, is to find the surfaces 
of the bodies.279 No matter how many times matter is divided, the divisions 
themselves are what hit the senses. To be sensed – or to interact with 
anything else – is to have a surface. At least in the sensible, to exist is to be 
findable – through surface contact. The sensible is made of things that can 
be sensed. The interior is therefore made of further skins. Just as we excavate 
the floor only to find further floor, there is nothing but covers, borders, 
distinctions under the skin.
If dermatology is general, it should look at the different skins, the skin 
of the ear versus the skin of the tongue – and how the eye does not affect 
whenever is entraining it, while the hands do. Differences in surfaces 
allow differences in what they contain, as interiors are demarcated spaces. 
Additionally, a general ontology focuses on the difference between the skin 
of a rock and the skin of a tree. They differ in texture, in permeability, in 
what affects them, but also they are different in the skins inside them. Some 
are compact and tight, while others harbor space. A poem by Szymborska 
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features a conversation with a stone.280 The stone replies to the interlocutor 
who wants to get in and visit the empty spaces inside it: you cannot get in; 
you can break me into sand, and still no grain will let you in; you cannot get 
in because I don’t have doors. If the rhythmite is the philosophical stone of a 
rhythm-oriented ontology, Szymborska’s doorless stone is the equivalent for 
a speculative dermatology. The absence of doors is not impermeability, but 
absence of an interior that can be other than what is demarcated by surfaces. 
The stone warns its interlocutor that discovery is not about going beyond 
the skin. There is nothing but other surfaces hidden inside anything. There is 
no discovery beyond the skins. Attributed to Heraclitus (frag., fr. 123) is the 
thesis that physis loves to hide. Fragment 277b (see Anarcheology 2/277b) 
holds that nobody will unveil it once and for all.
The surfaces that cover bodies are therefore what can be used in a 
speculative flight toward a general dermatology. It is an empiricist flight, 
for it understands the sensible in terms of what can be captured in the 
experience of touching.  Galatzia says his skin – and in fact his whole 
body – is a touchscreen.281 It responds to contact. Skins are touchscreen 
membranes: by covering what exists, they make them sensible. There is 
no discovery in the sensible that is not a touchscreen. Yet the surfaces are 
different. Speculative dermatology can be tactile, emphasizing skins, like I 
have been. It can also be auditory, or it can be visual and focus on the skin 
of the eye and on the surfaces of visual experience. It is in the framework of 
an appearance-driven speculative dermatology that we can place a rhythm-
oriented ontology like the one I rehearsed above. Rhythms are apparent and 
they are made of a surface of beats, interacting and entangled.
A rhythm-oriented speculative dermatology brings together the 
interaction of skins and composition through rhythms. Beats are like 
membranes that define intervals. They are like rhythmic skins: there is 
nothing to rhythms but a distribution of joints. What has skins evokes the 
depthlessness of rhythms: beats are made of further beats – not interior 
beats, but entangled beats. Interaction between things involves transduction. 
Entrainment is, in fact, a model of interaction: movement, pace and 
vibration are passed through skins. Rhythms, combined with skins that are 
shaped, like rhythmites, by being entrained by their surroundings, leave no 
room for substantiality. Beats entrain skins. The combination of rhythms and 
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skins – and their dynamic interaction – makes any appeal to what is hidden 
under the surfaces ultimately dispensable.
If we press the connection between surfaces and appearances, the 
superposition of surfaces becomes an interposition of appearances. If archés 
are the opposite of appearances, dermatology is an anarcheology. It is an 
ontology of the concrete strictly as sensible. As such, things are what they 
seem to be; to be is to appear. To appear as something is, in a sense, to be 
up for grabs, though not because skins can appear one way or another – nor 
because they have an intrinsic potentiality that is itself unapparent – because 
that would ultimately rely on how skins substantially are. The surface is 
merely a result of the confluence of entrainments; it reflects what coincides 
on it. Here, contingency lies in concomitance, in the accumulation of skins 
and the entanglement of rhythms. What ends up entrained is a result of the 
assemblage of what takes place. A rhythm-oriented ontology inspires the 
broader perspective of general dermatology. Skins are the perceptual events 
– the distinctness that can be the content of unmediated sensibility. In both 
cases, there is nothing but the unbearable superficiality of events. 
Sublunar
An ancient way to refer to the contingencies of the concrete – placing them 
in contrast with the necessity that would rule the movement of the stars – is 
to associate then to a sublunary sphere. Below the moon, everything is more 
exposed to accidents because there is less fixity and arguably substantiality 
is harder to grasp; the sublunar was the address of the sensible. The 
dismissal of geocentrism as an image of outer space made the interest in 
the specificities of the sublunar subside. The Earth, after all, was no more 
than an instance of something broader that is to be understood by a general 
physics. The more recent appearance of geology, and of studies of the history 
of life on Earth, reintroduced some interest in the specificities of “geos” 
and did so while introducing the idea of a natural history. The history of 
accumulated accidents emerged, as we saw, as an approach to making sense 
of the contingencies of the sublunar. However, it was only with the work of 
Lovelock that the specificities of what he called once more Gaia came to the 
fore.282 Lovelock has shown that the atmosphere of the Earth can only be as 
different as it is from its neighboring planets because of its history of hosting 
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various interconnected forms of life. The sublunar – in its atmosphere and 
in its geology – is infected with life and this makes an important difference 
with respect to the outer stars.  Further, Lovelock has emphasized how 
what is outside a living organism – or a plethora of them – is somehow part 
of its cybernetic system through air interchanges, temperature control and 
maintenance of functioning systems. What is outside the skin of a living 
organism provides its meta-stability. The skin itself is what is crucial for the 
organism to be what it is. The presence of an environment for life emerges as 
part of life itself – and is a distinctive feature of the sublunar.
Deleuze and Guattari have focused on the geology of morals to 
show how a general dermatology could provide a general account of the 
sublunar.283 They present an image around the surface where the interior 
and the exterior are both part of a stratum – and this for both the organic 
and the non-organic.284 Organisms as much as geotic structures have an 
environment associated to them that cannot be taken less as less than a 
part of them that is articulated around the stratum – the surface, the floor, 
the skin. This is why the environment that hosts life is itself living for the 
skin is not a device of separation as much as it is of contagion, of asserting 
a proximity – and a capacity to entrain.285 It is as if the dermic is what is 
somehow peculiar to the sublunar – or at least it is what can be considered 
central to our image of what exists in our terrestrial surroundings. Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that there is a dermic common structure to what takes 
place around the surface of the Earth. They provide a general metaphysical 
scheme for what is under the influence of a floor. Unsurprisingly, this 
general scheme is also a scheme for what takes place in the passing of time 
through a sequence of events. The main element of this scheme is the notion 
of double articulation. Two operations are not only simultaneous but also 
provide materials for each other. The first is sedimentation where stuff 
thrown on the floor gives shape to the surface – it is the process by which 
stones are formed from what is around them and the surface of the Earth is 
covered by the debris of what has taken place here. Sedimentation is a form 
of entrainment because it informs the floor; the past is coded by the traces 
it leaves for the future in the common plane where both happen. This first 
articulation is understood as chiefly molecular as it aggregates all kinds of 
dust that fall in the floor and does no more than pile them up. There is a 
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sense in which sedimentation creates a surface for it provides the elements 
with which it is composed – it provides a substance to the floor, a substance 
that shapes it. The second is that associated to the orogenesis, the folding 
that takes place when mountains are formed. They describe it as a folding 
that brings in a functionally stable structure which makes room for the 
sedimentation to take place. This second operation is one where the existing 
forms – products of sedimentation – consolidate into something substantial. 
The second articulation is what gives the Earth its topography that 
conditions what takes place next. It is an affair of sediments accommodating 
themselves, but it gives shape to further sedimentation. This is why the 
second articulation is molar; it provides structure for what comes next.
It is clear how the two articulations are intertwined. One provides the 
materials where the other indicates where these materials will be placed; one 
is matter and the other is form but matter itself produces form and form 
modifies matter. This geological double articulation is then speculatively 
extended to various sublunar issues. The two articulations take place 
around the stratum that is the skin of living organisms in the form of 
most exchanges of energy that sustain life – the skin is the basic bodily 
feature, but it has to be itself without organs. The articulations around a 
surface are common to what is living and what is not – it could be seen as 
a general dimension of animation that takes place in different speeds, in 
different paces, in different rhythms.286 As such, it is the fine structure of 
intensity. Further, the interaction between an environment that sediments 
organisms and a genetic makeup that organizes these sediments on the basis 
of previous processes of sedimentation is thought in terms of the double 
articulation. Genotypes appear as a collection of folds that would shape 
the acquisition of behavior. They are shaped by the sedimentation history 
of the species where the environment left its traces. Genetic structure 
and environment contributions are therefore intertwined in a double 
articulation. But they exemplify a broader structure of interaction between 
earthly things and their surroundings – those things are formed within their 
surroundings and carry on in an interchange with it. Eventually some of this 
interchange is condensed in a molar form that will affect the incorporation 
of elements from the environment, elements that in turn will affect the 
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molar structure. The surface of a stratum is therefore a regulation device – it 
makes the inner and the outer correlate.
This intertwined double articulation is rhythmic. Sedimentation provides 
a baseline of events that usher in some kind of orogenesis. Between the two, 
the surface – there is the movement from outside and the movement from 
inside and both couple because the outside and the inside merge where 
their effects beat. Deleuze and Guattari show how the double articulation 
is a model for recapitulation between living organisms and beyond as folds 
are entrained by other folds while a surface acquires its shape by what takes 
place in both of its sides. The ultimate recapitulation, however, is the double 
articulation itself that, like a rhythm, contaminates around the surface of 
the Earth. The presence of a floor – and not of a ground – is what makes 
earthly things what they are. Any surface that acts like a floor register the 
past events while conditioning the traces to come. At the same time, the 
double articulation exhibits the output of two coupled rhythms; a beat gets 
louder when, say, more and more people start clapping their hands to it but 
as more people join in, the beat itself changes. Any interaction of rhythms 
– and any interaction of double articulations – follow this pattern of co-
existence: a rhythm incorporates others but not without eventually being 
affected by them. The double articulation spells out also the co-entrainment 
that spread through what is sublunar. 
Being up for grabs
Rhythm-oriented ontologies make it possible to think of the up for grabs 
as related to events that just happen. The events assemble on a surface 
and relate to each other dermatologically: by transmission of intensity, by 
spreading, by infection, by contact. A key element in this transmission is 
transduction in the form of entrainment. The emphasis on appearance 
exorcises the appeals of substantiality – and therefore also deconstructs 
the contrast with accidents. Surfaces are up for grabs not because they 
are accidental but because they harbor no substance, nothing between 
the changes brought about by the events shaping them. They are nothing 
beyond the membranes, the beats, the changes themselves. Contingency 
appears here as mere distinctness, or as no more than concomitance. In a 
universe of rhythms, nothing but the perceived overall rhythmic soundscape 
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affects the state of affairs, but the rhythmic soundscape is dynamic enough 
to be entrainable by any event that takes place close enough. Contingency 
shows its no-interior face: rhythms made by beats and generating intensive 
time, floors that are enough for things to spread on and skins that veil other 
skins, hosting the interior as an epiphenomenon. An-arché shows itself as 
depthlessness: events that aggregate and therefore give rise to a surface or a 
soundscape that frames everything else.
Rhythm-oriented ontologies reveal an aspect of contingency that is 
not explicit either in the monadology of fragments or in the ontologies of 
doubt. While the former builds on the centrality of contingency as exposure 
to composition, and the latter relates the contingent with the insufficient 
or the indeterminate, rhythm-oriented ontologies disclose how contact 
and contiguity entail contingency. Rhythms are a clear way to see this, for 
they tread in intensity and entrainment. An event-based rhythm-oriented 
ontology shows how any event that takes place can affect the pace of what 
exists – existence requires a timing, and therefore clock ticks are themselves 
events. Placed within a broader framework of speculative dermatology, 
rhythms appear as a surface where the effect of any contact is spread 
through a matryoshka of membranes without any interior. Speculative 
dermatology relates appearance to the unsubstantial – there is no ultimate 
redeeming of what appears by an underlying reality, and therefore to 
underlie is no more than a relation between surfaces. Contact and continuity 
are what give rise to appearances – appearances result from surfaces that 
touch, skins that affect each other. A dermatological ontology has a grip on 
how appearances are prone to deceive; there is no ultimate non-deceiving 
access, as any revelation is a revelation of the skin of things. There is no way 
to access what is underlying, but only a way of touching other surfaces.
Whilst the ontologies of doubt posit indeterminations as a (possible) 
constitutional ingredient of things – either on their own or along with facts 
– rhythm-oriented ontologies tend to view what is up for grabs as dependent 
on the isolation of a rhythmic soundscape. In the former, what is up for 
grabs is constitutionally so because insufficiency is itself constitutive of 
how things are and is therefore not dependent on how other things turn 
out. In rhythm-oriented ontologies, what is up for grabs depends on what 
takes place around it. In an anechoic environment, no outside sound gets 
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in to entrain what is inside. Rhythmic soundscapes can be immunized 
from outside entrainment, which means that being up for grabs is not 
constitutional – things can be immunized and securely chained to the events 
in a rhythmic soundscape. Contingency, in rhythm-oriented ontologies, 
is immanent. In this sense, those ontologies resemble the monadology of 
fragments. In both cases, to be up for grabs is a product of how the rest 
of the world is arranged. Also in both cases, an immunization process that 
must be sustained, sponsored or protected can reduce  vulnerability. Being 
up for grabs follows from the dependence of each thing on everything else; 
rhythm-oriented ontology yields a measure of holism where intensity can 
put things in contact and there is a cost to being locked apart. Fragments 
and rhythms show how contingency is about interdependence, and as such, 
contingency depends on being up for grabs.
There are important differences, though. Monadologies – but in an 
important sense not the partial monadology espoused by Simondon – are 
agent-based ontologies. The monadology of fragments posits three modes 
of existence of gunky units: they can exist as fragments, compositions and 
composers. Fragments are individual entities that act as composers and 
are available as compositions. Rhythm-oriented ontologies, by contrast, 
are closer to a Deleuzian variation on process philosophy that stresses the 
rhizome, intensive variables and composition. Deleuze conceives of a world 
of proliferating intensities rather than fixed forms, where events precede 
individuals and names designate forces rather than individual agents.287 
He takes proper names as designating effects, zigzags, like a difference of 
potential.288 One difference between agent-based ontoscopies of contingency 
and intensity-based ones is that in the former, an-arché comes from 
plurarchy – the plurality of governments, as in a monadology – while in 
the latter, an-arché comes from a lack of genuine government.289 Rhythm 
entrainment works through the ingredients of governability, in what makes 
it possible for something to influence and be followed. Governments need a 
distinct capacity to entrain in a sufficiently recognizable way. They must be 
able to transmit, to broadcast, to filter – rhythms are the building blocks of 
perspectives. An agent’s view of the world is produced by what entrains it. 
Agents, as subjects, are constructed from rhythms. Rhythms are ingredients 
of subjectivity, larval, ecological and are not  autonomous agents.
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The contrast between a monadology of fragments and a rhythm-based 
ontoscopy can be also fruitfully compared with two of the four dispositions 
diagnosed by Descola.290 While animism is based on an identity of interiority 
among different entities conjoined with differences in physicality, analogism 
is centred on differences both in interiority and physicality associated to 
analogies of form and structure across the board. While the former posits 
agents that have different interfaces with the others, the latter is compared 
to recapitulation and exemplified by the idea of a great chain of beings. 
Descola’s dispositions are, among other things, different ways to understand 
what is up for grabs. While animism focuses on a structured interaction 
of a plurality of agents, analogism stresses how anything can be repeated 
elsewhere. Monadological thinking is like animism in many respects: 
monads are different but are all agents that are sensible to what takes place 
in other units of government – the relations between them has always an 
element of diplomacy. Similarly, a rhythm-oriented ontoscopy is like a 
multidimensional graph of beings where events produce a pace and a timing 
that interfere with events taking place elsewhere. While the former looks at 
alliance and negotiation, the latter privileges contagion and contact. The 
difference is between an agent-based interplay and the interaction afforded 
by the plasticity of events.
These differences points to what seems to be a salient feature of a 
rhythm-oriented ontoscopy of contingency. If we consider Meillassoux’s 
cartography of correlationisms and their discontents, monadologies easily 
cluster with varieties of the metaphysics of subjectivity, while ontologies 
of doubt display several features shared with Meillassoux’s speculative 
materialist thesis that facticity is itself absolute.291 An orientation toward 
rhythms, instead of providing a variety of the metaphysics of subjectivity that 
makes correlation absolute, exploits the very constituents of a correlation. 
The absolute is sought in these constituents, that is, in entraining rhythms 
– in rhythmic landscapes. It is not that the correlation is itself absolute, 
but rather that correlations are revealed by what makes them possible. The 
speculative premise here is not a correlation but our rhythmic experience 
of entrainment and entanglement. From the facticity of correlation, 
Meillassoux’s speculative step infers the absolute facticity of everything. 
The rhythm-oriented speculative step, by contrast, infers from the rhythmic 
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ingredients of a correlation the rhythmic character of everything. As 
contingency is not transcendent, it is not an absolute but enjoys a primacy 
– a centrality. Being up for grabs is central in a world of rhythms – such a 
world is only intelligible if rhythms can find places to propagate.
Speculative dermatology thinks of what is up for grabs as what lacks 
substantiality, and therefore thinks it has nothing but further appearances 
contrasting with its first appearance. It doesn’t stand alone; it has no interior 
that makes it anything in itself beyond its surface. We can also read doubts 
as skins, if we see indeterminations as borders between two facts. Ontologies 
of doubts make these distinctions – doubts – evident. To be sure, doubts 
appear in these ontologies as absolute, while a dermatological approach 
has skins as the contingent product of the contact between surfaces. The 
difference here, again, is one between the transcendence of ontologies of 
doubt and the immanence of rhythm-oriented ontology. In both cases, what 
is up for grabs appears near the borders. Both cases reveal how contingency 
is related to ambiguity – in terms of insufficiency or diaphonia in one case, 
and in terms of a division that makes more than one thing possible in the 
other. What is up for grabs is what can come to be in more than one way.
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Chapter 6
Contingency and its galaxies
The contingent and the up for grabs
Richard Rorty, in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, attempts to show how 
both the object out there and the subject that contemplates and acts upon 
it are products of a construction, and are sometimes intertwined. He claims 
that the world, as much as language, mental contents and intentional states, 
is a result of immanent forces where no upper hand is stable by itself. He 
brings in Freud, Nietzsche, Bloom, Wittgenstein and Davidson to show 
how words and thoughts, just like objects and events, exhibit a “sheer 
contingency”, as he calls it.292 Even though the thesis of an articulated 
construction of elements of both mind and world, sometimes mutually 
imbricated, is close to the metaphysical picture293 emerging in this book, 
it should be clear now that contingency is rarely sheer contingency. To be 
sure, Rorty is also close to the endeavor of assembling equally relevant 
ontoscopies to deal with what is contingent when he insists that there is no 
ultimate, privileged vocabulary for describing anything. We are bound to 
have a plurality of vocabularies, none of them having inborn superiority. 
This book, nevertheless, goes one step further and claims that what 
is contingent in the world, and not only our vocabularies, exhibits an 
irredeemable plurality. In this sense, it does to Rorty’s democracy of 
vocabularies the same operation that Latour claims modes of existence 
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perform on forms of ordinary relativism that, in his terms, don’t traffic in 
hard cash;294 it moves from the relativity of different images of the world 
to an image of the world that includes relativity. Hence, the multiplicity of 
vocabularies itself points toward a plurality in reality – a plurality related to 
what makes necessity absent. Contingency is never sheer, mainly because 
it is not the base level from which everything else is built up. It is not a 
primary raw material that constitutes structures and articulations and 
from which what is necessary, permanent or stable arise. This is the thrust 
of the Aristotelian flavor to the thesis that what is up for grabs is prota ton 
onton – not the ultimate constituent nor the universal explanans, but the 
central ingredient of the sensible. It is, so to speak, a mark or symptom of 
the sensible. This mark is not contingency itself – or non-necessity – but 
being up for grabs: the availability, the insufficiency and the superficiality 
that I have spelled out in terms of fragments, doubts and rhythms. It is 
not merely that there is no constitutive necessity to the sensible, but that 
being up for grabs is the gatekeeper of the sensible, and this porter regularly 
shifts his attire.
Indeed, what is up for grabs has many faces because it is about 
interstices. It has been presented in this book through a collection of 
ontosocopies that contrast with each other. As with the many modes of 
existence that followed from the parricide and the plurality in the kernel 
of being that arose from the fallen pile of muja (see AnArcheology 1/J/N), 
what is up for grabs deals in transitions. Ontoscopies are not themselves 
modes of existence – they rather have to do with how things are presented 
– but what is up for grabs presents itself in several ways because it lies in 
borders that make plurality possible. As Selassie writes in his letter, there is 
no plurality without real, non-eliminable separators, and these separators 
have to be contingent. Separators are germane to what is up for grabs – 
disruption, as the second fragment of the Sahagún Colloquia above makes 
clear (see AnArcheology 3/XVI-?-37-56), has a family resemblance with 
what is vulnerable. In the rest of this section, I will briefly explore a bit 
further this connection between what is up for grabs and what unchains 
– in terms of compositions from found fragments, of insufficiencies in 
determinations and of swerves on a prevalent rhythmic landscape.
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That what is up for grabs is not a baseline for all the rest can be 
clearly appreciated in the monadology of fragments. It could seem that 
immunization comes from a baseline formed by the communitas of sensible 
things. However, what is up for grabs does not always precede immunized 
assemblages. As the monadology of fragments makes clear, there are no 
elementary particles that are in themselves up for grabs – fragments are up 
for grabs precisely because they are not atoms. They are compositions – 
any fragment is gunky. Immunized assemblages, as fragments, are objects 
of composition and therefore material for disruption. In a monadology of 
fragments, the frailty of any composition comes from the immanence of any 
immunization, but the meta-stability of an assemblage is equally immanent. 
There is no baseline in communitas, because there is no transcendent 
starting point. In a monadology of fragments, what is up for grabs inhabits 
the interstices of the three modes of existence – because an assemblage is 
a composition and a fragment (apart from being a composer). It is up for 
grabs either because its meta-stability as a composition depends on other 
fragments or because it is an available fragment. The difference in modes 
of existence between fragments and compositions is to a great extent 
subject to something like a Doppler effect (see Chapter 1 above, “Turning 
Ontologically Towards Contingency”). It is only because something else is a 
composition that a monad is a fragment – and only because something else 
is a fragment that a monad is a composition. The monadology of fragments 
is, in this sense, enlightening because it makes clear how what is up for grabs 
also depends on point of view.
Only to the extent that other monads are composers, compositions 
and fragments is any monad a fragment, a composition or a composer. 
A city is vulnerable to its inhabitants as much as to the ingredients of 
its soil. Like cities, monads are part of a regime of stability involving the 
regions under their governments as much as part of a regime of stability 
involving neighboring regions. What is up for grabs can come as an 
external attack or as civil unrest – monads are vulnerable because they are 
governing entities. Vulnerability, in its turn, reflects the weak points of the 
regime that maintains a government. Plots against it can come from many 
angles. Monads display this vulnerability – they are up for grabs because, 
as ingredients of the sensible, they have to be part of several plots. No 
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government is like a substance – innately enduring – and no government 
has special dispensation to take care of its own stability. In this sense, being 
up for grabs invokes a diplomacy, a diplomacy of the multiple alliances that 
enable something sensible to carry on.
The monadology of fragments is one among a plurality of ontoscopies 
of what is up for grabs and one which takes contingency to be thoroughly 
immanent – its immanence comes to view. Viewed from an ontoscopy of 
doubts, there is a transcendent insufficiency to what is sensible – it is akin 
to indeterminations. To be sure, the multiple ontologies of doubt portray 
the board of doubts and determinations in different ways, but in all of 
them, under-determination is transcendently central to the sensible. In 
other words, doubts are prevalent and unavoidable and this is of the very 
nature of the sensible – it flows. A difference between the monadology of 
fragments and the ontology of doubts is that the second deals directly with 
determinations and establishes – through Pyrrhonist arguments – that they 
cannot be all that there is to the sensible. It makes use of transcendent, 
constitutive arguments to show that doubts must be present in what exists. 
Here again, this ontoscopy reveals the intimate link between contingency 
and plurality: insufficiency and under-determination point toward diaphonia 
– more than one possible discourse about how things are. Indeterminacies 
in the world, either along with determinations or not, erode the surrounding 
apparent substantiality or self-standing stability. It is clear from the 
discussion of the arguments against GS (in Chapter 4 above, “Formulating 
Ontologies of Doubt”) that doubts cannot be appreciated without holding 
something as fixed. Doubting requires hinges, and it is only from a point of 
view of determinations that doubts appear (and, arguably, vice-versa). Here 
again, what is up for grabs is related to a Doppler effect: it only appears 
from a perspective with determinations afforded by doubts.
A third ontoscopy introduces plurality directly in terms of assemblage: 
specifically in terms of rhythmic soundscapes. The impact of a beat that 
comes out of the blue is dispersed by means of the common sonic surface 
where an event has to make an impact. The superficiality of the sensible 
makes clear how the interstices are precisely the gaps where what is up 
for grabs comes in. The sensible is explicitly presented as an agglomerate 
of surfaces conjoined in a dermatological way where events affect each 
Contingency and its galaxies 199
other to the extent that they touch each other. A rhythmic soundscape is 
always superficial and therefore vulnerable to any event that disturbs it. 
The centrality of what is up for grabs is shown through the immanent 
superficiality of anything that has an impact on the sensible. Superficiality, 
in a sense, enjoys a certain transcendent character in the sensible. What 
is up for grabs, in its turn, arises from the absence of anything that, from 
an untouchable depth, maintains the surface as it is. But surfaces can just 
happen to be kept as they are; they can be left unaffected, although they 
themselves do not determine or cause this. 
Contingent a priori
The distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible has played an 
important role throughout this book, for its main thesis is the centrality of 
what is up for grabs in the sensible. I have chosen to call it sensible to be 
close to the usual translation of Aristotle’s aistheta as he explicitly focused 
on whether there is genuine substantiality within this realm. The sensible is 
also called the domain of concrete things, arguably because the articulation 
between concrete and abstract seems less dependent on human access than 
that between sensible and intelligible. The articulation is also close to the 
distinction Hume made between matters of fact and matters of reason (or 
relations of ideas). He took matters of fact as incorrigibly contingent – and 
in a uniform and non-structured way. Because matters of fact were all 
equally contingent, they were all to be known in an a posteriori manner: 
only experience could inform about them, and it enabled no justified 
belief concerning universals. In a Humean scheme, a priori knowledge was 
reserved for relations of ideas – or abstracta, if we want – while matters of 
fact could only be known empirically. (Additionally, matters of fact could 
only be objects of synthetic judgment.)
The distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas – or 
between the sensible and the non-sensible, as far as their associations 
with the a priori/a posteriori distinction – has been challenged in different 
ways. Leibniz’s principle of reason (see Chapters 1 and 3 above) explicitly 
rejects the idea of synthetic judgments and points to a continuity between 
the abstract and the sensible. Leibniz’s monadology created the basis to 
consider all objects as mathematical – with infinite definitions. This makes 
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the sensible no more than the realm of infinite predications. Monads have 
no substrata beyond their predicates – contingency is a consequence of 
their worldliness. As chapter 3 explored, Leibniz introduced a way to think 
of contingency as a structured feature and enabled the possibility of an 
a priori access to what is sensible – a mathesis universalis. An important 
upshot of the challenges to these families of distinctions is that the sensible 
is not all uniformly contingent, and therefore it can be accessed in a more 
structured manner.
A crucial development in this direction was Kripke’s disentanglement 
of the necessary from the a priori. Kripke pointed out that reference-fixing 
descriptions can be known a priori while being contingent. That cats are 
animals, that Adam was the first man or that Venus is the first star to appear 
in the evening are reference-fixing descriptions that can prove false; cats, 
for example, could be shown to be robots, as in the example that Kripke 
borrows from Putnam. As Kripke writes:
[O]ne should bear in mind the contrast between the a priori 
but perhaps contingent properties carried with a term, given 
by the way its reference was fixed, and the analytic (and 
hence necessary) properties a term may carry, given by 
its meaning.295
Kripke draws a distinction between what is known a priori and what 
is necessary – contingent things have to be known a priori for us to 
establish what we are talking about. Reference fixing must take place amid 
contingencies. If we discover that cats are in fact robots, we will still be 
talking about cats, even though we will have had false ideas about them.
To be sure, Kripke’s contingent a priori comes as a pair with empirically 
discovered necessities. Eventually, he holds, we can discover the ultimate 
(essential) nature of cats – robots or animals – and that would mean that 
they are so necessarily. Kripke contrasts this discovery with the initial 
baptism of something, the exercise of individuating something about which 
we are talking:
In an initial baptism it is typically fixed by an ostension or 
a description. […] The same observations hold for such a 
general term as ‘gold.’ If we imagine a hypothetical (admittedly 
somewhat artificial) baptism of the substance, we must 
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imagine it picked out as by some such ‘definition’ as, “Gold 
is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or at any 
rate, by almost all of them.”  […] The definition does […] 
express an a priori truth […]. The ‘almost all’ qualification 
allows that some fool’s gold may be present in the sample. If 
the original sample has a small number of deviant items, they 
will be rejected as not really gold. If, on the other hand, the 
supposition that there is one uniform substance or kind in 
the initial sample proves more radically in error, reactions can 
vary: sometimes we may declare that there are two kinds of 
gold, sometimes we may drop the term ‘gold’.’296
The distinction between the initial baptism and the later discovery is what 
shows that we have to find ways to track things among matters of fact. But 
that we later come up with a necessary a posteriori description of gold is not 
relevant. If there are no necessities to be disclosed empirically, we still have 
to resort to reference-fixing procedures to predicate anything in the realm of 
the sensible.
The notion of a contingent a priori provides an answer to the issue 
of whether predication needs substantiality – and necessity. Predication 
requires no (primary) substance – or substratum – that acts as a subject. In 
the sentence “Socrates lost weight,” no property is attached to a necessarily 
individuated subject; nothing needs to be assumed about Socrates apart 
from what contingently fixes its reference. To be sure, something has to 
be more stable than something else – Socrates changes more slowly than 
his weight. It is perhaps, once again, a Doppler-like effect: predication is a 
change with respect to a subject that is relatively fixed. If the fixed reference 
is investigated so that its necessary features are disclosed, these features will 
necessarily be predicated of it. But these features are not a priori attached 
to the fixed reference. Nothing but a stabilizing mechanism – a reference-
fixing procedure – is needed for a subject to accommodate predications. 
Reference-fixing is not immunization: the subject of a predication can still 
be up for grabs. 
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Galaxies
In this book, in order to discuss issues related to substrata or to Kripke’s 
account of modalities, I have eventually appealed to the notion of possible 
worlds.  It is sometimes said that something is contingent if it happens in 
some but not in all possible worlds. The framework of a possible-worlds 
semantics allows for a meta-theoretical quantification over possible worlds 
so that we can say that something is the case in some or all possible worlds. 
The question then arises as to what established the space of all possible 
worlds. Possible worlds contrast with impossible ones - as Lewis makes clear 
in the opening pages of his On the Plurality of Words.297 Lewis, together with 
many other philosophers, dismisses logically impossible worlds from any 
semantic or metaphysical consideration. But what are impossible worlds? 
Further, what makes a world possible? The answer to these questions is 
often quick and troublesome: logic. Impossible worlds are worlds ruled out 
by logic while possible worlds are allowed by logic. It is a quick answer, a 
ready one. But it is troublesome: why would we rely on one logic? Normally 
classical logic is taken for granted when this ready answer is given. This 
can be justified by claiming that classical logic is at least well entrenched. 
The issue that then arises is: is such entrenchment a matter of contingency? 
Indeed, the plurality of logics introduces a difficulty into the metaphysical 
use of the possible-worlds framework. Different logics evaluate modal claims 
differently. What is impossible in classical logic is not necessarily so in 
paraconsistent or intuitionist logics. 
I have developed with Alexandre Costa-Leite a general framework to 
generate alternative logics.298 Given any logic L understood as a set of 
formulas and a consequence relation – which can be classical or not – an 
antilogic is defined as entailing what L doesn’t entail and not entailing 
what L entails. Additionally, a counterlogic for a logic L with negation is 
defined as entailing an L-negation of what L entails and not entailing an 
L-negation of what L does not entail (if L has more than one negation, it 
will have more than one counterlogic). Both are opposites of L, and it is 
shown that, on a suitable interpretation of the opposition relations, while 
the antilogic is contradictory to L, the counterlogic is contrary to it.299  What 
is interesting about the several logics that are thus generated is that they 
enable very different results about what is logically possible – and what is 
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(logically) contingent. A formula α that is not a theorem of L, for example, 
is not logically necessary in L but logically necessary in its antilogic. In other 
words, different logics imply different evaluations of what is contingent – 
because they correspond to different classes of possible worlds. In fact, it is 
not hard to see that a logic (or rather a consequence relation) is equivalent 
to a collection of possible worlds. These collections enable a study of 
their own as they present interesting relations between them. I have been 
working with some colleagues on these collections and how they inform 
about contingency in general. We call these collections of possible worlds 
associated with a logic galaxies.300 The plurality of logics could pose little 
problem to metaphysics if the off-hand choice of one logic over all the 
others could be somehow motivated. It is hard to provide straightforward 
justifications, for they would have to be themselves based on a particular 
logic. Entrenchment considerations – which appeal to how much a logic 
is used – would favor classical first-order logic and its extensions. These 
could be a decisive factor, as one can point at classical mathematics – and 
empirical science, which makes use of it – as a place where classical logic 
is not only present but crucial. To be sure, such entrenchment would itself 
arguably be contingent. The advent of approaches like universal logic,301 
which attempt to provide an abstract analysis of the relation between logics, 
may have changed the landscape. It became possible to look at the plurality 
of logics not aiming to select one but rather to compare and contrast them. 
Plurality itself became a topic – the different ways in which logical systems 
relate to each other. It is no longer a challenge, but rather a starting point.
To look at galaxies is a way to bring this attention to logical plurality 
to collections of possible worlds. In other words, it is a way to consider 
plurality as a starting point for metaphysical consideration: in different 
logical systems, different things are contingent (or necessary, or impossible). 
There is, therefore, no contingency that spans all galaxies (as the case of 
any logic’s antilogic makes clear) – that something is contingent must be 
indexed as necessary within a galaxy (true in all worlds within that galaxy). 
Hence, an atomic proposition p is contingent in the galaxy of classical logic, 
and this is necessary within the galaxy (assuming that at least some logical 
truths are necessary). However, considered from the point of view of the 
plurality of galaxies, it is only contingently contingent. Any local judgment 
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of contingency is immanent to a galaxy: nothing is contingent with respect 
to anything else while anything is contingent in some galaxy. Still, there is 
something to be said about contingency in the framework of a topology of 
galaxies. Even though there can be no theorem in common between a logic 
and its antilogic, a galaxy of a logic and a galaxy of its antilogic can intersect 
– there can be worlds in common to two galaxies associated to contradictory 
logics. This intersection is itself a galaxy and has a logic associated with it. 
Even without developing this further here, it is easy to see how the interplay 
of relative contingencies can be illuminated by a focus on galaxies.
The negative lesson to be drawn from such focus is that the standard 
possible-world approach is insufficient to deal with contingency. It says 
nothing about the galaxy where the relevant possible worlds are placed – and 
nothing about the kaleidoscope of matrices of fixity and changeability that 
is attached to a particular logic. As an approach, it is guilty of attempting 
to shortcut metaphysical issues concerning contingency and necessity by 
an underlying appeal to a single logic – it makes a particular logic prior to 
all (modal) metaphysical considerations. While logical truth can provide no 
more than a local account of what is necessary, what is contingent within 
a galaxy reflects little about the interplay of different positions in the space 
of logics. It is in such space – the space of different logics that can be 
investigated through a topology of galaxies – that the contrast between what 
is contingent and what is not can be contemplated. To focus on a single 
galaxy is to take for granted, metaphysically, the import of a particular logic 
in determining how these differences articulate. Contingency is not only 
something that emerges from the plurality of worlds, but also something that 
can only be appreciated from the plurality of galaxies.
The framework of possible worlds without galaxy considerations is 
hostage to the idea that necessity draws the borders of what is up for grabs 
– and is in this sense prior. It is hard to overestimate the impact of the 
idea that the fixed comes first and provides the cartography for all the rest. 
The appeal to logical truth often comes with the assumption that logic is 
expected to offer the preliminary navigation map – and therefore is to be 
seen as prior to all experience. (Notice that something similar happens to 
the appeal to natural necessity, or even sufficient reason: what is law-like 
is expected to provide the general lines to be filled in by what can be one 
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way or another.) This is how the borders of matters of fact are drawn – the 
sensible is demarcated by the primary colors of necessity. The focus on the 
plurality of galaxies, by contrast, makes explicit how the sensible – where 
accident is central – has many maps and is relative to what is held as locally 
fixed. There is no such thing as the sensible as a domain; rather, the term 
names something that is spread through different but topologically related 
galaxies. What is up for grabs is spread, with its many faces, throughout the 
interstices (and intersections) between those galaxies. 
Contingent knowledge and the reality of the plural
The widespread occurrence of what is up for grabs – in what seems to be 
the sensible – points in many ways to plurality. It is possible to present this 
connection by seeing what is up for grabs as marks of the metaphysically 
plural. The furniture of the universe, if it makes sense to use such an 
expression, cannot be appreciated as a single landscape – it is rather like 
looking at many things at once, like in a Jastrow illusion, and this is why 
it requires multiple ontoscopies. What is up for grabs points toward the 
plural, toward a plot of separators. In a world of irreducible contingency, 
there should be more than one script, more than one order, more than one 
governing power. This is why the worlds in the intersection of galaxies can 
reveal something about the limits of necessity – about an-arché. Up for grabs 
and also, in a sense, up in the air and out of the blue. It lies wherever there is 
an irreconcilable diaphonia, an unredeemable variety of modes of existence, 
or a common space where there are genuine encounters with what comes 
from a different direction.
In order to deal with the plurality akin to contingency, I have introduced 
three ontoscopies.  The idea in each case is to show that, because not 
everything is up for grabs and sumbebeka prota ton onton, there is a 
structure around contingency either making it possible or following from it. 
Each ontoscopy is a way to view contingency – it can be described as point 
of view about what is up for grabs. It is interesting to pursue this line for a 
moment now that we are coming towards the close of the book. We can then 
find, at least, three points of view: that of the agents, that of the resulting 
action and a transversal point of view where the effects of agents on actions 
are considered in a pair with the effects of actions on agents. These three 
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points of view correspond to the three ontoscopies: the monadology of 
fragments, the ontology of doubts and the rhythm-oriented metaphysics. It 
is clear that contingency is transcendent if we take the second point of view, 
but not the others – as the resulting action will involve indeterminacies no 
matter what the agents engage in doing. If we see the ontoscopies along 
these lines, we can associate them to the three different modes of existence 
that the monadology of fragments, the first ontoscopy, affords. The first 
point of view is that of composers – of agents performing their action. The 
second of compositions – the resulting doubtful output of all agents. The 
third of fragments as they are simultaneously available to composers and 
part in a composition. Modes of existence are not ontoscopies, yet each one 
arguably entail a point of view. If this is so, the first ontoscopy, postulating 
three modes of existence, prefigures the overall picture.
The book has argued for the centrality of contingency in the world. 
Before concluding, it is interesting to examine briefly where we stand 
concerning the Aristotelian predicament that there could be no knowledge 
of the accidental. Knowledge could seem to have a family resemblance 
with substantiality, and if so it would not thrive if what is up for grabs 
enjoys primacy. There are, however, a variety of other ways to think 
about knowledge that would make it situated and more akin to alliance 
building than to achieving a view from nowhere. To be sure, as I said in the 
beginning, science and philosophy of the last few centuries have developed 
resources to deal with what is not necessary where the paradigms ranges 
from historical approaches in biology and geology to the stochastic studies. 
This book proposes three ontoscopies where what is up for grabs is shown 
as central but not as the unique prior reality. In these three cases, something 
can be said about how knowledge can be gained.
In a monadology of fragments, knowledge of each monad and its 
composition process leads up to the contingency of the agglomeration: 
global contingency is appreciated by looking at the trajectories of each 
composition process. Knowledge itself comes in fragments, as we do when 
we focus on Ceteris Paribus devices. Contingency is built from the very 
assemblage of non-concerted monads, but some knowledge can be gained 
when we look at some of them and find ways to isolate them from the 
rest. But we also know that groupings of monads are not isolated, and that 
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they are subject to interference. The plurality of fragments points toward 
the situated character of knowledge. In an ontology of doubt, we can get 
to know indeterminacies through the process of epokhé: through bringing 
conviction into question. It is a know-how – to know how to doubt – that 
is crucial in knowing contingencies, a know-how to which the sceptical 
tradition has largely contributed. Knowledge is, for instance, the application 
of the modes of Aenesidemus and Agrippa – the application of a technology 
to doubt, which means a strategy to discover indeterminacies and to spot 
diaphonia. Knowing doubts is to know the plurality of ways. Finally, in a 
rhythm-oriented ontology, and in its associated speculative dermatology, it is 
through rhythms that pass through us that we access the contingencies that 
entrain us. The acquired knowledge comes in the form of the entrainment 
that what goes on produces on us: habituation – the acquisition of a habit 
due to a rhythm of events that has been presented to us. In this last case, 
knowledge of the non-necessary is also not propositional knowledge, but 
rather it is like being tuned to a plurality of soundscapes that, like in the 
first case, erodes necessity by its very plurality. Knowledge is tuning in to a 
plurality. In all these cases, accidents can be thought through and, at least to 
some extent, they can be known.
Looking at what is up for grabs, we can also gain intuition about 
necessity and how it relates to contingency. We can understand that the 
relation is one where one is the plural of the other; namely, contingency is 
the plural of necessity. Or rather, contingency emerges from the plurality 
of necessities. Whenever there is genuinely more than one necessity – 
and not an ultimate overarching necessity ruling over all others – there 
is contingency. If we have, say, an irreducible physical necessity and an 
irreducible psychological necessity, there is a grey area of intersection  
between these necessities. Physical laws and psychological laws are such 
that they have to interact somewhere. Analogously, if there is more than one 
government, there is an an-arché area between them. The monadology of 
fragments sees contingency in the plurality of non-orchestrated composers. 
The ontology of doubts places it in the insufficiency of determination – a 
necessity that doesn’t carry enough strength to rule. Rhythm-oriented 
ontology would find it in the multiple co-existing entrainments that events 
to which events are subject. The corridor, or the plane, where these different 
necessities intersect is out of the scope of any of them, it is under the scope 
of no necessity – before the commencement and before the command. 
Because it has to do with Rilke’s Open, it has to do with the in-between – 
with an alley where things are unfixed. This is the space of what is mise en 
jeu, of what is up in the air – and up for grabs. 
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followed by their number (1-3) and then followed by an indication of the refer-
enced section, by letters or numbers. 
86. Cf. 2008: 97.
87. Op. Cit.: 94.
88. Souriau (2009: 114-129) explores things and phenomena as two (specific) modes 
of existence. 
89. Cf. Met. Λ, 6, 1071b. 5.
90. Cf. 1985: 111. 
91. Cf. Met. M, 3. 
92. See Met. Δ, 2.
93. Cf. Routley 1980, Priest 2005.
94. Cf. Harman 2010: 11.
95. Cf. 1986.
96. Cf. KrV B 625-630.
97. Cf. 1905.
98. Cf. 1948/9. 
99. Cf., for example, Zimmerman 1998 for a review. 
100. Examples from Quine 1948/9.
101. This has to do with why Aristotle thought that ousia protai to onton or why Kant 
(P, note 24) insists on the importance of a putative fix holder for passing predica-
tions. One way to see how contingent predicates seem more acceptable is to con-
sider the anomalous predicates considered by Goodman (1983). “Grue,” as much 
as “green,” is a predicate that we can contingently ascribe to emeralds, for we 
depend on an induction to project our current observations onto the future. It is 
not evident why we prefer “green” to “grue.” Goodman, however, doesn’t consider 
a predicate like, say, “dexist” for something that exists before, say, tomorrow, and 
doesn’t exist thereafter. It seems that the permanence (and the non-contingency) 
of what exists is more often taken for granted.
102. Cf. 2013. 
103. Cf. 2013: 2.
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104. Cf. Op. Cit.: 8.4.
105. Cf. 2013: 7. 
106. See 2013: cap. 2. Williamson believes the development of a metaphysics goes hand 
in hand with the development of logical tools. “In each case,” he writes, “a deviant 
metaphysics corresponds to a deviant logic.” And he proceeds, “[a]ny logical prin-
ciple has persuasive force in some dialectical contexts and not in others” (2013: 
146). His main arguments for necessitism rely on enabling modal logic to have 
more inferential power without having to appeal to free logic or other resources 
that he takes to be deviant. But he sees logic and metaphysics as intertwined, and 
he rejects the view that logic is a neutral arbiter of metaphysical disputes. 
107. Cf. Op. Cit. 1.6. 
108. Cf. 1975: 722-3. 
109. Cf. 1987, Plateau 10. 
110. Lucretius (RN),  Book II, sections 216-224. 
111. Cf. Souriau 2009, Latour 2013. 
112. Cf. 2009: 165-194.
113. Peter Handke, in his Essay on Tiredness (1994), speaks of the heartlessness of his 
attempt to content himself with investigating the images that a problem engenders 
and translating it as heartlessly as possible into language with all its twists and 
turns and overtones. He plays down contrast – an image created by a story-teller is 
not to be contrasted with any other before being fully appreciated. Telling a story 
is to avoid attention to be drawn to anything but the intensity of the image being 
drawn. It should play on affirmations. Negation, in storytelling, is not a non-pic-
ture, is another picture with specific details to it.
114. 114       Cf. 2013.
115. Cf. 2005: §7, §19, §25, §34.
116. Cf. 2013.
117. Cf. 2010. 
118. Cf. 1957: 56. 
119. Anarcheology is not a dictionary word. It has been used sporadically. The primary 
uses of the term here will be related to Bensusan et al. 2012. 
120. Cf. 1987. 
121. Cf. 1995.
122. Cf. 2013: 47-51.
123. In a class about the notion of anarcheology he invited me to give in his course of 
“Arabe pour les philosophes” in 2011 at the University of Paris 8.
124. See fragments 177b*, 286 and 286a* in the an-archeology below, Anarcheology 
2/277b*, 2/286 and 2/286a*. Digging tunnels is another (perhaps xenoarcheologi-
cal) way to deal with archés: use them for architecture.
125. Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BDBcKW72Oc
126. Cf. 2005. 
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127. Cf. 1977.
128. Moore’s poem “Poetry” has many versions itself since its first appearance in 1919. 
In more recent versions, the words above don’t appear. For the original version of 
the poem cf. Kreymborg (1920) 
129. Cf. 1988. Although Irréductions is the second part of the book, it somehow stands 
alone, or so I thought when I photocopied only this second part and bound it for 
my trip to Ethiopia.
130. A sauce served with injera, Ethiopian flat bread. 
131. The Ethiopian term both for the European and for white people in general.
132. This refers to the great soul of the world, in the Zulu tradition. It is sometimes 
compared to the Christian God. 
133. Nenaunir is an enchanted serpent. Its priests are called Mungos. 
134. Cf. Bensusan et al. 2012. 
135. See Sahagún 2013.
136. See Léon-Portilla 2002.
137. See Léon-Portilla 2006.
138. See, for example, Sahagún 2006. 
139. Sacred place, sacred mountain – like Coatepec for the Mexicas. 
140. The sacred word.
141. The burning of Nanahuatzin is the event that marks the rise of the Fifth Sun.
142. 142       Cf. Leibniz´s Dm, LAC and Mon.
143. Couturat’s interpretation of Leibniz’s system (Couturat 1901) renewed interest 
in Leibniz in the early twentieth century. He claimed to have found in Leibniz’s 
unpublished materials elements of a doctrine that contrasted with most of what 
was commonly ascribed to Leibniz. More recent research has found the distance 
between the published and the unpublished doctrines to be smaller (see, for ex-
ample, Deleuze 1992, Wilson 1999). 
144.          In fact, Leibniz is adamant his system is a combination of determination and 
contingency. Replying to Pierre Bayle’s suspicions which were similar to those 
raised by Arnauld, Leibniz attempts to make a clear distinction between necessity 
and determinacy in the Theodicy (Theo). He takes anything to be contingent if 
its negation is not a contradiction. Leibniz holds that whatever takes place in the 
world was chosen together with the wisest possible choice of a best possible world. 
This choice was made based on a simulation in God’s head of the possible interac-
tion of all monads. Once the world is chosen, whatever happens (including God’s 
miracles) is determined. Yet, everything is contingent. It is clear that contingency 
has nothing to do with indifference or with what is random. Leibniz (cf. Theo 
303-324) clearly distances himself of the idea of a random sway of the determined 
orbits that would constitute the Epicurist clinamina. Every act is determined by 
the nature of the substances involved which were chosen as part of the chosen 
world. Contingency requires no momentary lapse of connection with the rest of 
the world.  
145. See footnote to section Turning ontologically towards contingency in chapter 1. 
216 Notes
146. Cf. PP 51-54. 
147. Leibniz has slightly different systems of substances in different texts. For simplic-
ity here, I will consider monads as simple substances, like it seems to be the case 
in the Monadology (Mon). 
148.  Cf. Mon. 65-67. 
149.  See Three speculative accounts of contingency in chapter 1 above.
150.   Cf. Op. Cit. section 71.
151.  Cf. Schaffer (2010a) and Bohn (2009). 
152. In previous presentations, they occupy the space of a point, that is, a dimension-
less space. 
153. I won’t go into the discussion about materialism here, but matter itself is un-
derstood in many different ways, and whether it is active or merely passive is a 
relevant discussion. As for the role of matter in processes of ontogenesis, it is 
interesting to consider the Naturphilosophie tradition – as in Hamilton Grant 
(2006). Rosi Braidotti (2012) made suggestive approximations between “matter” 
and “mother.”
154. Cf DE AA VI, 3, 588.
155. Cf. Schaffer (2010a) for the distinction. Schaffer himself considers Leibniz to be a 
priority pluralist. 
156. Cf., for example, Tarde (1999), Whitehead (1985) and Latour (1988).
157. Cf. 1988 1.1.7, 1.1.8 and 1.5.1.
158. Cf .Deleuze (1992) for an analysis of Leibniz’s monadology in terms of a baroque 
concerto grosso. 
159. Cf. 1988 1.1.2, 1.1.4, 1.3.2 and 1.3.5.
160. Or as examples of what Meillassoux (2008) labeled metaphysics of subjectivity. 
161. See chapter 1 above, Three speculative accounts of contingency. 
162. Cf. 1985: 19.
163. Cf. 1988 1.1.9, 1.2.1, 1.1.14.1, 1.2.5.1 and 1.2.6.
164. Cf. 1985: 28-20. Whitehead builds some of his categories of explanation in terms 
of prehensions (perceptions and “negative perceptions” or perceptions of what is 
something’s absence) such that the rejection of vacuous actuality is  central. The 
notion of vacuous actuality, he remarks, is close to that of “inherence of quality in 
substance”. In other words, what is inherent to an actual entity is its connections 
with others through prehensions. 
165. Cf. 1988 1.1.5.3.
166. Cf. 1988 1.2.3.
167. Cf. 1985: 60.
168. Cf. Nagel 1999. A translation: I think therefore I know.
169. I am therefore I know.
170. Compare with Heraclitus, fragment 210, Anarcheology 2/210.
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171. Cf. 1988 1.2.3.1.
172. Cf. 2013: 417. 
173. Cf. 1992. 
174.  1985: 19. 
175. Cf. 1985: 23.
176.     Cf. 1988: 2.4.7.
177. Cf. 1988: 1.2.2.
178. In Whitehead God Himself is open to the improvement and this can be achieved 
by worldly deeds. God, and not only the world, is therefore conceived as up for 
grabs. 
179. Cf. Mumford (2004), Mumford & Anjun (2011).
180. Cf. Molnar (2003).
181. Cf. Ellis 2002).
182. Cf. Bird (2007).
183. Cf. Harman (2009: 112-116). 
184. Cf. 2010, 2010a.
185. Cf. 2010: 348-351. 
186. Cf., for example, Quine (1951) and Davidson (1974, 1983). 
187. Cf. 1983, 1991, 1991a.
188. For an exploration of epistemological holism, see Bensusan & Pinedo (2014a).
189. Cf. 1984, 1994. 
190.  I won’t go into this at length here, but see Bensusan and Pinedo (2014a) or 
Ramberg (1991) for a more thorough presentation.
191. Cf. Borgoni & Palomo (2006). 
192. Cf. 2010. 
193. Cf. 2013.
194. See 2010, ch. 1; but also 2009: 107ff., 143ff., 169ff.
195. Cf. 2010: 81.
196. Cf. 1995, 2005.
197. Cf. 2010: 16.
198. 1995: 157, my translation. Original text: […] il faudrait supposer que la science ne 
sera jamais achevée, parce que cette science est une relation entre des êtres qui ont 
par définition le même degré d’organisation : un système matériel et un être vivant 
organisé qui essaie de penser ce système au moyen de la science. […] la relation 
entre la pensée et le réel devient relation entre deux réels organisés qui peuvent 
être analogiquement liés par leur structure interne.
199. Cf. 1988: 1.2.3.
200. Cf. 2009: 113-4. 
218 Notes
201. Cf. 2009a.
202. The cathedral of Santo Domingo was built from 1559 onwards over the founda-
tions of a Wiracocha palace, the Kirswarkancha. Most of the stones of the cathe-
dral walls were taken out of the Saqsaywaman building, a strong construction that 
probably had been used for defensive purposes.
203. Cf. 1960.
204. The comparison of metaphysical composition and language composition is per-
haps a chapter of an effort to draw metaphysical lessons from what was achieved 
in the linguistic turn. Manuel de Pinedo and I (in a talk presented in the 2009 
Nottingham Conference on the Metaphysics of Science) called this effort “a 
linguistic turn of 360 degrees.” There, we focused mainly on a metaphysical read-
ing of Wittgenstein’s Investigations (2009), in particular the idea of predicates as 
only definable through family resemblance, and on contextualist semantics for 
demonstratives and dispositional predicates. We argued that we can use some of 
the insights of the philosophers of language working in these areas to introduce 
the idea that properties are themselves both dependent on family resemblance and 
context-sensitive. 
205. Cf. 1999: 173.
206. Cf. Latour (1988a).
207. Cf. 1985: 39-40.
208. Cf. Fine 2005a and McTaggart 1908. 
209. See, for example, Markosian (2004), Sider (2003). 
210. For a more detailed exploration of the relation between reality and perspectives, 
see my article “The cubist object,” Bensusan (2011). 
211. It is interesting also to compare this monadology, with its existential trialism, with 
Markus Gabriel’s ontology of fields of sense (see Gabriel 2014). 
212. See Anarcheology 2/212 and 2/214.
213. Cf. 2010: 117 ff.
214. Cf. 2010: 119. 
215. Cf. 2004. 
216. Cf. 1983. 
217. The attraction force of the virtual – which is different from the possible in that it 
is never actualized – is important for Deleuzian realism about the non-actual. For 
a good analysis of attractors as virtuality, within the scope of Deleuze’s ontology, 
see Delanda 2002: 41-59. 
218. Cf. Deleuze & Guattari (1987) and Garcia (2011).
219. Cf. Bataille (1945).
220. Cf. 1992.
221. Cf. 1995: 178-179. 
222. Cf. 1982: 29, my translation. Original text: .on ne peut pas interroger que le pou-
voir, le non-pouvoir est la question même.
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223. For recent accounts of truth as identity see, for example, Hornsby 1997, David 
2001. Wittgenstein points at this continuity between the contents of facts and the 
contents of thoughts on several occasions. In the Investigations (2009), section 
95, he says that our thought can be such that it doesn’t “stop anywhere short of 
the fact.” John McDowell (1994) has explored this to set the stage for his version 
of an identity theory of truth.
224.  Cf. for example, Pritchard (2005).
225.  Cf. 1995.
226.  Cf. 1963.
227.  There is much discussion of the connection between beliefs and holding some-
thing to be true. The most interesting ones revolve around what is called the 
paradox, introduced by Wittgenstein (2009a, 10). The paradox arises when some-
one asserts both that “p” and that “I currently believe that not-p” or variations 
thereof. 
228. Cf. PH.
229. Cf. 2009: 351-352.
230. Cf. McDowell 1994.
231. Cf. PH, I, 210-12.
232. Cf .Polito (2004). 
233. Cf. Conche (1994) and Bett (2000).
234. Cf. Conche (1994: 60).
235. Cf. Conche (1994: 225).
236. It seems that Wittgenstein himself ascribed to the issue a measure of indetermina-
tion; see his Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics (1978, section VII-41). 
For discussion, cf. McDowell 1984, Bensusan 2007, Bensusan & Pinedo 2014.
237. Cf. Heidegger & Fink (1979).
238. Cf. 2008.
239. Cf. Wittgenstein 1969 and Davidson 1974, 1983, 1991. 
240. Cf. 1969.
241. This is Frede’s (1997) reading of Sextus – he understands Sextus as an urban 
skeptic who appreciated the need for sharing some contents with people in his 
community while not entertaining any beliefs. This is why, apart from suspension 
of judgment, the urban skeptic would also recommend that some contents are ac-
cepted but not believed (that is, not held as true). 
242. Cf. for example, Pritchard (2012).
243. Cf. for example, Martin (2002).
244. Cf. 2006.
245.  Cf, new fragment 131, Anarch. 2/131.
246. The metaphysics of some is the ontological correlate of a holistic epistemology 
sketched by Davidson and developed further in Bensusan & Pinedo (2014a). 
220 Notes
247.  The qualifications account for the difference between the first two and the last 
formulation of the ontology of doubts. The last formulation is noncommittal about 
whether doubts are in the world – as it is noncommittal about whether there are 
only determinations in the world.
248. Cf. 1992.
249. For further discussion on the ontology of antennas, see Borges & Bensusan 
(2013). 
250. Cf. 1995: 70-82.
251. Recapitulation was a popular idea at the origins of the theories about the evolution 
of species (see Oken, St.-Hilaire, Buffon and also Schelling). One of the prevailing 
marks of recapitulation is Haeckel’s thesis, according to which ontogeny recapitu-
lates phylogeny: the phases of development of an embryo repeat those of its spe-
cies. Deleuze (especially with Guattari in 1987) draws on recapitulation to sketch 
the idea of a geological epidemiology. A rhythm-oriented ontology also draws on 
the idea that recapitulation has no borders. 
252. Lucretius’s clinamina, RN, Book II, sections 216-224. 
253. Cf. 1980, see also chapter 1 above. 
254. Cf. 2002.
255. Cf. Op. Cit. 94. 
256. Cf. Phy. VI, 6, p. 238. 
257. Cf. 1969.
258. Cf. 1967.
259. Consider time without change as in the Shoemaker thought experiments (1993).
260. Cf. 1973.
261. Cf. 1991.
262. Tropes are abstract particulars, not located in space or time but not universal like 
properties; examples of tropes are: this white, the red of this bottle of wine, etc. 
See Campbell (1990)
263. In order to show how our notions of objectivity are spatial and ultimately visual, 
Strawson (1959) presents a being whose experience is wholly auditory. Such 
being’s navigation has to be guided by elements that have nothing to do with he 
inner and the outer – or the deeper and the apparent (see Evans 1985). 
264. See chapter 1, Fragments, compositions and composers: a monadology
265. An issue that emerges here is the complexity of an entraining rhythm. A rhythm 
can always be viewed as a sequence of beats and intervals, but beats are them-
selves rhythmic. One approach to the issue is to start with the minimum sequence 
that can provide the rhythm and take this sequence to measure its complexity (as 
it is done to consider the Kolmogorov-complexity of something; see, for example, 
Li and Vitanyi 1993). Such an approach, nonetheless, cannot do much more than 
measure the complexity of a rhythm as it is heard – as it entrains something else. 
The matryoshka character of each beat makes it feature a specific complexity.
266. Cf. 1995, 2005.
267. Cf. KrV B 75.
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268. Cf. 1999. McDowell has recently distanced himself from this formulation. 
269. Cf. 2009.
270. Some readers of Wittgenstein, influenced by Sellars (like Brandom and 
McDowell), seem to espouse the idea that without a language – and the concepts 
that come with it – there would be nothing to be said. That is, content depends on 
language. Within a rhythm-oriented perspective, conceptual content appears in 
a broader context. It is, to be sure, one of the many rhythmic signals that is to be 
transductively exploited. 
271. Cf. Bensusan (2008).
272. Cf. 1931.
273. At Martin-Gropius-Bau, in Berlin, 2014.
274. See section Three anarcheologies in chapter 2.
275. Cf. 1978: 378.
276. Cf. 1986.
277. Harman distinguishes the attempts to deconstruct objects from below, through 
their components, matter or elementary particles, and attempts to deconstruct 
them from above, through sensory qualities, impressions or aggregates. He de-
scribes the former as strategies to undermine objects and the latter as overmining 
them. 
278. Cf. 1887.
279. Cf. 1797.
280. Cf. 1962.
281. Cf. 2014.
282. Cf. 1979.
283. Cf. 1980, plateau 3. 
284. Cf. Op. Cit: 65-6.
285. It is remarkable how close the early part of this Plateau is close to some of the 
central tenets of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis. For him too, there is no interior 
or exterior of life understood as a separating border. Gaia is alive because it is 
infected from being the environment of many forms of life. 
286. It is interesting to compare the double articulation as the surface of animation 
with the recent work of Elizabeth Povinelli that tries to go beyond what she calls 
the carbon imaginary of life (2014).
287. Harman (2014) compares Whitehead (and Latour) on the one hand and Deleuze 
(and Simondon) on the other placing the former in school X and the latter 
in school Y. The difference between these two schools of process philosophy 
envisaged by Harman is that in school X, but not in school Y, the emphasis is 
on individual entities and not on becomings. One could then say that while the 
monadology of fragments is in school X, rhythm-oriented ontology is in school Y. 
(Simondon’s partial monadologies would be clearly in Y.)
288. Cf. Deleuze & Parnet 1987: I, 1. 
222 Notes
289. Compare with verses 17-38 of the first part of the Sahagún Colloquia above 
(Anarcheology 3/VI-1016-17 to 38).
290. Cf. 2005.
291. Cf. 2008.
292. Cf. 1989: 22.
293. Rorty’s image of metaphysics seems to be related to necessary connections. To 
place something in the realm of sheer contingency, as he intends to do with the 
world and with language and mind, is to place it outside the scope of any meta-
physics. Contingency, for him, is the antidote to metaphysics. This is the limit of 
the convergence between this book and Rorty’s endeavors. 
294. Cf. 2013: Introduction.
295. Cf. 1972: 135.
296. Cf. 1972: 135-6.
297. Cf. 1986. 
298. Cf. Bensusan & Costa Leite (2012).
299. See Blanché (1966) for an initial analysis of the geometry of opposition. In the 
triangle formed by a logic, its antilogic and its counterlogic, two sides express 
relations of contradiction and contrariety, and the third expresses subalternity 
(provided that some restrictions to the original logic apply). 
300. Most of our results up till recently are in Bensusan, Costa-Leite & Souza (2015). 
The study of galaxies has been primarily carried out with my colleague Alexandre 
Costa-Leite. He himself has worked on how contingency interact with epistemic 
operators (Costa-Leite 2006). We have also developed a way to think about 
contradictions in the world in terms of galaxies (Bensusan & Costa-Leite 2013). 
Recently we are developing a general approach to universal logic based on the 
framework of galaxies (and other sets of possible worlds). See Trafford (2014) for 
a somewhat similar research.  
301. Cf. Béziau (2005).
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OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
This is a book about what ain’t necessarily 
so. It is about how we can grasp, assimilate 
or come to terms with what could have 
been otherwise – or might not be at all. The 
book’s main contention is that contingency 
is what we should primarily look at in order 
to ultimately come to terms with the sensible 
or the concrete. In other words, metaphysics 
should fi rst engage with the contingent. A 
metaphysics of contingency needs to create 
its own images, for otherwise it will be prey 
to images already spread and that often 
obliterate the accidental as what merely 
contrasts with what is necessary. Images 
invoke tonalities. Thinking about the world 
always engages tonalities – and some of 
them are metaphysically fruitful.
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